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Ridicule, Emotion, and Community in Ancient Rome

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Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

December 2015

Dedication

for Kyle and William

cum gratiis et amore

Acknowledgements

For their guidance and assistance during my graduate studies and the writing process, I thank my supervisor, Andrew Riggsby, and my committee members, Deborah Beck, Jen Ebbeler, Ayelet Haimson Lushkov, and Tim Moore. I am glad to have had the support of Theresa Vasquez throughout my graduate career, and to have made wonderful friends like Ann and Stephanie and the rest of the Texas Ten.

My deepest appreciation goes to my family for their unwavering support. Thank you to Mom and Katy for listening and telling me it will all be okay. Thank you to Kyle for being a brilliant partner and making this possible. I truly couldn't have done this without you. Thank you to William for making it worth it. I love you all.

Ridicule, Emotion, and Community in Ancient Rome

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2015

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This dissertation examines the effects of ridicule on emotions and communities in Latin literature. Ridicule has a social function of marking objectionable behavior and reinforcing acceptable behavior, since individuals seek to avoid ridicule by acting in a manner that has been deemed appropriate by their community. Errors in judgment of the power relationship between two parties can also provide opportunities for ridicule, since an individual who esteems himself too highly is brought down by the ridicule of his peers because of that prideful over-estimation (*superbia*). Ridicule evokes an emotional response known as the "shame state," or a cluster of emotions, including shame, humiliation, and embarrassment. By emphasizing the values and emotions privileged by groups of people, or "emotional communities," I focus on these social functions of ridicule, and I explore the ways that an emotional community responds to ridicule.

In the introduction, I contextualize my study in the scholarship on ridicule, emotion, and emotional communities. I discuss the function of pride and ridicule in ancient Rome, and I provide an analysis of the Latin words for laughter and ridicule. The body of this dissertation is divided in two, with concentrations on ridicule *domi militiaeque,* or at home and abroad. The first chapter focuses on the Roman army as an emotional community. I offer an overview of evidence for this *militiae* emotional community, and I review in detail some examples of the army experiencing ridicule from

Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita,* Vergil's *Aeneid,* and Tacitus' *Annales*. I demonstrate that the Roman preference for victory narratives encourages an exaggeration of the Roman army's shame state in response to ridicule, in order to allow for a more impressive recovery and eventual triumph. The second body chapter explores the *domi* emotional community of elite civic leaders in the Republican period. I use Cicero's *In Verrem* to show that members of this community perform their membership by participating in legal and political matters. I argue that Cicero presents himself as the embodiment of the emotional ideals of the community, and that he attacks his opponents for their failure to live up to those standards.

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Introduction

According to one version of the story, Romulus, the founder of Rome, killed his brother Remus because he had mocked the low walls of the nascent Rome by jumping over them.[1]

> Volgatior fama est ludibrio fratris Remum novos transiluisse muros; inde ab irato Romulo, cum verbis quoque increpitans adiecisset, "Sic deinde, quicumque alius transiliet moenia mea," interfectum. Ita solus potitus imperio Romulus; condita urbs conditoris nomine appellata. Livy 1.7

> The commoner story is that Remus jumped over the new walls in mockery of his brother, and so was killed by an angry Romulus, who added these words also in chiding him, "And thus from now on for anyone else who jumps over my walls!" Romulus thus became sole ruler, and the city was named after its founder.[2]

When Livy tells this popular story (*volgatior fama*), he uses the word *ludibrium* to describe Remus' intentions. By laughingly jumping over the wall, Remus demeans his brother by belittling the walls of his new city; Romulus asserts his dominance by immediately and angrily (*irato*) silencing his brother with scornful comments (*increpitans*) of his own. Romulus refused to allow his brother's ridicule to challenge his authority, so he responded with more mockery and more violence in order to reassert his position of power.

Ovid rehabilitates Romulus' temper in the *Fasti* by giving the deathblow to one of Romulus' deputies, and giving Romulus the opportunity to mourn his brother. Still, Remus is credited with mocking (*contemnere*) the low walls.

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[1] See Wiseman 1995 for a full discussion of the foundation myth of Rome and the accounts of Romulus and Remus.

[2] All translations are my own.

quod Remus ignorans humiles contemnere muros
coepit, et 'his populus' dicere 'tutus erit?'
nec mora, transiluit: rutro Celer occupat ausum;
ille premit duram sanguinulentus humum.
haec ubi rex didicit, lacrimas introrsus obortas
devorat et clausum pectore volnus habet.
flere palam non volt exemplaque fortia servat,
'sic' que 'meos muros transeat hostis' ait. *Fasti* 841- 848

But Remus, unaware, began to mock the low walls
And said, "Will the people be safe with these?"
And he hopped over without delay. Celer attacked the bold man with a shovel;
Remus, bloody, hit the hard ground.
When the king learned these things, he swallowed deep his shed tears
And held his pain shut in his heart.
He did not want to weep openly and wanted to serve as an example of strength,
And said, "May every enemy who crosses my walls die thus."

As part of Ovid's sympathetic depiction of Romulus, he includes the emotional reaction to his brother's death. Romulus has to swallow his tears (*lacrimas introrsus obortas/ devorat,* 845- 6; *flere palam non volt,* 847) and buries his pain deep down (*clausum pectore volnus habet,* 846), so that his grief is not apparent. He models bravery (*exemplaque fortia servat,* 847) for his men, remaining steadfast and consistent in his orders.

This dissertation is about the intersection of emotion, ridicule, and community in ancient Rome. As these two passages have shown, ridicule has a way of exposing the boundaries of behavior for a group. The way a group responds (or not, as the case may be) to ridicule shows us their priorities and preferences. In the chapters that follow, I will explore the ways that ridicule works in Latin literature, with a particular emphasis on understanding how ridicule elicits an emotional reaction in a group or community of

people. Before I turn to case studies of ridicule and emotion in the communities of Romans, let me first establish the terms and positions of this analysis.

EMOTIONS

There is still no one definition of "emotion" agreed upon by scholars of emotions. There does not appear to be a universal concept of emotion,[3] and emotions are not classified the same way in different languages. The English term "emotion" came about as part of the growing interest in the study of the sciences in the nineteenth century;[4] before then, terms like "passions" or "affections" or "sentiments" were used.[5] Ancient Greeks and Romans argued about the definitions, too. Aristotle, in the *Nichomachaean Ethics* and in the *Rhetoric*, puts forth a cognitive theory of emotions, connecting emotions with thoughts.[6] Emotions are therefore judgments that can be determined to be true or false. In the *Tusculan Disputations,* Cicero, after considering Peripatetic and Epicurean models of emotion, promotes the Stoic view of emotions as representations of a diseased mind (*aegritudo*).[7] As Cicero argues, emotions represent a choice or a

3 See Grima 1992 on the universality of emotion; through her own work on Paxtun women and performance of despondency, she demonstrates that there is no word that maps accurately onto the English "emotion."

4 See Dixon 2003 for an in-depth exploration of the study of emotions in the nineteenth century.

5 Rosenwein 2006: 3.

6 "Emotions are the things that cause men to change their minds concerning their judgments, and are accompanied by pain and pleasure: for example, anger, pity, fear, and all similar such things and their opposites." (ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰςκρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία, *Rh.* 1378a8) Aristotle's focus on the effects of emotions on the thought process is related to his interest in analyzing poetry or political theory. For Aristotle on emotions, see Leighton 1982 and Fortenbaugh 2003.

7 See Graver 2009 on Cicero's outline of the emotions in *Tusculan Disputations.*

judgment to experience distress or upset at something outside one's control, so emotions should therefore be avoided by thoughtful leaders.[8]

Modern historians of emotion are in similar dispute over the proper definition of "emotion." Rosenwein acknowledges the term as "a convenience" for "affective reactions of all sorts, intensities, and durations.[9] Nussbaum has argued for an updated Stoic view, understanding emotions as thoughts that judge the value of external objects or ideas.[10]

This interpretation generally leaves out physical reactions as part of the requirement of an emotion, though it acknowledges that they may appear for some people.[11] Kaster avoids a direct definition, but makes it clear that he considers "emotion" to be a term for "affective experiences."[12] Cairns declines to define "emotion" at all, though he ascribes to the understanding that emotions are cognitive and involve some sort of evaluation.[13] Fulkerson acknowledges the complications of interpreting emotions as physiological and therefore universal, as well as strong cultural influences on which emotions are good or appropriate for a person to experience, especially in public, without being considered a social outcast or even insane.[14]

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8 Cicero argues, for instance, that because, Pompey's men, upon seeing him fall dead, were able to save themselves and flee danger before grieving for him, men must have control over whether to feel emotions (*…si igitur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest; voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem confitendum est*; *Tusc. Dis.* 3.66).

9 2006: 4- 5.

10 2001: 22- 30. As Wilson points out, the physiological responses to humor vary based on social context, and can even be faked (1979: 3ff).

11 *ibid*. 25; 56ff.

12 2005: 7.

13 1993: 5.

14 2013: 3- 5. See also Ekman 2003 on the universality of emotions: he argues for physiologically universal facial expressions of emotions, identifiable across cultures, and interprets that as evidence for universal experiences of emotion, as well.

There is some general agreement here: emotions are affective reactions, in that they are moods or feelings. I support Nussbaum's neo-Stoic approach to emotions as thoughts ("emotion-thoughts") and judgments of value.[15] If we combine these ideas, we can define an emotion as an affective reaction to a judgment of value: this is the definition of "emotion" used in this dissertation. By considering emotions as affections, we include the various synonyms (as Rosenwein allowed) of feeling and mood; by focusing on the evaluative properties of an emotion, we maintain its cognitive functions so that we can carefully consider how an emotion is constructed and shaped by the values someone attaches to other objects, persons, or ideas. In this way, we can understand strong emotions to be indications of significance and value: the stronger the attachment to an object, the stronger the emotional reaction to the judgment about that object. For example, Nussbaum's chief example is her grief at the death of her mother. She acknowledges that her mother had great value for her, and that her grief is the emotional reaction to an evaluation of the loss of that value.[16]

Now that we have defined "emotion" as an affective reaction to a judgment of value, we can consider how values, and therefore emotions, are influenced by membership in a particular group.

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15 The notion that emotions are elicited by evaluations of events or situations (e.g. a romantic relationship ends, and therefore a thing of value has been lost, and therefore a person feels sadness) is known as appraisal theory. This approach further assumes that each emotion is triggered by a distinct pattern of appraisal – the same situations causing the same appraisals evoking the same emotions in each person. This theory of emotion seems to me to be too rigid for the full texture of human emotion. See Roseman and Smith 2001 for a summary of appraisal theory, published at roughly the same time as Nussbaum's monumental tome on emotions as thoughts (and evaluations).

16 2001: 39ff.

EMOTIONAL COMMUNITIES

Because emotions are connected to evaluations of value, it is important to consider how objects come to receive that value. I suggest that we consider the socio-cultural norms that shape these values as a result of an "emotional community." According to Barbara Rosenwein, who coined the term, an emotional community is "a group of people animated by common or similar interests, values, and emotional styles and valuations."[17] An emotional community is a group in which people have common interests and shared goals – often a social community, like a town or a congregation or a political party, but just as possibly what Rosenwein calls a textual community, one "created and reinforced by ideologies, teachings, and common presuppositions."[18] A single person might therefore be in multiple emotional communities. Importantly, an emotional community contains a set of emotions and values, not just one or two; the pattern of emotions, felt in specific circumstances and by certain types of people, is what defines the emotional community. We can think of these emotional communities as snapshots of these circumstances, so that emotional communities can evolve as the sets of emotions and values do.

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[17] Rosenwein discusses emotional communities in Rosenwein 2002, 2006, 2009, and 2010, but she provides the more succinct definition quoted above in Plamper 2010: 253. Rosenwein reported being "still quite happy" (Plamper 2010: 252) with her full definition of "emotional community" from Rosenwein 2006: 35, that they are "precisely the same as social communities – families, neighborhoods, parliaments, guilds, monasteries, parish church memberships – but the researcher looking at them seeks above all to uncover systems of feeling: what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations that they make about others' emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect encourage, tolerate, and deplore."

[18] Rosenwein 2006: 25.

Rosenwein's term "emotional community" is deliberately named. Her term "emotional" recalls Reddy's term "emotive," which he uses to refer to the emotional expressions, gestures, and speech that can "perform" acts.[19] "Community" emphasizes the "social and relational nature of emotions."[20] Regularly occurring emotives become engrained to the point of automaticity in a community: only the most common emotional processes become subconscious cognitive habits.[21] These most frequent emotives become the most privileged emotives in a community, as others are repressed; the power in the community lies in these approved, habituated emotives.

Rosenwein herself presents an array of emotional communities, ranging from a community of one (Gregory the Great) to the emotional communities of three different towns in medieval France, represented through epitaphs experiencing variations of tenderness and excitement in their commemoration. Other historians have analyzed the emotional communities of late nineteenth and early twentieth century middle class white women who were anxious and frightened of the pain of childbirth,[22] or parents of young children in Georgian England who experienced parental love, anger, anxiety, grief, and more. There are as many possibilities of emotional communities as there are social communities, and a single person might inhabit several overlapping or intersecting emotional communities at once.

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19 Reddy 2001: 105.

20 Rosenwein 2006: 25.

21 Isen and Diamond 1989 first proposed the idea of emotives as automatic cognitive habits. Their hypothesis has been confirmed multiple times; see Reddy 2001: 17.

22 Wood 2014: 189.

In the accounts of Roman emotional communities that follow, I have termed the constellation of emotions that any one particular emotional community privileges (or minimizes) the "emotional apparatus." By this, I refer to the emotional experiences and personal values that an emotional community emphasizes, in addition to the emotions that it devalues and avoids, or neglects entirely. The emotional apparatus is a network of interrelated, inter-dependent emotions and values, so, as we will see, if one part of the apparatus is over-emphasized, the emotional community is thrown off-balance and becomes dysfunctional.

In her definitions of emotional communities, Rosenwein includes "what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them,"[23] and I want to be careful to emphasize the inclusion of common interests and values in the emotional apparatus of the community. The emotional apparatus contains more than just emotions. Since, as I have just described above, an emotion is connected to an evaluation of the value of an object, a community's strongest emotions are connected to what it considers most important. If, for example, an emotional community attaches a strong value to the quality of honesty, then the members of that emotional community will react very negatively when they judge that it has been threatened or devalued. We can transfer the value of that object (in this example, the personal quality "honesty") to the emotional apparatus of that community.

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[23] 2006: 842.

EMOTION, RIDICULE, AND EVALUATION

Thus far, we have established that an emotion is an affective reaction to a judgment of value, and that emotional communities are groups of people with common values and ideologies. Ridicule emerges as a sort of connection between these two ideas. I first present a basic process of ridicule and its effects, and I will then explain each step in more detail.

First, a person must have a series of beliefs about himself. For example:

(1) *I am a good person.*

I have a nice house.

That person must also hold that these beliefs are good and important. In other words, the set of beliefs needs to be closely-held, like the emotions and values in a community's emotional apparatus.

(2) *I am a good person.* AND *It is good to be a good person.*

I have a nice house. AND *It is good to have a nice house.*

When the person encounters ridicule, he is forced to make a reassessment of these beliefs. The jokes at a person's expense challenge the previously-held beliefs. The effect of the ridicule will vary based on the connections a person feels to the beliefs, to the ridiculer, and to the audience of the ridicule.

If a person feels strongly about a set of beliefs and experiences ridicule from someone he does not care about, he will experience minimal suffering as a response. But if the feelings are strongly held, and the ridiculer's opinion is esteemed by the victim of

the joke, and especially if the ridicule is performed in front of others who are esteemed by the victim, the victim will suffer more acutely.[24]

(3) *I am a good person. It is good to be a good person.*

Ted is also a good person. He joked that I am not a good person.

George and Brenda are good people. They laughed at Ted's joke.

Am I still a good person if another good person (Ted) made a joke at my expense, and good people (George and Brenda) laughed in agreement?

This basic analysis is a sketch of the thought process that the victim of ridicule goes through in reaction to the joke. This sudden realization that one's own beliefs about himself (or other things) are not the same as those of others in the community causes an individual to re-evaluate those beliefs and his position in the community. If the victim of the joke determines that the ridicule contains valid criticisms, he experiences humiliation at being outed as not as well-versed in the emotional community's apparatus, and he is ashamed of the fact. Depending on the relationship between the joker and victim, the presence or not of witnesses, and the context of the joke, a victim may experience anger, guilt, physical illness, self-hatred, disgust, depression, regret, chagrin, dishonor, scorn, mortification, or wounded pride in a confusing cluster of emotions labeled by psychologists as the "shame state." In response to suffering the pain of the shame state,

[24] This analysis generally follows Veatch's theory of humor (1998: 178), which suggests that the more closely held a belief is, the less likely it is that a joke about the belief will be considered funny.

the victim of ridicule may attempt to recover his position in the community, or he may yield entirely.[25]

RIDICULE

I define ridicule as a negative evaluation in the form of a joke or amusement that is meant to mock or belittle the victim of the joke. The evaluation at stake here is the victim's status in the community. Ridicule exposes a deficiency: with a joke or some mockery, the victim suddenly revealizes that he considers himself to be more, or better, than the rest of the group does, usually because he has done something that breaks the social rules of the community. When the victim of ridicule realizes this discrepancy between his self-evaluation and his group's evaluation of him, he feels embarrassed, humiliated, ashamed, or any combination of these or other feelings.[26] This experience of exposure is so uncomfortable that people go to great lengths to avoid it. In this way, ridicule enforces the social rules – and the emotional apparatus – of a community. The members of the community act within the boundaries established by the group in order to avoid the pain of ridicule and exclusion from the group.

Ridicule always involves this negative evaluation. The nature of ridicule is that it exposes a discrepancy between the joker's perception of the victim and the victim's perception of himself, so by definition there must be a negative judgment. Ridicule is a kind of humor, but it does not always need to be laugh-out-loud funny (and probably

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25 As I demonstrate in the following chapter, the Roman presentation of the army's emotional community is always to recover a lost position in the community by correcting the judgment inherent in the ridicule. I focus on the shame state in more detail below.

26 This combination is the "shame state;" for more detail, see below.

never is funny to the victim). It is amusing to the joker, at least, and perhaps also to the audience, if there is one. Ridicule is malicious and is intended to hurt the victim, pushing him out of the community; teasing, on the other hand, is light-hearted and is not meant to cause pain in the butt of the joke.[27] Ridicule and teasing can each hide criticism in a joke, but, with ridicule, the tone and intent of the joker is malicious. The ridiculing joker wants his victim to understand the difference in power between them. The emotional reaction to being ridiculed causes the victim to feel diminished and weak, and the joker, especially if encouraged by an audience of community members who conform with his evaluation of the victim, is elevated.

Ridicule therefore benefits from an audience. The pleasure at the joke (and at not being the butt of it) and from being included in the resulting laughter makes the audience want to conform to the social rule at the heart of the joke.[28] In this capacity humor can work as a social lubricant or as an abrasive: it can keep a social group running smoothly, with light-hearted teasing to redirect behavior, or it can create tension and disruption in the community, with aggressive ridicule.[29] Even the mere observation of another person

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27 Platt 2008: 105; see also Titze 2009. Platt's argument is that gelotophobes are unable to distinguish good-natured teasing from ridicule, and react strongly with shame, fear, and anger to both types of jokes. Gelotophobes are pathologically afraid of ridicule and mockery, to the extent of paranoia and social phobia. Titze describes several case studies of gelotophobes, whose paranoid fear of ridicule drives them to avoid the potential for mockery at all costs, even resulting in severe social phobias, including agoraphobia. Even for those who are not gelotophobes, the distinction between teasing and ridicule can sometimes be blurred, especially in sensitive subjects.

28 Wilson 1979: 189- 225, Billig 2005: 200ff, Holmes 2000: 164ff. Bergson 1900 put the reinforcement of social order by humor at the center of his scheme of humor. Richlin 1992 and Corbeill 1996 rely on the idea of corrective humor. Billig 2005 argues that too much discussion, both academic and among laypersons, of humor inappropriately promotes "positivist" ideas such as humor being "good for you," or a nice stress-reliever to share with friends, since, as he sees it, humor is really negative reinforcement.

29 Martineau 1972: 103. See also Holmes 2000 for the positive and negative effects of humor in group settings (in this case, the modern office workplace).

being ridiculed – without being the actual target – can have an inhibitive effect on a group member, according to Janes and Olson. This "jeer pressure," as they cleverly term it, or the anxiety of being ridiculed in the same way, instills a desire for conformity and a fear of failure in the observing group member.[30] This controlling function of humor is generally considered by modern scholars to be useful for people in positions of power, since a more powerful person can use humor to hedge an order or criticism of a less powerful person, thereby appearing less cruel or judgmental.[31] For instance, a boss may gently chastise a subordinate for inappropriate workplace behavior by making a joke about a failed task.[32]

Ridicule reinforces existing group dynamics and power structures because it usually moves down or across social hierarchies, and rarely up.[33] It also supports a group's belief systems, since those who do not conform to the group's norms are ridiculed. Generally group members do not mock those who hold similar beliefs. Instead, the usual victims are group members who are on the fringe of the group, or perhaps aspirational group members who would like to move "up" to another group.[34] The chart below demonstrates the effect of ridicule on the audience (A) and the butt of the joke (A*).

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30 2000: 474.

31 Holmes 2000: 175, Martineau 1972: 114ff.

32 This technique is more useful in teasing than in ridicule: in order to have the desired corrective effect without the disruption of upsetting the employee for being the butt of a joke, a supervisor would need to tred a fine line between humor and humiliation. See Holmes 2000: 165.

33 Wilson 1979: 212.

34 Martineau 1972: 103, Wilson 1979: 212ff.

Audience's reactions to the form and content of derisive jokes[35]			
	Reaction to content criticizing A*	**Reaction to joke "form"**	**Net reaction to joke**
If A[36] likes A*	Displeasure	Pleasure	Slight displeasure, indifference, or slight pleasure
If A is indifferent to A*	Indifference	Pleasure	Moderate pleasure
If A dislikes A*	Pleasure	Pleasure	Extreme Pleasure

Table 1: Audience's reactions to the form and content of derisive jokes.

As the chart makes clear, if the audience dislikes or is indifferent to the victim of the joke, they will feel at least some pleasure at the joke – thereby reinforcing whatever social rule the victim had been shown to have violated. In this way, the audience (or emotional community) builds cohesion in its group members by confirming the rules of membership and isolating or excluding those who do not conform to those rules.[37]

On the other hand, ridicule can also be rebellious or "contestive."[38] In this function ridicule is used by less powerful groups to disguise a challenge to the authority of the powerful. Ridicule allows a criticism of power and provides relief from oppression

35 Wilson 1979: 205.

36 It is possible for A and A* to be the same, as in cases of self-deprecation, but since this dissertation is focused on ridicule in a group context, that notion is generally not relevant.

37 Martineau 1972: 116ff.

38 Graham et al 1992: 162, Winick 1976.

while being a safe form of expression for both the powerful and powerless – since, after all, it's just a joke.[39] For example, an employee may safely camouflage a criticism of her boss in a joke at a board meeting. Not every humorous utterance can be neatly categorized into either repressive or contestive, and there may be some overlap.

In this section, I have defined ridicule as a negative evaluation, couched in the form of a joke, that is intended to mock or belittle the victim. Ridicule articulates the social rules and the membership of a community, since it provides a strategy for members to point out violations of social rules and to negotiate which members are included in the audience and which are reduced to the butts of jokes. The victims of ridicule, who want to be accepted by the community and are devastated to be found lacking, suffer an emotional reaction, known as the shame state, at the realization and exposure of their error in self-evaluation.

SUPERBIA

In Latin, a person who fails to recognize his proper place in the community is labeled *superbus,* or proud (literally: "that which is above"). A haughty person becomes irritating or dangerous to his community, disrupting the emotional apparatus and social structure. To restore order to the community, other members might use ridicule to reduce the *superbus* member to his proper status.[40] However, the same social miscalculation that

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39 Wilson 1979: 192- 4.

40 Baraz 2013: 217ff. In the next chapter, we will see instances of members of a Roman emotional community using ridicule to take down members of a non-Roman emotional community. See Figure 1 below for a pattern of ridicule, shame state, and reparation: ridicule can be countered with more ridicule to correct the balance of social relationships.

makes a person *superbus* also encourages that person to ridicule. As we will see, ridiculers, such as Turnus and Arminius, are often described as *superbi.*

The Latin word *superbia* generally covers the negative aspects of pride, such as the haughtiness and over-stepping described above, but it does not quite cover the lexical ground of the English phrase "to take pride in something." Even more confusingly, soldiers can be called *superbus* in a positive sense, in that they are outstanding or brave.[41] The term is also used in connection with royalty, but this use is frequently tinged with the typical Roman distaste for royalty.[42] But when sympathetic characters in the *Aeneid* are called *superbi,* it is from the perspective of the audience, who knows of impending doom.[43] For example, the *superbi* walls of Troy, the adjective indicates the formerly-great or the "once proud, but proud no more."[44] The walls of Troy are *superbi* because they retain their former glory despite their current lowly status as captured and fallen. Because the "self" evaluation of the walls (through Aeneas) is higher than their status as perceived by others, they are called *superbi.* So, the use of *superbus* and *superbia* is dependent on the perception of status and power between the described object or person and the speaker or narrator. Even when *superbus* is used to describe objects or people in a mostly positive sense, like the Trojan walls, it is with a pessimistic shade of foreshadowing. When *superbia* mixes with ridicule, it is almost always negative, since

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41 The stock *miles gloriosus* character, with his over-abundance of self-pride, could be considered the caricature of this phenomenon: he is *superbus* or *gloriosus* because he is overconfident and boastful of his own skills. *Superbus* is not a positive descriptor here (Murphy 1997: 77, Baraz 2013: 215).

42 See Baraz 2008: 382- 7 for more on the connection between *superbia* and royalty.

43 For example, Pandarus and Bitias are *fratres superbi* just before their deaths at *Aen.* 9.695. See Lloyd 1972: 128 and Traina 1991.

44 Lloyd 1972: 128.

both *superbia* and ridicule involve a mistake in self-evaluation. As I will explain further, the negotiation of pride (and *superbia*) is extremely important for the emotional community's confrontations with ridicule.

Superbia is not a good quality, then. In English, we speak of a good sort of pride: in one's child, for example, as he succeeds in school, or in a friend who is getting married, or in ourselves for having accomplished a goal. This is a happy, excited feeling on behalf of ourselves or of someone close to us. But there is also negative pride, when someone has *too* much of the first kind of pride and is arrogant and overconfident. The English word "pride" covers both the positive and negative aspects, but the Latin word *superbia* does not map directly onto these meanings. Generally, *superbia* did not connote the same feelings of positive pride that are familiar to us in English.[45]

The Roman emotional vocabulary lacks a label for this kind of positive pride. I do not mean that the Romans did not feel the warm, puffed-up glow of happy pride, but that there was no name for that feeling. The absence of a specific term for a particular emotion cannot mean that the emotion was not felt. Surely English speakers would agree to the existence of a feeling of positive pride, but we know there is no separate term for that feeling. The ancient Greek term μεγαλοψυχία is sometimes mapped onto the English

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45 In modern French and Italian, there exist separate words for the negative and positive aspects of pride: *fier* and *orgueilleux* and *fiero* and *orgoglioso* respectively, although the division between the uses of these terms is often not clear-cut. The positive terms, *fier* and *fiero,* derive from the Latin *ferus,* "wild and uncivilized." The related word *ferox* shares a stem with *ferus,* with the suffix *–ox* (cf. *atrox*) "seeming, looking;" thus *ferox* means "*ferus*-looking" (Fay 1917: 82). The "positive prize" meaning of *ferus* is post-classical; I can find no instance of *ferus* in classical Latin that means something like "fierce positive pride." Even in post-classical Latin, then, the conception of positive pride arose from a sense of impropriety and social misconduct.

sense of positive pride, but is now more commonly translated more literally (greatness of spirit).[46]

I argue that the notion of positive pride was subsumed into ideas of *gaudium* or *laetitia*, words for joy. Cicero provides a definition of *laetitia* that neatly maps onto the modern sociologists' definition of positive pride. In the *Tusculan Disputations,* he defines *laetitia* as the *opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri rectum esse videatur* (a newly-formed opinion that a good is present, about which it is appropriate to feel uplifted; *Tus. Dis.* 4.14). Later in that same work, Cicero elaborates. He describes as *bona* the sort of things we, as English speakers, might also identify as things to be proud of (*honores divitiae voluptates cetera*: holding office, wealth, other pleasures; 4.66), and he cautions against excess feelings of *laetitia*. Seneca echoes Cicero in his discussion of *gaudium* at *Ep. Mor.* 59.2.

It is clear from their definitions that, in common usage, these words did much the same lexical work as the English "pride" in its positive sense. An ancient Roman felt joy or pleasure or even (if I may) pride at the birth of his child or at a friend's success, even if there was no specific word for it. And because Cicero and Seneca could articulate this phenomenon, although they acknowledged it as potentially troublesome for some philosophies, we can still consider it to be an emotion. So, the Romans felt positive pride – as members of the army's emotional community did – without having a specific word for it.

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46 Baraz 2008: 365ff.

Latin does have several terms that suggest the haughty, negative kind of pride: *adrogantia, insolentia, fastus,* and *superbia*.[47] Of course, the most common word for negative pride, and one that maps most closely onto ideas of English negative pride, is *superbia.* A person is *superbus* if he esteems himself or something close to him to be higher than an observer (the one who labels him as *superbus*) does; this comparative quality is important to the notion of *superbia. Superbia* is a miscalculation, or a mistaken self-evaluation.

Because it requires a comparison between one's self and others, *superbia* implies a negative assessment of others: therein lies much of the offense of *superbia.* This definition of *superbia,* provided by Isidore, is close to the emotional evaluative process in haughty pride outlined by modern sociologists and psychologists:[48] s*uperbus dictus quia super vult videri quam est; qui enim vult supergredi quod est, superbus est* (He is called proud because he wants to appear to be more than he is; for he who wants to overstep what he is is proud, *Orig.* 10.248).

For the army, a person who was *superbus* did not understand his position in the army, or the army's emotional community; by elevating his own position, he demoted others, to their offense. Often foreign warriors are considered *superbi,* since as non-Romans who fight Romans, they challenge Rome's authority.[49]

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47 See Baraz 2008, 2013 and Kaster 2005 on negative pride.

48 Davidson 1976: 746ff, Taylor 1985: 21ff; c.f. Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature.*

49 Lloyd 1972: 126ff, Murphy 1997: 77ff.

SHAME STATE

If a victim of ridicule does accept the premise of the ridicule, he experiences a cascade of negative emotions, known as the "shame state," in response to the ridicule.[50] The shame state is comprised of feelings of shame, guilt, embarrassment, humiliation, chagrin, mortification, dishonor, fury, wounded pride, scorn, disparagement, wanting to disappear, and more. "Feeling ridiculous, embarrassment, chagrin, mortification, humiliation, and dishonor are all variants of the shame state," according to Helen Block Lewis, who coined the term.[51] Shame is an emotion of negative self-evaluation: when a person is disappointed in or disgusted with himself, especially because of some moral lapse that has been observed by others, he feels ashamed.[52]

Shame is the key emotion in this reaction. Shame is the belief that someone has failed to meet the standards of a community's emotional apparatus, and is disappointed in himself and before others.[53] The judgment in a joker's ridicule is mirrored in the self-assessment of the victim. The phrase "shame state" implies that shame is the core emotional reaction, but it is not the only one. Shame may be accompanied by humiliation, which is the sense that someone has been disparaged "for what one *is* rather than what one *does*."[54] Embarrassment and mortification are the results of "accidental foolishness"

50 This term originates in Lewis 1971.
51 Lewis 1976: 188.
52 Buss 1980: 148- 9.
53 Klein 1991: 117.
54 *ibid*.

or other failures that are perceived to be temporary, fleeting, small, or uncomfortable mishaps.[55]

This process is represented in the flow chart below. When a member of the emotional community (M) experiences ridicule, he must determine whether the ridiculer and the ridicule have some merit or standing. If M agrees with the judgment conveyed in the ridicule, then he enters the shame state; if not, he finds some tactic for correction of the ridiculer's assessment.[56] The eventual goal is reparation, through ridicule or another method. If a victim of ridicule is eventually able to recover himself, he can work to regain the esteem lost in his own opinion and in that of others; a victim of ridicule who did not enter the shame state might move directly to this step.[57]

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55 Buss 1980: 140- 1. Buss, a psychologist like Ekman, focuses on the expressive elements of emotion. He argues that embarrassment, of all the emotions, is most tied to a physiological reaction, particularly blushing (see especially 1980: 129ff). Although the definition of emotion I have outlined above follows the cognitive approach of Nussbaum and others, and therefore does not require a physiological reaction like blushing in order to classify an emotion, I do not actively exclude physiological reactions from the study of emotions.

56 I will provide examples of these scenarios in the chapters that follow.

57 One tactic for reparation is the rage or fury of humiliation, especially in instances of war, personal vendettas, or other violent attacks that sometimes accompany ridicule. See Buss 1980: 119f.



Figure 1: The shame state

The shame state encompasses any combination of these emotions and physiological reactions, and individuals might even experience different groups of emotions at different times. A community's emotional apparatus privileges certain types of emotions and reactions in the shame state, so some community members favor particular reactions more than others.

LATIN DEFINITIONS

Now that I have defined the theoretical terms of this study, I will turn to some relevant Latin terms. The following is a review of words for laughter, including *rideo* and its compounds *derideo, inrideo,* and *surrideo; cachinno*, *cavillatio, contemno, contumelia, facetiae, insulto, iocor, lepos, ludibrium, ludicrus, ridiculus,* and *salsus*. These words for laughter are frequently in scenes of ridicule, so it will be useful to understand precisely what kind of laughter and expression each term connotes. For instance, an author's choice of *derideo,* which frequently denotes ridicule, over *rideo* or *iocor,* which do not normally indicate ridicule, tells us that the derisive laughter is important in that passage.

Of the laughter terms, ***rideo*** is the most common laughter word.[58] Its ubiquity gives it a neutral meaning that can range from *to smile*[59] to *to laugh gently*[60] or *to laugh*

58 A search of the Packard Humanities Institute's Latin corpus for forms of *rideo* and *ridiculus,* using *rid-* and *ris-* as terms, returns 1173 instances, after removing irrelevant results (like *ridica,* a wooden stake for vines).

59 cf. *OLD* definition A3: (transf., of things having a bright and cheerful or welcoming aspect) to 'laugh,' 'smile.'

60 See note 59, and also *OLD* A2: to laugh as a sign of goodwill or the absence of hostility (perhaps sometimes almost equal to 'to smile'); (especially with the dative of person favoured, or *ad*).

mockingly.[61] *Rideo* is used to indicate the act of laughing *at* something or someone, and someone smiling or laughing more generally. In an example from Terence, *risisti* refers both to the sound and act of Chremes' laughter and to the object of his laughter:

CH. Hahahae! MEN. Quid risisti?

CH. "Hahaha! MEN. What are you laughing at? Ter. *HT* 886

Often, as when *rideo* is used to indicate approval or goodwill, no actual laughter is implied: *dum iuvat et vultu ridet Fortuna sereno* ("While Fortune helps and smiles approval with a peaceful face," Ov. *Tr*. 1.5.27). *Rideo* can also be used metaphorically of objects, in describing a bright or pleasant aspect of a garden, for example, but these instances are not relevant for our purposes here.

It is clear even from this brief outline that it would be foolish – or, dare I say, ridiculous – to rely on a word search of *rideo* to find instances of ridicule. But ridicule appears far more often in the compounds of *rideo*. For example, ***derideo*** gives us the English synonym *derision* for ridicule, and indeed in Latin its use is to indicate objects of scorn; *derideo* therefore is a generally reliable indicator of ridicule. *Derideo* is used for instances of mockery and other ridicule; it is not used of inconsequential joking or in jovial conversations, like *rideo* is.[62]

In a letter to Cicero, which dates to January 45 BCE, when Caesar was fighting the Pompeians in Spain, Cassius expresses his concern about the younger Pompey's reaction to the derision he senses from the other senators: *scis Gnaeum quam sit fatuus,*

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61 cf. *OLD* A1d: (in mockery), or B6a: to deride, laugh at, make fun of.

62 *OLD* definition: a: to deride, laugh at, make fun of. b: to be able to laugh, i.e. to escape, get off scot-free.

scis quo modo crudelitatem virtutem putet, scis quam se semper a nobis derisum putet; vereor ne nos rustice gladio velit ἀντιμυκτηρίσαι (You know that Gnaeus Pompey is so foolish, you know how he thinks cruelty is a virtue, you know how he thinks we laugh at him. I'm afraid he wants to answer the mockery in the rustic sense, with a sword, *ad Fam.* 15.19.4.6). Cassius' use of *derideo* here, and his accompanying concerns for the negative effects of that derision, demonstrates the power such ridicule can have in social situations. This same social effect of ridicule is seen in a passage from Seneca's letters: *nulla res citius in odium venit quam dolor, qui recens consolatorem invenit et aliquos ad se adducit, inveteratus vero deridetur, nec inmerito; aut enim simulatus aut stultus est*, ("Nothing becomes odious more quickly than grief. When it is recent, it finds a consoler and it attracts others to itself. But after it becomes entrenched, it is mocked, and not undeservedly: for it is then either pretended or foolish," *Epi. Mor.* 63.13.8).

In this example, Seneca uses *derideo* to describe mocking as a social censure for behavior he finds inappropriate. Unlike Cassius' letter to Cicero, where *derideo* represented ridicule that might have negative repercussions, Seneca feels that the mockery is shaping good habits in its ability to curb unnecessary grief. In both senses, however, *derideo* represents negative or ridiculing jokes and laughter.

Irrideo, the compound of *in* and *rideo*, means to direct one's laughter at someone or something, often maliciously.[63] For instance, in Plautus' *Captivi,* the *senex* Hegio exclaims *per urbem irridebor!* ("I will be mocked throughout the city!" *Capt.* 785). This

63 *OLD* definition: to laugh at, mock, make fun of (persons), b (things), c (with *quod* clause), d (elliptical or absolute).

is a fairly typical usage of *irrideo:* Hegio fears he will be the target of mocking laughter. In his comments on Vergil's *Eclogues,* Honoratus suggests, without further comment, that we read *ridens* as *irridens* (*RIDENS irridens,* 6.23.1),[64] intensifying and focusing the action from something like *smile* or *laugh* to *smile at* or *laugh at.* His comment implies that *irridere* is a bit stronger than *rideo,* although I detect no malice in either Vergil's original line or in Honoratus' comment.

In another comment, Honoratus also glosses *insultare*[65] as *irridere per cavillationem*:

> INSULTENT RUTULI: propter illud "interea Rutuli portis circum omnibus instant." *insultare* autem est inimicis irridere per cavillationem, *exultare* vero gloriari et laetum esse. *In Libros Verg. Aen.* 10.20.4
>
> [How] the Rutulians mock [us]: because of the phrase "meanwhile the Rutulians stand around all the gates." *insultare* means "to laugh at enemies through raillery," but *exultare* means to be truly boastful and bountiful.

Here, Honoratus clarifies the mocking laughter of *insultare,* explaining that this behavior is like jeering at someone.[66] As we have seen, *irridere* is not necessarily a malicious laugh, although it has a focused target. *Cavillatio* is a witty jeer or cleverly mocking banter (as below), so *irridere per cavillationem* is to laugh at someone in particular with clever jokes at the target's expense. Honoratus explains that Venus says *insultent Rutuli* because the Rutulians have menacingly surrounded the Trojans, as readers learn when Vergil shifts the narration from the council of the gods to the Trojan camp.

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64 *Ecl.* 6.23: *ille dolum ridens "quo vincula nectitis?" inquit* ("Laughing at the trick, he said, 'Why bind me in chains?'"

65 See more on *insulto* below.

66 Or "malicious exulting," as Harrison puts it (1991: 64).

Only ***subrideo*** (or *surrideo*) typically avoids associations with ridicule. It most often means to smile upon someone or something, as in the Vergilian formula *olli subridens,* although even this may have the connotations of the condescension of an "archaic smile."[67]

Cachinno is an onomatopoeic term for a loud laugh, like a guffaw, or for similar sounds, like the slapping of waves against the shore.[68] Its loud, boisterous laughter is often considered to be aggressive and inappropriate.[69] *Cachinno* is not as frequent as the broader laughter terms, but it appears frequently in Apuleius, where it often connotes derisive laughter.[70]

Iocor is a generic term for teasing or jesting.[71] In my study of laughter terms I found only a handful of instances (out of 677 results) in which forms of *iocor* might indicate ridicule; most commonly it is used for light-hearted jokes or otherwise unparticular instances of humor. Petronius' *Satyricon* features one of the few instances in which it is clear that *iocus sim* refers to being the butt of others' jokes, but, as with many instances of *iocor,* the joking is vague or unspecific: *et nunc spero me sic vivere, ut nemini iocus sim* ("And henceforth I hope to live a life beyond the reach of any one's ridicule, 57.5.1). In this instance, a freedman is denouncing his former status as slave,

67 See Uden 2014.

68 *OLD* definiton: 1a: (intransitive) to laugh, especially loudly or boisterously, guffaw, b: (transitive, of the sound of the sea), 2: (transitive) to laugh loudly at.

69 Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 4.66 distinguishes appropriate laughter from inappropriate guffaws: if it is permitted to laugh, guffaws may still be reproachable (*si ridere concessum sit, vituperetur tamen cachinnatio*).

70 *Cachinn-* appears only 46 times in the PHI Latin corpus, including two instances where the term is applied to the sound of waves crashing. Nine of these instances are in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*: perhaps the sound of *cachinno* is especially appropriate for the tale of a donkey and his social misfortunes. See Lateiner 2001.

71 *OLD* definition: to jest, joke.

claiming that, now that he is free, he will never brook ridicule again. He uses *rideo* four times in his harangue about one's status and the accompanying susceptibility to mocking laughter.

Ridiculus is the adjectival form of *rideo,* describing something capable of causing laughter, or something absurd.[72] This word can therefore be used to indicate something simply amusing or something condemnable by ridicule; often, the term implies that something is preposterous without actually portraying ridicule. Frequently the accusative neuter *ridiculum!* is used in exclamations to indicate incredulity or absurdity. In this example, Quintilian is baffled by the idea of certain school exercises: *ridiculum est ergo, in exercitationibus quae foro praeparant, prius cogitare quid responderi quam quid ex diuerso dici possit* ("It is therefore ridiculous, in exercises which prepare the student for the actual courts, to consider what answer can be made before ever giving a thought to what the opposing counsel is likely to say," *Inst. Orat.*5.13.44). Quintilian finds these school exercises – or perhaps the teachers who assign them – to be foolish and silly, worthy of laughter because of their absurdity. The term *ridiculus* can have an ambiguous meaning, however, as we will see in more detail in Chapter Two. Something can be funny or absurd, and therefore labeled *ridiculus;* but that laughter can easily turn into derisive, mocking laughter that is invited by the very same word, *ridiculus.* This is the technique that Cicero uses against Verres: a slow accumulation of *ridiculus* phrases that, together, work as ridicule.

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72 *OLD* definiton: 1: capable of arousing laughter, funny, comic, amusing; b: (of persons); (masc. as sb.) a jester, buffoon; c: (neut. as sb.) a piece of humour, a joke; *per ridiculum,* jokingly, in fun. 2: (in bad sense) absurd, silly, ridiculous; b: (neut. as interj.) the idea, question, etc., is absurd!

Other terms in my search included those that describe the cleverness of a person, particularly in occasions of wit, such as *cavillatio, salsus,* and *ludicrus.* ***Cavillatio*** is a term describing a witty banter or a verbal joke, but it also refers just as often to the sort of quibbling over minutiae that frequently occurs in discussions of philosophy.[73] Cicero in *de Oratore* defines it as the sort of wit that is found throughout a speech, instead of infrequent touches of humor (*alterum aequabiliter in omni sermone fusum, illa a veteribus superior cavillatio,* 218). This use of *cavillatio* aptly conveys its sense of clever, verbal wit. But as demonstrated above, in the example of Honoratus' comment on *Aeneid* 10.20, the word could also be used in situations of more serious taunting. Suetonius uses the word in a description of one of Tiberius' cruel jokes:

> Nec multo post in senatu Pompeio cuidam equiti R. quiddam perneganti, dum vincula minatur, affirmavit fore ut ex Pompeio Pompeianus fieret, acerba cavillatione simul hominis nomen incessens veteremque partium fortunam. *Tib.* 57.2
>
> Not long after, when a certain Roman equestrian Pompeius disagreed with something in the Senate, Tiberius threatened him with imprisonment and declared that he would make a Pompeian from a Pompeius, attacking the man's name and the fate of the old Pompeian party with a cruel witticism.

This use of *cavillatio* encompasses both senses of the word: a witty verbal joke and a taunt. So, *cavillatio* is used in instances of ridicule and not; it is not an obvious indicator of ridicule.

Insulto can mean *to trample,* literally or figuratively. In nonliteral use, it means *to mock* or *scoff*; in other words, *to trample over someone's feelings*.[74] When *insulto* is used

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73 *OLD* definition: 1: raillery, banter, badinage; 2: sophistry, quibbling, captiousness.

74 *OLD* definition: 3a to behave insultingly, mock, scoff, jeer; b (with accusative) to mock at.

figuratively, it almost always conveys demeaning ridicule. In this example, the Roman army seethes with indignation, eager to fight the Sabines again after some embarrassments:

> ad id, quod sua sponte satis collectum animorum erat, indignitate etiam Romani accendebantur: iam alterum exercitum uictorem in urbem rediturum; sibi ultro per contumelias hostem insultare; quando autem se, si tum non sint, pares hostibus fore? Livy 3.62.1
>
> Besides the fact that they had a ready supply of spirit, the Romans were also burning with indignation. The other army would return to the city victorious, but the enemy mocked them with insults. When would they be equal to the enemy, if not now?

Not only had the Romans lost to the Sabines, but the Sabines made it all the worse by mocking their enemies, taunting the Romans for losing. Livy conveys the embarrassment and the shame of the situation in his metaphor *indignitate…accendebantur* (burning with indignation) and by offering the Romans' private thoughts as part of his own narrative. The taunts of the Sabines (*per contumelias hostem insultare*) affect the Romans as much as the military defeat.

Similarly, ***contemno*** conveys, at least, dismissive treatment,[75] and extreme scorn and insult at most.[76] *Contemno* is not always associated with ridicule. It does, however, describe a derisive attitude and therefore does frequently appear in instances of ridicule. In his speech against a law that would have established a veterans' colony at Capua,

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75 cf. *OLD* definition 2: to treat as of no importance, pay no heed to, disregard; b: (poet., of things); 3: to keep away from, avoid, have nothing to do with (a thing).

76 *OLD* definition 1: to regard with contempt, look down on, take a poor view of, despise; b: (refl.); c: to treat with contempt in word or action, scorn, insult.

Cicero imagines a frightening future in which Capuans, in their shiny new city, grow to look down on Rome:

> Romam in montibus positam et convallibus, cenaculis sublatam atque suspensam, non optimis viis, angustissimis semitis, prae sua Capua planissimo in loco explicata ac praeclarissime sita inridebunt atque contemnent. Cic. *Agr.* 2.35.96
>
> They will laugh at Rome, despise Rome, situated in the mountains and valleys, stuck up and suspended in attics, not on good roads, with very narrow streets, as compared to their own Capua, luxuriating in a wide open space and situated most beautifully.

In Cicero's nightmarish vision of Capua's future, the city regains enough power to turn on Rome once again and mock Rome for its foolishness in restoring Capua to glory. Capua had been an ally of Rome's until Rome's loss at the Battle of Cannae in the Second Punic War; Rome duly punished Capua for its treachery, and Capua had never recovered its importance and power. In this instance, then, *contemno* (accompanied by *inrideo*) compounds ridicule with just the possibility of regret of giving strength to a former enemy and of shame in being mocked by that former enemy.

Lastly, a ***ludibrium*** is a mockery, in either of its English senses: a *ludibrium* is a sham (or sometimes a plaything), or it is the object or the act of mockery.[77] In this second sense it is connected to ridicule. An excellent representation of the sense of the word is in Livy's representation of Brutus, who played the fool in order to stay safe from the ruling Tarquin family. Brutus is both a plaything and the butt of jokes for the Tarquin brothers

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77 *OLD* definition: 1: a plaything, toy; b: playful or frivolous behavior or an instance of it; c: a product of playfulness, jest, or similar. 2: an object of derision or reproach, laughing-stock or similar, (especially in predicate dative); 3: insulting treatment, mockery, derision, or similar; b: (pl) instances of such treatment, insults, outrages, affronts; 4: something that mocks by seeming to be other than it is, a pretence, sham, imposture, etc.

on their trip to Delphi: *is tum ab Tarquiniis ductus Delphos, ludibrium uerius quam comes, aureum baculum inclusum corneo cauato ad id baculo tulisse donum Apollini dicitur, per ambages effigiem ingenii sui* ("Then it is said that when he was taken to Delphi by the Tarquins, more as a butt for their jokes than as a companion, he brought a golden staff enclosed in a hollow wooden staff as a gift for Apollo, an enigmatic representation of his own character, 1.56.9). Brutus endures his status as *ludibrium verius quam comes* until the time is right for him to reveal his true sensibility; with this deception, he rather makes the Tarquins his playthings.

Often the word *ludibrium* has dire consequences for one's reputation: a Roman fears becoming a *ludibrium,* or laughing-stock, for others. This is often presented as the worst possible outcome of a social or political situation, both for individuals, as in Brutus' case above, and for larger groups. For example, in the thirteenth *Philippic,* Cicero quotes Antony, who suggests to Hirtius and Octavian that their feud could make their cause (the Caesarians) into a laughing-stock (*ludibrium*) for their enemies (the senatorial party).

> Quam ob rem vos potius animadvertite utrum sit elegantius et partibus utilius Treboni mortem persequi an Caesaris, et utrum sit aequius concurrere nos quo facilius reviviscat Pompeianorum causa totiens iugulata, an consentire ne ludibrio simus inimicis. *Phil.* 13.38.5
>
> Accordingly pay attention to whether it is more proper and more useful to your party to seek the death of Trebonius or Caesar, and whether it is more reasonable for us to meet in battle, so that the Pompeians' cause, which has so often been butchered, may all the more easily revive; or to come to an agreement so that we are not a laughing-stock for our enemies.

Since Cicero publicly picks apart and mocks Antony's letter for most of the Thirteenth Philippic, it would seem that Antony, at least, became the *ludibrium* he had feared. The insult to one's *dignitas* and reputation can be magnified if the *ludibrium* is aimed at a larger group. In Tacitus' *Annals,* the Roman army and the general Corbulo, who received a message from the emperor Claudius to stop his campaign immediately, became an object of scorn for the Germans whom they had been fighting and a laughing-stock to the Roman allies: *ille re subita, quamquam multa simul offunderentur, metus ex imperatore, contemptio ex barbaris, ludibrium apud socios, nihil aliud prolocutus quam 'beatos quondam duces Romanos,' signum receptui dedit* ("When the dispatch arrived, although he was overwhelmed by many things (dread of the emperor, contempt from the barbarians, ridicule from his allies), he said nothing except, "Happy those Roman generals of old!" and gave the signal for retreat, *Ann.* 11.20.1).

Contumeliae are insults or taunts, representing the same sort of ridiculing abuse as *ludibrium.*[78] In a basic sense, *contumeliae* represent derisive behavior or malicious intent, as in this example from Cicero's first *Philippic*: *ego, si quid in vitam eius aut in mores cum contumelia dixero, quo minus mihi inimicissimus sit non recusabo* ("If I have said anything malicious against his life or morals, I will not object to being his bitterest enemy," *Phil.* 1.27). Here, Cicero uses *cum contumelia* to refer to any sort of ridiculing speech at Antony's expense. He acknowledges that such spiteful speech deserves animosity in return: to speak *cum contumelia* is to breed contempt.

78 *OLD* definition: insulting language or behaviour or an instance of it, indignity, affront; b: (transf.) rough treatment.

Often, these ridicule words appear in **clusters**, working together. The use of several synonymous ridicule words, or perhaps even the *iteratio* of the same ridicule word, draws attention to the ridicule and emphasizes the damage done by the derision. A cluster of ridicule words can also emphasize the severity of the ridicule. For example, in the sixth of Seneca's *Suasoriae,* the participants discuss whether Cicero should beg for his life from Antony. Seneca's character Cestius Pius suggests:

> In hac parte cum descripsisset contumelias insultantium Ciceroni et verbera et tormenta, dixit illam multum laudatam sententiam: tu mehercules, Cicero, cum veneris ad Antonium, mortem rogabis.
>
> Sen. *Suas.* 6.10.14

> He said it would be useful to avoid the torture of his body, since he would not simply die if he fell into Antony's hands. And when he had described the mockeries and insults [lit. mocking abuses of insults] and beatings and torture in store for Cicero, he gave a much-praised opinion: "By Hercules, Cicero, when you come to Antony, you'll be begging for death!"

Cestius argues that Cicero should die, but considers that if Cicero should choose to live, Antony would be so incensed with violence towards him that Cicero would hope for death. Cicero's actions and, importantly, his *Philippics* against Antony have created such an animosity between the two, that Antony's natural response includes mockeries and insults and beatings and torture (*contumelias insultantium Ciceroni et verbera et tormenta*). As we have established above,[79] Cicero's *Philippics* ridiculed Antony and contributed to the bitter rivalry between them. Although Cicero did not use violence against Antony, Cestius' comment here demonstrates that Cestius (or rather, Seneca) believes that Antony will respond to Cicero's non-violent ridicule with more ridicule and

[79] v.s.in the discussion of *contumelia,* Cic. *Phil.* 1.27.

with violence. Seneca's pleonastic *contumelias insultantium* and the polysyndeton of *et* suggests that he views the ridicule (*contumelias insultantium*) as much a part of Antony's punishment of Cicero as the physical punishments *verbera et tormenta.* The real situation of Cicero's mockery of Antony, and this hypothetical response of Antony's ridicule of Cicero, demonstrate the real, physical effects of ridicule.

A cluster of ridicule words can also emphasize the significance, or even the success, of ridicule.[80] For example, in the following passage, Livy describes the situation in Istria, as the leaders Marcus Junius and Aulus Manlius, together with their legions, defy and mock the newly elected consul, Gaius Claudius, who had urgently traveled to Istria to command them to retreat. At first, Livy establishes the contempt with which Claudius treats Junius, Manlius, and their soldiers, and vice versa; as he concludes the story and employs three ridicule words to describe the soldiers' mockery of the consul:

> …ad extremum utrumque decedere provincia iussit. Ad quod cum illi tum consulis imperio dicto audientes futuros esse dicerent, cum is more maiorum, secundum vota in Capitolio nuncupata, lictoribus paludatis profectus ab urbe esset, furens ira vocatum, qui pro quaestore Manli erat, catenas poposcit, vinctos se Iunium Manliumque minitans Romam missurum. Ab eo quoque spretum consulis imperium est; et circumfusus exercitus, favens imperatorum causae et consuli infestus, animos ad non parendum addebat. Postremo fatigatus consul et contumeliis singulorum et multitudinis – nam insuper inridebant – ludibriis, naue eadem, qua uenerat, Aquileiam redit. Livy 41.10.10

> He [Gaius Claudius, the consul] ordered both of them [the former consuls and generals, Marcus Junius and Aulus Manlius] to leave the province. When the consul's order was announced, they said that they would listen when he had arrived at camp in the old manner, after offering a votive at the Capitol, and with the lictors and in military garb. Furious with anger, he summoned the man who was Manlius' quaestor, and demanded some

[80] See, e.g., Moore (1989: 149ff) on clusters of virtue words in Livy.

> chains, threatening to send Junius and Manlius to Rome in fetters. The consul's *imperium* was spurned by this man, too, and the surrounding soldiers, favoring the cause of their leaders and angry with the consul, also refused to obey. At last the consul, worn out by the insults of individuals and the jeers of the whole crowd —for they ridiculed him as well — returned to Aquileia in the same ship in which he had come.

Livy establishes the indignation of the consuls, the quaestor, and the soldiers through his description of their escalating disobedience of the consul Claudius' orders. We sympathize with the soldiers, who are loyal (*favens*) to their immediate commanders (the former consuls Junius and Manlius). The disobedience of Claudius' *imperium* begins at the top with Junius and Manlius, then spreads to the lower officer (the unnamed quaestor), and finally spreads to the soldiers, and as the defiance spreads, so too does the indignation.

Finally, with the chiastic structure and Livy's inclination to *variatio,* we can liken *contumeliae* to *ludibria* in the phrase *et contumeliis singulorum et multitudinis… ludibriis.* In this situation, then, the mockery of the leaders (*singulorum*) and the men (*multitudinis*) is analogous. Their similarity is further clarified by the parenthetical explanation *nam insuper inridebant*. Livy adds that "they" (the *multitudo*, or the crowd of soldiers) mocks the consul Claudius, as their leaders Junius and Manlius do. The soldier's mockery is all the more insolent because of the disparity of their respective positions of authority, and Livy reminds us of this discrepancy by using the word *imperium* twice. The saturation of ridicule words in this passage, following a description of the increasingly indignant anger of the crowd of soldiers at the consul's presumption, emphasizes the overwhelming force of the derision in this scene. The episode concludes

(after the quoted section) as Claudius submits to the insolent army's commands, returning to Istria in the *mos maiorum* as ordered. In this case, defiance and derision have accomplished their goal in shirking the new consul's authority, and the accumulation of key words, including ridicule words, has accomplished Livy's goal in describing this successful challenge of authority, and the efficacy of this ridicule.

Not every laughter term in my search yielded examples of ridicule. ***Salsus,***[81] ***facetiae***,[82] and ***lepos***[83] are often used to describe a clever person's wit but only rarely describe ridicule. A ***ludicrum***[84] is a play or musical performance, and the adjectival *ludicrus* refers to light-hearted jokes or songs. I did not find any instances of ridicule in the uses of *ludicrus*.

STRUCTURE

As case studies for the ways emotional communities navigate ridicule, the shame state, and the recovery, I have focused on two emotional communities in Latin literature, representing Rome *domi militiaeque*: the Roman army and the senatorial elite.[85] In each chapter, I define the emotional community and its emotional apparatus before turning to at least one case study of the community's engagement with ridicule.

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81 *OLD* definition: 3: (of situations, speech, etc.) salted with humour, witty, funny; b: (of persons).

82 *OLD* definition: 1: skillfulness, cleverness; a clever action; b: cleverness or aptness of expression; 2: the quality of being witty or facetious, wit; b: (sg.) an amusing thing or remark, joke.

83 *OLD* definition: 1: charm, grace, attractiveness; b: (as a term of endearment); 2: charm or cleverness of language, wit, humour; b: (usually in plural) an instance of this, pleasantry, witticism.

84 *OLD* definition: 1: a source of fun, amusement, diversion; b: a plaything, toy; c: a piece of light verse, etc., trifle; d: a witticism, joke; 2: a public entertainment, show (sporting or theatrical); *ludicrum Troiae,* a kind of sham fight.

85 Note that I use the terms *domi* and *militiae* for the sake of convenience in referring to the two emotional communities described in this dissertation.

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I detail the emotional community of the Roman army, or what I have called the *militiae* emotional community. I provide an overview of its emotional apparatus and the hierarchy of the army, with its officers as leaders of the emotional community.

I then turn to three case studies to focus on ways in which Roman authors use scenes of ridicule and the shame state to shape the narrative of their histories. In Livy's description of the disaster at the Caudine Forks, he exaggerates the bitterness of the ridicule and the shame state that the Roman army must endure before recovering their community by defeating the Samnites. I argue that Livy uses ridicule and the shame state to benefit his victory narrative, making the Romans' eventual defeat of the Samnites all the more impressive. The next case study is Vergil's depiction of the Trojans encounters with the native Rutulians in the *Aeneid.* Here, I argue that Vergil establishes Aeneas as a positive exemplar of the emotional apparatus of the *militiae* emotional community, contrasted with Turnus, who is characterized as *superbus* and derisive. I explore scenes of ridicule from both camps, arguing that the final scene of the *Aeneid* is so confusing because the audience has had certain expectations of ridicule throughout the work. Last, I detail the ridicule in Tacitus' description of the Roman campaign against Arminius. Vergil's Aeneas and Turnus serve as models for Tacitus' Germanicus and Aeneas, and I suggest that, while Tacitus attempts a ridicule-turned-victory narrative like Livy's, it is less successful.

In the second chapter, I turn to the elite senatorial class in the late Republic: Cicero's emotional community, which I have labeled the *domi* emotional community.

After providing a survey of the community's emotional apparatus, I argue that membership in this community is so valued that it becomes the focus of Cicero's campaign against Lucius Verres, our last case study. These speeches are nominally a persecution of Verres by Cicero for charges of corruption, but they are really about Verres' poor performance as a member of the emotional community, and Cicero's embodiment of the ideals of the emotional apparatus. I suggest that much of oratory is the performance of membership in the community, and that success in oratory is based on one's skill in portraying oneself as the ideal member of the emotional community. I conclude by offering some summarizing thoughts and some suggestions for future work in the intersection of emotion, community, and ridicule in Latin literature.

Chapter 1: Ridicule and the *Militiae* Emotional Community

Ridicule is part of a process of emotional reactions experienced by a group of people. The social functions of ridicule, and the emotional response it triggers, are felt by an emotional community. In this chapter, I examine the ways in which Roman authors present this social process of ridicule in their depictions of the Roman army. I suggest first that the Roman army, as presented in Latin literature, functions as an emotional community that privileges certain emotions and rejects others. Next, I define the emotional apparatus of that community, arguing that Roman authors rely on their audience's familiarity with this apparatus to use ridicule to shape a text to fit other literary goals. For situations involving ridicule in the Roman army, the process of ridicule is employed as part of a victory narrative: to emphasize the emotional lows of the Roman army in order to later emphasize the army's impressive victory. In addition, the ridicule process provides an opportunity to characterize antagonists as haughty ridiculers who need to be reformed by virtuous Romans. Authors benefit from their audience's understanding of the social context of ridicule and, by using ridicule in this way, reinforce the social rules of ridicule and emotion in Rome.

In the first part of this chapter, I build on the definitions of ridicule, shame state, and emotional community offered in the Introduction and tailor them for discussion of the Roman army. I first establish that the Roman army functions as an emotional community, offering some literary and archaeological evidence. In the next section, I outline the major emotions and values that were privileged or rejected in the army's emotional community. I then present the possible emotional reactions to ridicule in the

Roman army. I focus in particular on interactions between the Roman army's emotional community and foreign armies.

As case studies of this situation, I feature discussions of the ridicule process in Livy, Vergil, and Tacitus. I begin with Livy's presentation of the disaster at the Caudine Forks, which prominently features the reactions of the Roman army's emotional community. The Caudine Forks episode allows Livy's audience to observe the ridicule process from its beginning to the end, including the emotional community's recovery from its shame state and an application of Livy's victory narrative. Next, I analyze Vergil's characterization of Aeneas, Turnus, and their men in the context of ridicule and victory, particularly in light of his discussion of *superbia,* or haughty pride. Vergil establishes the enemy as *superbus* and inclined to ridicule, and he blends the Trojans' recovery from Rutulian ridicule with their military triumph in Italy. Last, I show that Tacitus uses Vergil as a model for the characterizations of his protagonist, Germanicus, and his antagonist, Arminius, just as he uses Livy as a model to craft a victory narrative out of the folly and ridicule of his protagonists.

THE ROMAN ARMY AS AN EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY

The Roman army spanned hundreds of years and thousands of miles and lives, so naturally the army evolved over time. But within such a vast entity, there were patterns of behavior – a code of conduct – that helped to develop a sense of community in the army. The army functioned as a social unit, marked out by a set of behaviors and signs that indicated its special status. Shaw suggests, in a discussion about the distinctions maintained between a Roman army and local civilians, that the Roman army could be

considered a total institution.[86] Goffman, a sociologist, first coined the term "total institution" to refer to any "place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered life."[87] Goffman's original analysis featured mental hospitals in the most detail, but he noted that many other organizations, like army barracks or jails or monasteries, functioned as total institutions. By his definition, a total institution had three basic characteristics: a single authority who (or which) controlled all aspects of life, daily activities conducted in the close company of many others, and a tight schedule of daily activities.

As Shaw, and later Pollard, demonstrates, the Roman army operated as a total institution.[88] First, there was an authority: the army operated under the command of its generals. Second, daily life was controlled: the soldiers lived and worked close together, often for years. And third, there were regular routines for setting up camp and for fighting. Soldiers showed their membership in this community, as we have seen, through their dress, their diet, their living quarters, their names for each other, and even their gravestones.[89]

Because it functioned so successfully as a total institution, the Roman army is a perfect example of the sort of unit that can become an emotional community. With shared goals and accomplishments and failures – not to mention the normal drudgery of daily

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86 Shaw 1983.
87 Quoted from Goffman 1961: xxi.
88 Shaw 1983 and Pollard 1990.
89 See Lendon 1997: 238- 240 in particular.

life on campaign – the army formed its own emotional community. In addition to terms of endearment like *commilitiones* and *amici,* legionaries called each other, and especially their own tent-mates, *fratres*; we might infer a close, family-like atmosphere from such nicknames.[90] Entire legions could earn nicknames for outstanding service; for instance, after defeating Boudicda, *Legio XIV* became known as *Martia Victrix.*[91] These epithets served to enhance a sense of cohesion in a unit, and they represented a sense of pride in being a member of a community known for a particular accomplishment. In particular, soldiers who have experienced particular campaigns together, or who have followed a specific general for much of his career, form another set of emotional communities within the Roman army. Veterans might identify with current legionaries in a broader emotional community. In these situations, emotional communities overlap with social communities, but our emphasis is on the systems of feelings experienced by the community; in this case, our focus is on the community's emotions related to ridicule.

Thinking of the army as a total institution is particularly useful after the Marian reforms of the first century BCE, when all citizens were eligible to join the army, even if they did not meet earlier property requirements that would have limited the army to certain classes. From that point on, the Roman legions were mostly volunteer forces of semi-professional soldiers in what came to be standing armies.[92] During that time, a soldier and his comrades would have spent long years on campaigns together, away from

90 MacMullen 1984: 443, and *passim*; Lendon 1997: 253.
91 Goldsworthy 1998: 254.
92 Watson 1969: 21, 36ff.

home and family, in stressful situations. It is easy to see how a person could form close bonds in such circumstances.

When we speak of the Roman army as a community, it is possible to consider the entire army, with its legions spread across the Mediterranean, as a very broad community whose members would recognize each other by certain symbols of their community: their military titles, their oaths of service, their code of conduct, and perhaps also their dress or routines. These signs of membership in the army community would have been intelligible to anyone familiar with the Roman army.[93]

Clothing was one such way to mark out membership in the army community. While there was no official uniform for Roman soldiers, each man typically wore a tunic and boots, with a sword belted around his waist.[94] The military boots, *caligae,* were typical enough of a soldier's outfit that the future emperor Caligula earned his nickname because, as a child, he dressed up like a soldier. To be seen without a belted tunic (to be *discinctus*) was a form of shaming – a symbolic and temporary removal from the community – and was used as punishment.[95]

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93 When we consider smaller communities within the Roman army, such as the legions stationed together in a particular area, we can focus on even more specific details, such as diet or family status, that are markers of a more specific community. For example, soldiers were prohibited from marriage for much of the empire, but this rule was overlooked more often than not in certain locations, especially where soldiers were stationed indefinitely; in long-term posts where soldiers married and started families, new forms of community developed (Scheidel 2007: *passim*). For more on the Roman army as a community, see Goldsworthy 1998, Goldsworthy and Haynes 1999.

94 Phang 2008: 84ff.

95 Williams 1999: 147- 8; Phang 2008: 141- 2.

The soldiers also cooked and ate together[96] because they were required to cook their own food with their tentmates in their barracks (or *contubernia*), where they also slept. These close quarters became a home for the soldiers, who were often on campaigns together for years. The soldiers felt pride in the maintenance of these *contubernia* and their camps in general. As Tacitus has Vespasian's soldiers put it, "the army camp is the soldier's special pride, his homeland, his *penates*" (*proprium esse militis decus in castris: illam patriam, illos penatis*; *Hist.* 3.84). Since the soldiers lived in such close quarters, and since they were often on campaigns for years at a time, it is not surprising that the soldiers developed close relationships with each other.

Tacitus suggests that men joined the army because they were failures otherwise, and the army provided an opportunity to grow and improve one's lot in life.[97] If these men could adapt to the new rules and habits of the community, they could not only be a part of the community, but they could find success in it, with rewards and promotions for a job well done. The army community was therefore not just a place to live and work, but a way of life and a path to the future.

Proud soldiers and veterans make mention of their achievements in service, and even under whose leadership they served, on monuments and in epitaphs.[98] By noting a commander, the authors of these inscriptions imply a particular pride in serving under

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96 Phang 2008: 249- 284.

97 Tacitus has Tiberius complains that the army is made up of men who sought the army because they had no other options, and that their position makes them uninspired or undisciplined soldiers: *nam voluntarium militem deesse, ac si suppeditet, non eadem virtute ac modestia agere, quia plerumque inopes ac vagisponte militam sumant* (For there was a lack of volunteers for the army, and even if there were a supply of them, they did not carry themselves with the same virtue and discipline, since most take a military post on account of poverty or homelessness; *Ann.* 4.4). See Goldsworthy 1998: 252.

98 Lendon 1997: 260ff.

that leader and in being a part of that military unit. This pride in community is an essential part of a successful Roman army, and, as I will note later, it is an important feature of an emotional community.

One complication in this social community is the status of the officers, who were generally of a different social status than the majority of their soldiers, but more importantly were supposed to be leaders of the community. Successful Roman military officers had to articulate carefully their relationship with the army community: they could not be too close with their soldiers, or risk losing face and the respect required for a leader.[99] But they could also not become too haughty or disdainful of their men without losing the men's favor and loyalty, which were essential not only on the battlefield but more broadly for the wealth and popularity they needed to be successful leaders. Essentially, the army's leaders were caught between emotional communities: their *militiae* community with the legionaries, and their *domi* community in Rome with other elite leaders. As a result, in order to be well-received in both communities, they needed to embody the ideals of each group's emotional apparatus.

Evidence for the Roman Army's Emotional Community

In these discussions of the features of the emotional community, I have drawn on the literary evidence of historians. It is important to acknowledge the handicaps of these sources: these are not snapshots of actual conversations or situations, but stylized works of literature. These are not useless for learning about emotions and ridicule in these

99 Phang 2008: 239ff.

communities; we simply need to be mindful of the author's personal goals in writing as we consider his representations of the community's emotions and ridicule.

There is also evidence for the emotional community of the Roman army available through other sources. For primary sources, we might turn to the personal letters from soldiers at Vindolanda or in Egypt, or to archaeological and papyrological evidence from a site like Dura-Europos (as Pollard has done). These sources do not contain the extended scenes of ridicule that are essential to this study, but they do convey some of the army's evidence of the emotional apparatus. We have even less in the way of physical evidence, as Rome did not honor its war dead with memorials in the field, as the Greeks often did, so battlefield memorials are few and generally not helpful for reconstructing an emotional community.[100]

There are many epitaphs for soldiers, however, and the choices made in commemorating these soldiers reveal the priorities of the members of this emotional community. We can consider the epitaphs that identify the decedent as a soldier (usually a name with the abbreviation *mil.*) as a minimum indication of membership in the army, and therefore the emotional community. Many epitaphs contain no further detail about the decedent or his relationship to the army. Some may go further, carefully listing out a *curriculum vitae* of the decedent's military career, including his honors and awards from military service. If there is any discussion of the decedent's personal emotional apparatus,

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100 Greek monuments to the war dead were erected for victories and defeats. The most famous Greek epitaph, for example, is Simonides' epigram for the Spartans lost at Thermopylae, as reported by Herodotus (7.228): "Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, that we lie here, obedient to Spartan orders (Ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε/ κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.)." The Roman focus on a victory narrative also made Romans less likely to devote field memorials for military defeats. See Clark 2014: 9ff.

the most common is the simple dedication that the memorial is "well-deserved."[101] This praise is so ubiquitous on funerary inscriptions as to be almost meaningless for the specific purpose of understanding the *militiae* emotional community.[102] A similar claim of "deservedly" (*ob merita*) earning the military promotions is cited in the epitaph of Gaius Oppius.[103] At least once, the long list of military achievements grants that one such promotion is due to the soldier's *virtus,* but no other virtues are mentioned in the entire epitaph, and the only adjectives of praise are for the decedent's wife and son, who was also a soldier:

> [-------] / militavit L annis, IV in leg. III A[ug(usta)] / libr. tesser. optio, signifer / factus ex suffragio leg. [A]u[g. pr. pr. 7] / militavit 7 leg. II Ital., [7] leg. VII ---- / 7 leg. I Min., 7 leg. X Gem., 7 leg. II [----] / 7 leg. III Aug., 7 leg. II[I] Gall. 7 leg. XXX U[l]p. / 7 leg. VI Vic., 7 leg. III Cyr., 7 leg. XV Apol. / 7 leg II. Par., 7 leg. I Adiutricis / consecutus ob virtutem in / expeditionem Parthicam / coronam muralem vallarem / torques et phaleras, agit in / diem operis perfecti annos LXXX, / sibi et / Claudiae Marciae Capitolinae, koniugi karissimae, quae agit / in diem operis perfecti / annos LXV, et / M.Petronio Fortunato filio / militavit ann. VI 7 leg. X[X]II Primig. / 7 leg. II Aug., vixit ann. XXXV, / cui Fortunatus et Marcia parentes / karissimo memoriam fecerunt. *CIL* VIII 217

In the epitaph, both father and son are credited with military service, and the father has a full list of titles, positions, and awards (including the one earned "through his *virtus*"). The relationship between husband and wife and between parents and child is described as *karissimo,* but no other adjectives are used to describe the family members. Because so

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101 e.g. *CIL* IX 1415: *d.m., / Ti. Cl. Maximo / II vir, aed. quaes /. pecuniae alim. / vixit ann. XXVII m. V / Ti. Cl. November / et Cl. Hermio/ne filio bene / merenti fec. / et sibi.*

102 *bene merenti* is frequently abbreviated b. m., with the option of adding a dative noun (also frequently abbreviated) specifying the decedent's relationship to those who erected the monument (as in *filio bene merenti = f. b. m.*).

103 e.g. *CIL* IX 5839: *C. Oppio C. f. Vel. / Basso p.c., / pr. Auximo, leg. IIII Fl. fel., evoc. Aug. / ab actis fori, B pr. pr. signif. option. tesse. / coh. II pr., mil. coh. XIIII / et XIII urbanarum, / coll. cent. Auxim. / patr. ob merita eius. / L. d. d. d.*

much care was taken in describing the units and the years of military service, we might assume that this military service was considered the most important aspect of the Fortunati men's lives. In terms of emotional community: being a member of the *militiae* community was so significant that the *bona fides* of that experience needed to be captured on a tombstone for eternity. That each was a good member of the army is implied through the descriptions of their service, but that they were good members of the emotional community is largely neglected.

Only rarely do we see inscriptions detailing the kinds of values privileged by the emotional community. Descriptions of a soldier "fighting hard for the republic" (*pro r. p. fortiter pugnans*), as in one inscription placed in the Forum of Trajan for a fallen soldier in the Dacian wars, are the exception rather than the norm.[104] In epitaphs I have also noted descriptions of the deceased soldier as *optimo et dignissimo*[105] and as *piisimo,*[106] but, while these are surely compliments for any Roman, neither truly evokes an ideal member of the *militiae* emotional community that I describe below.

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104 *CIL* VI 1377: M Claudio Ti f Q / Frontoni cos / leg Aug pr pr provinciarum Daciarum et / super simul leg Aug pr pr pro Vincia / Daciar leg Augg pr pr Moesiae super / Daciae Apulesis simul leg Augg pr pr pro vinciae Moesiae super comiti divi Veri / Aug donatd donis militarib bello Ar/meniaco et Parthico ab imper tore Antonino Aug et a divo Vero Aug corona / murali item vallari item classica item / aurea item hastis puris IIII item vexillis / IIII curatori operum locorumq publicor misso ad iuventutem per Italiam legen/dam leg Augg pr pr exercitus legionarii / et auxilior per Orientem in Armeniam / et Osrhoenam et Anthemusiam ducto/rum leg Augg legioni primae Minervi/ae in exspeditionem Parthicam deducen/dae leg divi Antonini Aug leg XI CL prae/tori aedili curuli ab actis senatus quae/stori urbano X viro stlitibus iudicandis. / Huic senatus auctor e imperatore M Au/relio Antonino / Aug Armeniaco Medico / Parthico maximo quod post aliquot se/cunda proelia adversum Germanos et Iazyges ad postremum pro rp fortiter / pugnans ceciderit armatam statuam poni in foro divi Traiani pecunia publica censuit.

105 *CIL* IX 5840: C Oppio C f Vel / Basso p p, p c, / pr id Aux, leg IIII / Fl fel et leg II Tr for / evoc Aug ab act fori / pr pr, mil coh II pr / et coh XIII et XIIII urb, / omnibus officiis / in caliga functo, / centuriones leg II / Traianae fortis / optimo et dignissimo. / In cuius ded cenam col ded. / Lddd.

106 *CIL* VI 2977: dm / M Aur Augustiano / coh V vig vix an XXXIIII / provitus ann XVII excep/tor presidi provincies / M s ann IIII, lectus in prae/toria, eques sive tabu/larius ann V, factus in Syria, vixit ann VIII, / Claudia Pacata coniux / piissimo et Ulpius Mar/cellus nepos b m fece/runt.

We might conclude, then, that the community's emotional apparatus is not well represented in epigraphical evidence. What few mentions are made of emotions or of personal virtues or values are too general to be useful for understanding the *militiae* emotional community. There are a few explanations for this. First, the limited space available on an epitaph naturally requires abbreviated descriptions of a decedent. Second, perhaps inscriptions are simply not a place where this information was conveyed. But I would argue that, to a Roman soldier, the truly impressive part of military service was the rank and service itself. It was noteworthy simply to be a member of the emotional community, but it was all the more impressive to document one's advancement through the ranks of that emotional community.[107] That a person also embodied the emotional apparatus of the community is not useful in commemorating a fallen soldier, or perhaps it is simply implied through descriptions of military service.

To continue beyond epigraphical evidence: there are no extant literary records of an average soldier's experience in battle or on campaign. Such accounts do not exist, and perhaps never did. Much of the literary evidence is fiction, like the stylized epic poems of Romans at war, or history, written for the most part decades or even centuries after the events. Caesar's commentaries provide a unique opportunity for this study, since Caesar himself was a part of the wars he describes.

So, given the limits of evidence I have just outlined, we must be careful, in the following analysis of scenes of ridicule and the army's reaction to them, of the limitations

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107 The importance of displaying membership in the emotional community foreshadows the role of ridicule in the *domi* emotional community in the next chapter.

of the sources and therefore our understanding of them. In the next section, I outline the emotional apparatus of the Roman army community, as depicted in literary evidence. An understanding of "anything so romantic as the soul of the soldier"[108] might still be out of reach, but the real goal of this study is to understand the ways that authors relied on their readers' understanding of these emotional communities in order to use scenes of ridicule to manipulate the plight of the ridiculed Romans to fit the author's own literary goals.

Most of the evidence for the emotional apparatus of the *militiae* emotional community is the constellation of emotions and values that were idealized by the men who wrote the literary works that survive today. The men involved in the emotional community as it truly existed are those memorialized in epitaphs. The reactions of the emotional communities to ridicule are based on evidence of real human behavior, but the ideals of the apparatus are loftier and more abstract. This chapter is chiefly concerned, then, with the connection between these two concepts, and the interplay between that connection and the literary goals of each author studied.

In the next section, then, I give an overview of the emotional community of the army. This is a generalized description, gathered from literary evidence spanning several hundred years. Further, the emotional apparatus outlined below is prescriptive: the Roman authors have provided their readers with an ideology for the emotional community of the Roman army. Importantly, though, this is the literary depiction of the

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[108] Quoted from Macmullen 1984: 440: "Historians usually and rightly look at the outside of legions and at their impact in battle. Armies have historical importance only because they win or lose. Of course it is recognized that certain of their internal features have a bearing on their success or failure, notably their training and supply. As a guide to the archeologist or as the yield of excavation, studies exist on military living conditions and leisure facilities. *But an attempt to understand anything so romantic as the soul of the soldier has, I think, yet to be made* (emphasis mine)."

army's emotional community, so this is the basis for our understanding of how Romans thought about the army.

Militiae Emotional Apparatus

An emotional community is a social community defined by its shared system of feeling: the things that are privileged or deemed harmful, the emotions that are respected or repressed, the bonds between people, or the ways that people express their emotions.[109] The army's emotional community centers on the feelings that promote the well-being of the army. To discover how the army functions as an emotional community, we can focus on the kinds of things that the soldiers and their leaders focused on as valuable.

A soldier privileges what will make the best soldier: strength, bravery, skill, endurance, and so forth. Most of these features are bound up in the term *virtus,* which is the driving force behind the individual soldier. *Virtus* is the kind of excellence of spirit that makes a man great: it is all the features of strength and bravery of a soldier, but also the moral uprightness and good nature of a person. It is a moral quality of a person, and it is certainly the ideal for Roman men, especially Roman soldiers and military leaders.[110] Because *virtus* was so esteemed as the most important quality of a soldier, we can consider it to be at the center of the army's emotional system, even if *virtus* is not

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109 See Rosenwein 2009, and above in the Introduction, for a review of emotional community.

110 This moral aspect of *virtus* is developed after the Greek virtue ἀρετή, which, along with so many other Greek ideas, became popular at Rome. In the republic, as well, *virtus* was connected to an aristocratic idea of *gloria* and personal achievement. For more on *virtus,* see Eisenhut 1973, Moore 1989: 5ff, McDonnell 2006, Riggsby 2006: 83ff, and Phang 2008: 3ff,.

properly an emotion.[111] Other values and emotions, as we will see, revolved around the presence or absence of *virtus*.

For the emotional community to function at its best, certain features needed to be prominent, and other, more negative qualities needed to be controlled. All these moral qualities and emotions – good *and* bad – were a part of the emotional community, so it is important to understand the full scope of the community's emotional apparatus. When we study the community's emotional response to ridicule, we see the community at zeniths and nadirs of emotional reactions. I will now outline the range of features of the army's emotional community, beginning with *virtus,* and working through positive and negative qualities in the emotional apparatus.

Virtus

Virtus is that characterstic of soldiers that allows them to best serve their leaders and Rome. With soldiers in Livy, Moore notes that *virtus* is particularly connected with bravery and courage, and with the steadfastness necessary to overcome challenges; *virtus* is the physical and emotional strength needed to be a great soldier.[112] Men earn *virtus* through their experience and exercise; the grit and determination to see a battle through, and the know-how to understand how to handle a situation.[113] Since part of the quality of *virtus* is experience, it is possible that, over the course of a narrative, an army might gain

111 *Virtus* is not included on Cicero's list of emotions in *Tusc. Dis.* 4, for example, although Cicero admits that the list is not intended to be an exhaustive inventory of all possible emotions.
112 1989: 5ff.
113 Riggsby 2006: 88- 91.

virtus.[114] For instance, even Caesar's horsemen, who had formerly been put to flight by the enemy, are able to save face and recover by showing enough *virtus* to overcome their earlier embarrassment.

> Horum adventu tanta rerum commutatio est facta ut nostri, etiam qui vulneribus confecti procubuissent, scutis innixi proelium redintegrarent, calones perterritos hostes conspicati etiam inermes armatis occurrerent, equites vero, ut turpitudinem fugae virtute delerent, omnibus in locis pugnae se legionariis militibus praeferrent. *BG* 2.27.2
>
> At their arrival there was such a great shift in the situation that our men, even the ones who had fallen down, worn out by their wounds, leaned on their shields and re-entered the fight. Then the camp slaves saw that the enemy was completely terrified, and they ran into the battle, even though they were unarmed. Our horsemen, too, so that they might cover up the disgrace of their flight with their [current] courage (virtus), put themselves in front of the legionary soldiers in every part of the battle.

Caesar found that his troops were motivated by a sense of "competitive *virtus*,"[115] so that they might outdo each other, earn more rewards, and impress their commander.[116]

Military leaders have a special position in the army's framework of *virtus.* In Horace's famous ode about military service to Rome, *virtus* takes the emphatic position at the beginning of two successive stanzas. *Virtus,* Horace says, maintains its honor when it is undefeated, when it grants honor to the worthy, and when it does not yield to the whims of the mob:

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114 As in *De Bello Gallico:* Caesar is uncertain of his troops' *virtus* (2.8.1), but after gaining experience against the enemy, Caesar becomes reassured of their *virtus* (2.20.3). Riggsby 2006: 86- 7.

115 Phrasing Phang's at 2008: 47.

116 A useful example is at *BG* 5.44, when two centurions, T. Pullo and L. Vorenus, attempt to settle a personal dispute by showing off in battle. When it appears that their bickering might backfire and Pullo suffers a setback, Vorenus steps in to shield his comrade. They return to the fortifications after killing many of the enemy. Caesar concludes: *Sic fortuna in contentione et certamine utrumque versavit, ut alter alteri inimicus auxilio salutique esset, neque diiudicari posset, uter utri virtute anteferendus videretur* (And so Fortune handled them in this rivalry and conflict so that one rival was the safety and the salvation of the other, and it could not be said which one ought to be considered to have more *virtus* than the other).

Virtus, repulsae nescia sordidae,
intaminatis fulget honoribus
nec sumit aut ponit securis
arbitrio popularis aurae. *Od.* 3.2.17- 20

Virtus, ignorant of filthy defeat,
shines with untarnished honor
and does not take up axes or put them down
at the impulse of an inconstant mob.

The rest of Horace's ode, including the famous line *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori* (it is sweet and right to die for the fatherland), which occurs just before these stanzas, emphasizes the possibility of glory and honor achieved through *virtus* in military sacrifice. These accomplishments are solemn and weighty and probably intended mostly for the wealthy elite who would lead soldiers. As I will describe below, the leaders of the Roman army were also considered to be leaders of the *militiae* emotional community; in both capacities, they were expected to be the best representation of the emotional apparatus. Such a manifestation of their *virtus* not only benefits each leader personally, but also the army as a whole. As for the Roman authors describing such circumstances, the skilled, noble leaders of the army provide protagonists around whom a historian can frame his narrative.

Polybius, the Greek author of Roman history, claims that courage is the most essential virtue in every state, but especially in Rome: "It remained for him [Scipio] to achieve a measure of courage, practically the most important virtue for a leading man in every state, but especially in Rome, and the training for this was correspondingly difficult" (Λοιποῦ δ' ὄντος τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν μέρους καὶ κυριωτάτου σχεδὸν ἐν πάσῃ μὲν πολιτείᾳ μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ, μεγίστην ἔδει καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν περὶ τοῦτο τὸ

μέρος ποιήσασθαι; 1.29.1). Polybius singles out this aspect of *virtus* that connotes manly bravery (or what Polybius calls ἀνδρεία) as the most important virtue for young Roman leaders. Elsewhere he suggests that every elite Roman is pushed to success by a desire to suffer even the worst in order to achieve glory (εὐκλεία) on behalf of the state (τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, οἱ νέοι παρορμῶνται πρὸς τὸ πᾶν ὑπομένειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων χάριν τοῦ τυχεῖν τῆς συνακολουθούσης τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐκλείας, 6.54.3).

Virtus was the most important moral quality for a Roman man, and especially a member of the army's emotional community. *Virtus* was the summation of all the good features of a Roman soldier, and the other qualities and emotions – not to mention successes and failures of the military campaigns – hinged on the proper nurturing of one's *virtus.*

Positive Qualities in the Emotional Community

Virtus is certainly the most important moral quality in the emotional community, but *virtus* is supported by other characteristics that are likewise privileged in the emotional community. These positive qualities, including *magnitudo animi, animus, impetus,* and *modestia,* are all required for the maintenance of the army and therefore the emotional community. Such features are esteemed in individual members of the emotional community, and the community is praised when the group works together to display these characteristics. These positive features are balanced by a natural (for a soldier) inclination to violence and quickness of temper, so a member of the emotional community must become skilled in constantly checking the appropriate balance of these

positive and negative characteristics of a solider. I will briefly review each of these features.

Magnitudo animi is an extension in the spirit of *virtus*. It implies a certain sense of self that, while present in the best soldier, was really most common in the elite leaders of the army, since it more frequently connoted the sort of official honors and political offices that would be out of reach for the average soldier.[117] In Livy, *magnitudo animi* is closely tied to self-esteem and the confidence that helps to accomplish military success.[118] This connection to actual achievement (as opposed to empty boasts, which is a trademark of *insolentia*) is the most important feature of *magnitudo animi* for the army's emotional community.[119]

Animus is the strength of spirit, or morale, that inspires confidence and dedication to an army's military goal. Without *animus,* the emotional community would suffer because they would fail to complete their military orders. *Animus* is often paired with ***impetus****,* or the energy to rush forth into battle.[120] *Animus* is distinguished from *impetus* by the timing and the endurance of each feeling. Where *animus* sustains an army through a campaign, *impetus* is the sudden urge that drives the men onto the field at the moment of battle. This is not to say that *animus* is at a constant high throughout a campaign; as argued below, the emotional community benefits from its leaders' encouragement and

117 Moore 1989: 141.

118 *ibid.* 141- 7.

119 See Baraz 2008: 375- 376.

120 *pace* Lendon, who construes *animus* as more of the psychological component to the physical act of *impetus* (eg 1999: 290; cf. *OLD* definition 13b "courage, spirit, morale"). I count *impetus* as both the act of rushing forth into battle and the mindset to do it. (s.v. *OLD* 2b "a military charge, assault" and 5 "a violent mental impulse, urge, effort [often unpremeditated], 6 "an impulse to do something." For more, see below and Phang 2008: 37ff.

direction in balancing negative qualities with *animus*. For example, Livy contrasts *impetus* with *consilium* at 42.29.11: *impetuque magis quam consilio* ("more from impulse than planning"); here, Livy intends to present an impulsive action. At 6.38.4, however, he pairs *animis* with *concilium [plebis],* or both the emotional and political prerequisites for action, at 6.38.4: *ingentibus animis armant concilioque* ("they armed themselves with great courage and a resolution"). While *animus* is the emotional mindset, *impetus* also suggests an emotional eagerness and drive: Caesar commented on the importance of *impetus* for success in battle, noting that generals needed to focus their troops' *impetus* for best results.[121] So, *impetus* indicates the impulse, and *animus* represents a mindset. These qualities of *animus* and *impetus* can easily tip into *furor* and *ira,* negative but necessary qualities in the emotional community.

Modestia is a soldierly respect for authority.[122] This obedience is vital for military operations, but as a moral quality in the emotional community, *modestia* was valued for its counterbalance to the violence that could easily overwhelm a soldier.[123] Of course, this kind of obedience is most important for soldiers, not leaders; the leaders of the emotional community were tasked with enforcing the proper *modestia* in their men.[124]

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121 Caesar describes the emotional background to *impetus* at *BC* 3.92: *…propterea quod est quaedam animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quae studio pugnae incenditur; hanc non reprimere, sed augere imperatores debent* (…because there's a certain enthusiasm of spirit and a speed naturally found in everyone, which is inflamed by a desire to fight. Generals should not repress this, but instead increase it). cf. Phang 2008: 47.

122 Moore 1989: 75: "*Modestia,* like *moderatio,* means self-restraint, but while *moderatio* is usually used of those who have power, Livy nearly always uses *modestia* to describe the restraint of those under the control of others."

123 Phang 2008: 73ff.

124 *ibid*.

So, *virtus* was a quality that needed to be refined and practiced, under the careful leadership of one's superiors.[125] Other positive qualities, like *magnitudo animi, animus, impetus,* and *modestia* also served as counterpoints to negative qualities that, despite their helpfulness on the battlefield, could detract from the optimal operation of the Roman army and its emotional community. In other words, *virtus,* in its sense of requiring the very best of a soldier, also required him to restrain his less helpful emotions and features.

Negative Qualities in the Emotional Community

In discussions of the best features of soldiers and the emotions and qualities that are privileged in the emotional community, we often see descriptions of the negative emotions and features that should be limited in the emotional community. A passage from Caesar's *de Bello Gallico* illustrates the balance of states of emotions and moral qualities that Caesar expects from his soldiers:

> Postero die Caesar contione advocata temeritatem cupiditatemque militum reprehendit, quod sibi ipsi iudicavissent quo procedendum aut quid agendum videretur, neque signo recipiendi dato constitissent neque ab tribunis militum legatisque retineri potuissent... Quanto opere eorum animi magnitudinem admiraretur, quos non castrorum munitiones, non altitudo montis, non murus oppidi tardare potuisset, tanto opere licentiam arrogantiamque reprehendere, quod plus se quam imperatorem de victoria atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent; nec minus se ab milite modestiam et continentiam quam virtutem atque animi magnitudinem desiderare.
>
> *BG* 7.52

> The next day, after he called a meeting, Caesar reproached the temerity (*temeritas*) and the greed (*cupiditas*) of his soldiers, since, as he said, they seemed to have judged for themselves where they should go or what they should do, and could not be held back, even when the sign had been given, by either the tribunes of the soldiers or by the legates… As much as he admired the greatness of spirit (*magnitudo animi*) – since they could be

[125] *ibid.* 42, 65- 67, and passim.

> held back by neither the fortifications of the camps nor the height of the mountain, nor the city wall – he just as much blamed their disorderliness (*licentia*) and arrogance (*arrogantia*), because they thought that they knew more than their leader about victory and about tactics. He wanted no less discipline (*modestia*) and self-restraint (*continentia*) from his soldiers than he did *virtus* and *magnitudo animi.*

This passage illustrates the careful balance of qualities necessary for a successful soldier: just as much *virtus* as *modestia,* and just as much *magnitudo animi* as *continentia.* Keeping negative qualities, like *temeritas, cupiditas, licentia,* and *arrogantia* in check is just as important as honing the positive qualities. The emotional community's safety hinged on the proper balance of these features.

Some of the negative qualities that Caesar describes in this instance can be considered an absence of the positive qualities mentioned earlier. ***Temeritas,*** for instance, is the brashness, or temerity, that indicates an absence of *magnitudo animi.* The greatness of spirit (*magnitudo animi*) and military order (*modestia*) that achieves good things has become uncontrolled and out of control. This in turn indicates both ***licentia*** **(**disorderliness) and ***arrogantia*** (arrogance), which are symptoms of a lack of *modestia,* since these qualities imply a belief that the soldier does not need the guidance of his commander. Without a tightly functioning hierarchy, the emotional community suffers.

Anger is a complicated characteristic for a soldier. A certain amount of ***ferocia*** (ferocity) and ***ira*** (anger) is required for surviving close combat, or for war in general; in this way it could certainly be classified as a positive value for the army. The adjectives

ferox (spirit, rage)[126] and *acer* (keen energy)[127] are used to convey the bursts of energy or fiery passion (*furor*) that were useful in making an attack. But anger is potent and sometimes unpredictable. Because it can cause distraction and disruption, anger (*ferocia* or *furor*) posed a threat to *disciplina.*[128] For the emotional community to function properly – and not just the military unit of the army – the amount of *ira* needed to be just right. The Stoics Cicero and Seneca argue, for both the soldier and the orator, that *ira* is not necessary for *impetus.*[129] *Ira*, *furor*, and *ferocia*[130] were connected to themes of violence between citizens, especially in the civil wars of the first century BCE.[131] *Ferocia* is frequently connected with disorderliness or barbarians.[132] Anger, in its forms of *ira* and *ferocia,* must be kept under control and in the right amounts in order to be an ideal for the *militiae* emotional community; to ascribe these qualities to Roman soldiers connotes civil war or barbarity.

For our purposes, in analyzing the emotional community's responses to ridicule, anger is important in its relationship to the shame state. Anger is just one of the features of the shame state, and is an especially common reaction for men, like soldiers, who are already accustomed to violence. As we will see, the shame state is a reaction to the internalization of ridicule. But anger can also be helpful: the *iusta ira* of the vengeful

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126 Phang 2008: 46ff.

127 Moore 1988: 23ff.

128 Lendon 2005: 185 specifically ties *ferocia* and *furor* to the young men of the army, who are more eager to compete for glory than older men, who have already had opportunities to accumulate a personal history of "great deeds." See Cairns 1989: 81ff on *furor.*

129 Cic. *Tusc. Dis.* 4.43; Sen. *Ira* 1.9, 171*;* Phang 2008: 47- 49.

130 On *ferocia* and *furor,* see Thompson 1965: 19ff and Oakley 1985: 104- 5.

131 Oakley 1985: 104- 5, Harris 2001: 214ff.

132 See Traub 1953: 252ff on defiant barbarians.

Aeneas, for example.[133] This type of anger in reaction to ridicule is the opposite of the shame state, as I explain in detail below. For now, it is important to note that *ira* for the army's emotional community holds a power of chaos and destruction that makes it a negative virtue for the community's well-being; *ira* must be checked by other positive qualities and by the emotional community's leaders.

When the army fails – when its military prowess is not enough, and when its negative emotions overwhelm the positive qualities – the emotional community suffers ***ignominia,*** or disgrace. When his army was starving due to dwindling resources in a siege, Caesar proudly explained that each of his legions declared they would rather starve and continue the siege than quit and suffer *ignominia:*

> sic se complures annos illo imperante meruisse, ut nullam ignominiam acciperent, numquam infecta re discederent: hoc se ignominiae loco laturos, si inceptam oppugnationem reliquissent; praestare omnes perferre acerbitates, quam non civibus Romanis qui Cenabi perfidia Gallorum interissent parentarent. *BG* 7.17
>
> They said that they had served several years under his command, and that they had never endured disgrace (*ignominia*); that they never left a task unfinished, and that they would bear it as a disgrace *(ignominia*) if they left the fight once it was begun, and that it was better to endure every hardship, than to not avenge those Romans who died at Genabum because of the perfidy of the Gauls.

According to Caesar's depiction of his legions' emotional community, *ignominia* is absolutely to be avoided and is worth further suffering. *Ignominia* is a sign that the army has failed, and therefore it represents the ultimate low for the emotional

133 Harris 2001: 218 briefly discusses *iusta ira.* Certainly from Juno's perspective, her *ira memor* is justified, and is a driving force in the *Aeneid.*

community. The infamy of *ignominia* will haunt the community members' reputations even beyond the *militiae* community.

One final, but extremely important, feature of the emotional community is the proper place of pride. We have already described the army as taking pride in their emotional community, or in their position in the army. Soldiers needed such pride in order to maintain their campaigns and have success in battle. They also needed to be careful not to have too much pride, when they might overstep their position in the military hierarchy and become *superbus,* thereby disrupting the carefully constructed emotional community.

The emotional apparatus of the army's emotional community emphasizes the kinds of values and emotions that make good soldiers, and it avoids an excess of violent emotions that would threaten the safety of the army and its emotional balance. The leaders of the army are also leaders of the emotional community, and they are looked to as examples of the best of the emotional apparatus' features, as I will explain below in more detail.

THE EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY AND RIDICULE

The army's social structure is a rigid hierarchy of officers and soldiers, but they are nonetheless all involved in the emotional community. The community's hierarchy adds an extra step of evaluation for the emotional community's response to ridicule (see Figure 1.2). The member of the emotional community (M = member) must contemplate the ridiculer's (J = joker) status in respect to his own. Reactions to ridicule will be bound

by the rules of the military, in addition to the social and emotional consequences of ridicule.



Figure 2: Post-ridicule evaluation

A member of the army's emotional community must take several steps of evaluation. First, he must determine if the ridiculer (J) is Roman (and therefore a member of the extended Roman emotional community). Since the army is frequently in contact with non-Romans or enemy combatants, this is a crucial first step. If the ridiculer is *not* Roman, the default response is outrage: a barbarian should not confront a Roman in this way. The power relationship is clearly misunderstood by the ridiculer, and the victim (who chooses not to be a victim, as it were) is tasked with correcting his ridiculer's understanding of the power relationship. This is situation B in Figure 2.

An author may choose to dwell on situation A: a foreigner ridicules the army (or a member of its emotional community) and the victim of the ridicule acknowledges some truth to the criticism contained in the ridicule. (Note that for Roman authors, situation A almost always resolves into situation B with some time for recovery of the emotional community.) This demoralizing realization that an enemy has seen some embarrassing truth about the Roman army sends the victim of the ridicule into a shame state. This is the context of two of the case studies below, Livy's Caudine Forks episode and Tacitus' extended description of Germanicus and the Roman army's interaction with Arminius and his German army.

In these circumstances, something has gone terribly wrong: the army has suffered a military defeat and the emotional community begins to fall apart. The historian slows down and focuses on the episode for dramatic effect, because, at least in these cases, ridicule of the army is an opportunity for the historian. These episodes allow the historian

to emphasize the disaster in order to extoll a later victory. The army's emotional community eventually recovers enough gumption to recover the lost status from the



ridicule (and the military defeat that inspired it), and eventually the episode concludes with the Roman army victorious. This particular course of the ridicule/shame state cycle is featured in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Ridicule and shame state cycle

This figure makes the distinction between humiliation (a public emotion) and shame (a private emotion), but these are also meant to stand in for the accompanying emotions of sadness and feelings of despair that are described in the individual texts. Generally, the last emotion is anger (*ira*), which leads the emotional community to conviction and desire to set the record straight, or reparation. This in turn leads to a restoration of pride – and can even cause the members of the emotional community to rise to the occasion and return the ridicule.

Situation G offers a similar scenario, in that the Roman army emotional community must repair its reputation to those outside the community. However, in this case, those outside the community are still included in the greater emotional community of Romans in general. The main tension here is between the army and civilians; this was not always a peaceful situation, but it only occasionally is mentioned as coming to a head.[134]

Situations C, D, E, and F are a bit more complicated, since they arise within the emotional community. Since both the ridiculer (J) and his victim (M) are members of the same emotional community (the Roman army), they must also negotiate their respective positions within that community. Because of the rigid hierarchy in the army, there are other social rules that govern how the victim (M) can react to the ridicule.

In situations C and D, the ridiculer (J) and his victim (M) are peers. There are no power differentials to navigate; they are on even ground. Next, the victim must decide if

[134] See e.g. Alston 1999.

there is real criticism contained in the ridicule. If he decides that the ridiculer has raised a serious issue, he might enter the shame state and correct his behavior to avoid future ridicule and its accompanying emotional reactions. This is situation C: the severity of the shame state might well be less than that of situation A, since the ridiculer and his victim are peers. However, if the ridicule challenged a closely held belief, or if the audience was vast, the shame state might still be very deep and powerful.[135]

Unfortunately, given the complete absence of first person accounts from soldiers, we have very few examples of these interactions.[136] One representation of two soldiers jesting with each other is from Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum*: two of his soldiers challenge each other and find common ground when threatened by the Gauls (5.44ff). We might reasonably assume that situation C is the most common: tentmates tease each other and brush off the joke. Again, we suffer a lack of evidence, but in modern sociological studies, this peer joking relationship is the most common.[137] In this case, the ridicule in question comes closest to simple joking, where no real criticism is intended. Since the ridiculer has no real authority over his peer, the criticism contained in his ridicule has no real force behind it.

Situations E and F involve a power disparity in the relationshp between ridiculer (J) and victim (M). In situation B, a subordinate steps out of bounds with ridicule of his superiors. This is not behavior that is encouraged by the standards of *modestia* or

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135 For more, see above Introduction, page 30.

136 The Vindolanda tablets did not reveal any such examples, and, as might be assumed, epitaphs – even ones that take the time and space to announce that they were erected on behalf of the decedent fellow soldiers – do not typically have space for such an extended exchange.

137 For more on the peer pressure of humor ("jeer" pressure), see Janes and Olson 2000.

enforced by *disciplina militaris,* and instances of this situation, while they do exist, are not very common. In Situation F, a commander uses ridicule to enforce the very rules of *modestia* and *disciplina militaris* that are challenged in Situation E.

A famous example, albeit from Greek literature, illustrates both situations E and F clearly. In the second book of the *Iliad,* a common soldier, Thersites, disfigured and vulgar and known to us only from this episode, interrupts an assembly to attack Agamemnon in front of the entire emotional community. Thersites is described as particularly loathed by Odysseus and Achilles because they were the most frequent victims of his abuse (ἔχθιστος δ' Ἀχιλῆϊ μάλιστ' ἦν ἠδ' Ὀδυσῆϊ·/ τὼ γὰρ νεικείεσκε, *Il.* 2.220). Odysseus responds by scolding Thersites, beating him, and threatening to strip him naked and beat him publicly. Thersites doubles over, sheds a tear as a wound festers on his back, and quietly sits down. The rest of the assembly laughs mercilessly at Thersites. One of the soldiers comments that Odysseus did well in silencing that "slanderer" and that Thersites will never again challenge a king with "reproachful words" (ὃς τὸν λωβητῆρα ἐπεσβόλον ἔσχ' ἀγοράων./ οὔ θήν μιν πάλιν αὖτις ἀνήσει θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ/ νεικείειν βασιλῆας ὀνειδείοις ἐπέεσσιν, *Il.* 2.275- 277).

The episodes from Roman literature that fit situation E are not quite so violent nor so infamous as the Thersites episode, but the message is still clear: respect the authority of the commanders. Despite the literary ideal of the historians' version of the Roman army, there are still several instances of this situation. Perhaps the inclusion of some insubordination, even among the idealized versions of the Roman army, implies that insubordination happened in the real Roman army even more frequently. To that end,

there are several instances in which a military commander must use ridicule and mockery to keep his soldiers in line (Situation F), as it seems that no other motivation for obedience is successful.

Now that I have outlined the circumstances and evidence for each situation, I will provide further detail and context for each possibility, this time in reverse order. As I will show through the case studies below, Roman authors tended to focus on situations A and B most of all, since they provide the most opportunity to advance the victory narrative favored by Roman historians. We will turn to examples from Livy, Vergil, and Tacitus in order to understand how recovery from ridicule works in the *militiae* emotional community.

Situations E and F: Superiors and Subordinates

Although the picture painted by historians and epic poets is often one of Roman glory and success, there are still scenes of faltering and terror and panic. In these situations, soldiers balk at their orders or speak out of turn to their commanders. To inspire their troops back to the fighting form, commanders used a variety of tactics, including shaming punishments like flogging or forcing a soldier into public nakedness.[138] One such technique was to shame one's soldiers back into their proper place in the emotional community. In this way (that is, in Situation F), ridicule serves to reemphasize the community's emotional apparatus and rules for behavior, to unify a splintering community group, and, as a more literary function, to make the commander

138 See Phang 2008: 140ff for shame punishments.

look at once stern, for enforcing proper behavior, and gentle, for not resorting to crueler, more violent tactics.

Like the Thersites episode, in which Odysseus chastizes his soldier not only for speaking out of turn and against his leaders, but also for showing signs of weakness and a lack of interest in continuing the fight, one story, as told by Suetonius, Appian, and Dio,[139] has Caesar shame his troops by calling them Quirites – a name for civilians, not soldiers. The tenth legion, after years of faithful service in Gaul, was proving troublesome in the civil war against Pompey. They mutineed and Caesar only begrudgingly allowed them back into service, Suetonius says. But with a single command (*sed una voce*), Caesar lowers the troops to the status of citizens, and easily brings them around and bends them to his will (*tam facile circumegit et flexit*; *DV* 70).

In Appian's version of the story, Caesar extends the tension of the shame state even longer.[140] Appian first reports that a mutiny had sprung up, and that the soldiers, protesting unfulfilled promises, were making demands of payment from Caesar. When the soldiers almost killed the legate who had been sent with Caesar's latest promise of more payment, Caesar boldly (μάλα θρασέως) went to the rioting, furious soldiers (στασιάζουσιν), despite the protests of his officers (2.13.92). Caesar's mere appearance at the Campus Martius was enough to startle the soldiers back into formation (καί, ὡς ἔθος, ἄφνω φανέντα σφίσιν ἠσπάζοντο αὐτοκράτορα, 2.13.93). Caesar's calm demeanor and

139 Suet. *Div. Jul.* 68- 70, App. *BC* 2.13.92- 94, cf. Tac. *Ann.* 1.42, where Germanicus refers to the episode.

140 I include Appian here, in a study of ridicule in Rome, because his subject matter and his *floruit* were Roman, although his language was Greek. Further, his presentation of the episode is echoed in Latin sources, as in the previous note.

the sudden acquiescence to the soldiers' demands began to sink them into a shame state: shame took hold of all of them, and jealousy of their comrades who would achieve the glory and riches that they themselves were giving up, and silent, embarrassed astonishment at the ease with which Caesar rid himself of them:

> αἰδὼς αὐτίκα πᾶσιν ἐνέπιπτεν καὶ λογισμὸς μετὰζήλου, εἰ δόξουσι μὲν αὐτοὶ καταλιπεῖν σφῶν τὸν αὐτοκράτορα ἐν μέσοις τοσοῖσδε πολεμίοις, θριαμβεύσουσιδ' ἀνθ' αὐτῶν ἕτεροι καὶ σφεῖς τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ κερδῶν ἐκπεσοῦνται, μεγάλων ἔσεσθαι νομιζομένων, ἐχθροί τεόμοίως αὐτοῦ τε Καίσαρος ἔσονται καὶ τῶν πολεμίων. δείσαντες οὖν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡσύχαζον ἐξ ἀπορίας, ἐλπίζοντες ἐνδώσειν τι καὶ τὸν Καίσαρα καὶ μεταγνώσεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἐνχερσὶ χρείαν. *BC* 2.13.93
>
> Shame immediately took hold of all of them, and a calculation, along with jealousy, if they seemed to be leaving their commander in the middle of such wars, and that others would triumph with him instead of themselves, and of losing their plunder in Africa, which they thought would be great, and of becoming enemies of Caesar and of the opposing party. They stayed all the more silent, fearing these things, and hoping that Caesar would give in and change his mind, since there was urgent necessity.

Caesar only exacerbated their shame state when, at the urging of his officers to say something more to his longtime soldiers, he began to speak by calling them "citizens" and not "comrades," as he had done before, thus implying they had already been discharged from service (ἀρχόμενος λέγειν πολίτας ἀντὶ στρατιωτῶν προσεῖπεν, 2.13.93). At this last shameful remark, the soldiers broke down (οἱ δ' οὐκ ἐνεγκόντες ἔτι, 2.13.94), and begged Caesar to reinstate them. After more delays, he reaffirmed that he would give prizes as promised, and would reinstate everyone except the tenth legion, shamefully reproaching them about their previous glories under his command.

In this story, repeated by two sources years after Caesar's civil war, Caesar is able to silence his subordinates with one sneering word: Quirites. The remark cut so quick and deep that his troops were instantly in a shame state, begging for readmission into Caesar's army's emotional community. Caesar, as ridiculer, did his job of making them feel removed from the emotional community; Caesar, as commander, removed them from the army.

There are other versions of commanders mocking their troops for poor service that do not end so unhappily. Tacitus describes the commander Antonius Primus using "shame and insults" (*pudore et probris*) to inspire some troops, along with "praise and encouragement" (*laude et hortatu*) for others.[141] In general, it appears that commanders used ridicule as a form of tough love for inspiring honor in their troops. By encouraging them to embody the ideals of their emotional community, and avoid the lowest forms of dishonor and despair in the community, everyone in the emotional community benefits.

Situations C and D: Peer Ridicule and Joking

Because of the lack of evidence from soldiers themselves, peer ridicule is difficult. We see the soldiers almost exclusively through the lens of the commanders or historians (sometimes the same man, e.g. Caesar or Velleius Paterculus). In Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum* there is a quarrel between two soldiers,[142] when Caesar interrupts a

141 Tac. *Hist.* 3.24: *Igitur Antonius, ubi noscere suos noscique poterat, alios pudore et probris, multos laude et hortatu* (And so, when Antonius could recognize his men and be recognized by them, he stirred some of them up with shame and reproaches, and many with praise and encouragement, and all with hope and promises.)

142 *BG* 5.44, cf. note 116 above.

description of a battle against the Belgic tribes with a focalized episode of a battle of *virtus* between two of his men, Lucius Vorenus and Titus Pullo.

The two centurions are introduced as *fortissimi viri,* the bravest or strongest of men. Caesar claims that they have an ongoing rivalry (*perpetuas inter se controversias*) about which one should receive the best positions. Pullo dares Vorenus to follow him into the fray, tauntingly asking Vorenus why he was hesitating at the chance to prove his *virtus* (*Pullo, cum acerrime ad munitiones pugnaretur, "Quid dubitas," inquit," Vorene? aut quem locum tuae probandae virtutis exspectas?* 5.44). Vorenus follows because he worries about what the other men would think (*Ne Vorenus quidem tum sese vallo continet, sed omnium veritus existimationem subsequitur,* 5.44). In battle, the men help each other fight off the enemy, and they each display *virtus*.

This episode serves more as an example of the competitive valor and *virtus* of Caesar's men than of their contests of mockery. There is no indication that Pullo and Vorenus' personal competition involves any mockery or battle of wit; Caesar uses no terms of derision. Vorenus does act in order to avoid the low opinion (*existimationem*) of his fellow soldiers, and we might interpret that as an action to avoid the shame state. But there is no ridicule here.

It seems unlikely, given the length of time each man served in the army and the closeness of the emotional community, that there were no scenarios in which a group of soldiers teased and mocked each other. Instead of assuming that such joking interactions did not exist, we should ask why they were not included in our texts. In this case, the Pullo and Vorenus episode does not link backward or forward to other parts of the *Bellum*

Gallicum, and the narrative is not advanced by the episode. Instead, its purpose seems to be to promote and endorse the soldiers' competition for *virtus.*[143] Caesar's literary goals had no place for focalized episodes about what it was like to be a soldier in camp, but they had plenty of use for displaying the *virtus* of his men.

Tacitus uses a similar scene to illustrate the opposite point: Vitellius' men have no *disciplina militaris* and use competition between each other to the detriment of Vitellius' army.[144] He is explicit about this argument: "According to the habits of their commanders, legates and tribunes either emulate their discipline or revel in fancy dinners; and in the same way a soldier is either focused or free (*legati tribunique ex moribus imperatorum severitatem aemulantur vel tempestivis conviviis gaudent; proinde miles intentus aut licenter agit, Hist.* 2.68)."

Vitellius' army's emotional community, in other words, is not functioning as an army should. This situation leads to interpersonal competition between a Roman legionary and a Gallic auxiliary, and the two men brawled in drunken disorder. Eventually, the legionary fell, and the auxiliary mocked him in his defeat (*postquam legionarius prociderat, insultante Gallo,* 2.68). Tacitus does not report what the Gaul said exactly, but the fight spread to the other soldiers watching, and soon led to a riot between the legionaries and the auxiliaries. Two entire auxiliary cohorts were killed in the riot.

It is important to note that the two soldiers were not equals: the legionary was a member of the Fifth Legion, and the auxiliary was a member of the local, Gallic (non-

143 See Phang 2008: 47.

144 *Hist.* 2.68 in particular, or the second half of *Hist.* 2 in general.

Roman) force. While they both served in the same army, and therefore were members of its emotional community, that community was already splintered and weak, as Tacitus takes great care to explain. And futher, the smaller emotional communities (those of local auxilaries and of career Roman soldiers) were clearly not weakened in the same way, since the soldiers came together on those sides to fight amongst each other. In this episode, then, Tacitus proves the importance of a cohesive emotional community in the army, and one that is operating with full capacity of its emotional apparatus.

Situation G: Mockery beyond the Community

Shortly after describing the riot between legionaries and auxilaries, Tacitus reinforces this point when he recounts the interactions of the soldiers (*milites* this time, not more specifically *legionarii* or *auxilii*) and local civilians. This is Situation A in Figure 1.3, featuring ridicule from Romans outside the emotional community. In this instance, the army is currently stopped just seven miles outside Rome, and Vitellius served his soldiers generous portions of food. To join in on the picnic, the people of Rome traveled to the army.

This interaction between Romans who were not in the fractured emotional community of Vitellius' army proves fatal. The townspeople caught the soldiers off guard and cut their belts, then asked about the soldiers' weapons (*incuriosos milites—vernacula utebantur urbanitate—quidam spoliavere, abscisis furtim balteis an accincti forent rogitantes,* 2.88). The soldiers did not appreciate being made laughing-stocks (*ludibrium*) and could not brook the ridicule (*non tulit ludibrium insolens contumeliarum animus*, 2.88). To cope with the humiliation of being seen *accincti* and having been caught off-

guard by townspeople, they attacked and killed some of the townspeople, including relatives of a soldier. Again, Tacitus recounts this story to describe the "many and fatal results" (*multae et atroces caedes*) of the lack of discipline and unity in Vitellius' army.

Situations A and B: Correcting Foreign Mockery

In the situations we have discussed so far, the ridiculers and the victims of ridicule have been Roman; that is, they have all been part of the larger Roman emotional community. But the army was in a position to interact with non-Romans on a regular, and highly emotional, basis. When the army's emotional community encounters ridicule from the foe, there is no need to negotiate the hierarchy of military command. Instead, it is assumed that if the Roman army is at war with a combatant – an Other over whom the army is asserting its dominance – then the enemy should not be in a position of power from which to issue hurtful ridicule at the army.[145]

In the next two situations, A and B, the Roman army's emotional community experiences ridicule from a foreign enemy (who should not be in a position of authority over the Roman army). In Situation A, the Roman army sees the truth in the criticism concealed in the ridicule, and the combination of criticism and verbal conquest by the enemy is sufficient to send the army into the shame state. However, since these episodes are presented to us by Roman authors, we see the army recuperate enough to leave the shame state and, over time, recover their pride.

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145 This is not to say that every instance of ridicule is hurtful or that every ridiculer needs to be in a position of power over his or her victim: see above, Introduction, for more.

Pride is an important part of ridicule and the shame state in confrontations between non-Romans and the Roman army's emotional community. As the armies vie for control, they engage in a contest of pride. To their enemy, an army with too much pride is *superbus.* When an army is ridiculed or defeated or both, it is faced with the sudden, painful renegotiation of its pride.

LIVY AND THE CAUDINE FORKS

Livy's description of the Roman loss at the Caudine Forks provides a good example of the Roman army's emotional community in a situation in which the army experiences ridicule and the ensuing shame state; the emotional state of the army is mapped directly onto the military and legal maneuvers in the episode, resulting in a detailed depiction of the emotional community's experience. This episode is particularly detailed because Livy, given his penchant for "thrilling" his readers with depictions of emotions[146] and for crafting moralizing narratives out of his histories, uses the defeat as an opportunity for his Roman army to display virtue and overcome a setback. As Clark has demonstrated, the military narrative of the third and second centuries BCE is presented, by Livy and others, as a story of victory and conquest.[147] Any defeat or loss is only a temporary setback in a longer, victorious campaign. And, in order to make the eventual victory seem all the more impressive, Roman authors exaggerated the military

146 *sic* Oakley 2005: 62: "L., alert to the emotions of the protagonists in his history, likes to thrill his readers by depicting the stupefying effect of a sudden or surprise development."

147 Clark's *Triumph in Defeat* (2013) traces the victory narrative in Republican history, demonstrating how military losses are emphasized precisely to make the eventual victory seem more impressive. She does not use the surrender at the Caudine Forks, and she does not identify ridicule as a tool used by historians to craft this narrative.

losses that came before: the more devastating the defeat, the more impressive the victory.[148]

Livy uses the process of ridicule and the shame state in the Roman army to present this victory-through-loss narrative in his histories. His extended discussion of the defeat at the Caudine Forks features the emotional reaction of the soldiers individually and the army as a community, and, later, the Romans as a whole. Although the Caudine Forks episode may have been a minor loss, in terms of casualties, the defeat affected the Romans deeply. It was remembered among the worst defeats in Roman history, among Allia, Trasimene, Cannae, and Arausio.[149] As if he assumes that it is so infamous that his readers will already know in what year it occurred, Livy mentions the Caudine Forks disaster in the first sentence of Book 9 (*Sequitur hunc annum nobilis clade Romana Caudina pax, 9.1*). Livy uses ridicule to emphasize the humiliation of the defeat at the Caudine Forks, elevating it, or perhaps demoting it, to the levels of the very worst military losses in Roman history.[150]

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148 Haimson Lushkov 2015: 64.

149 Oakley 2005: 38.

150 The imperial grammarian Fronto mirrors Livy's version of the Caudine Forks story arc as victory-via-defeat. Fronto groups Caudium with Allia, Cannae, Numantia, Cirta, and Carrhae in a description of Roman defeats that led to victories. Fronto is discussing a passage from Ennius' *Telamon,* in which Telamon tells his sons that he was aware that they were being sent to deadly wars; Ennius draws the comparison to Mars and the Romans, and Fronto lists several battles in which Mars (and the Roman army) turned "problems into prizes and terrors into triumphs." (*An cunctetur de militibus nostris Mars Pater illa dicere: 'Ego cum genui, tum morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli; / Praeterea, cum in terrae orbem misi ob defendendum imperium, / Scibam me in mortifera bella non in epulas mittere.' Haec verba Telamo Troiano bello de suis liberis semel elocutus est; Mars de Romanis saepe multisque in bellis hoc carmine usus est: Gallico bello apud Alliam, Samnitei apud Caudium, Punico ad Cannas, Hispanico apud Numantiam, Iugurthino apud Cirtam, Parthico ad Carrhas. Sed semper et ubique aerumnas adoreis terroresque nostros triumphis commutavit*; Fro. *Parth.* 1.3-13)

To begin, I will provide some context for the episode. Livy begins the ninth book of his *Ab Urbe Condita* with a description of the defeat at the Caudine Forks, in the Second Samnite War. According to Livy, the Roman army is deceived by Samnite soldiers, disguised as local shepherds, into believing that an allied city, Luceria, was besieged by the Samnites. In order to come to Luceria's aid as quickly as possible, Livy explains that the Roman army opted to march through a narrow gorge instead of taking a longer but more open route. The Samnite army trapped the Roman army in the gorge, known as the Caudine Forks. With nowhere to escape, the Roman army is forced to surrender to the Samnites without a battle or any bloodshed.

The Samnites are surprised by their victory, and are unsure what to do. The Samnite commander, Pontius, consults his father Herennius, who advises that the Samnites either release the entire army or kill them all, since any moderate punishment would render the Romans eager for revenge. Pontius instead decides to make an agreement with the Roman generals and sends the army under the yoke. Sending an army under the yoke (*mittere sub iugum*) is a long-standing form of torturous humiliation and embarrassment.[151] When the army returns to Rome with a *sponsio,* or agreement, with the

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151 When an ancient Italian army surrendered, there were three options: death, enslavement, or submitting to the yoke. When total death and destruction was deemed too much violence, and when enslavement was too much to handle, complete humiliation and literal subjugation (deriving from *sub* and *iugum*) was a sensible third option. But submitting to pass under the yoke was not a simple choice for a defeated army. Submission to the yoke was a sign of the ultimate humiliation for ancient Italians. The yoke was constructed of three spears, two set in the ground and a third tied across the top. Soldiers were stripped of their arms and made to walk under this arch of spears individually.

Comparable practices in ancient and medieval Europe, including even the passing of a victorious Roman army under a triumphal arch on the way into city, suggest that the practice was one of purification. Going under the triumphal arch strips the victorious army of any miasma of bloodshed; if a conquered army is stripped of its weapons and then passes under the yoke, it is cleansed of any spiritual weapons, too. So, to submit to the yoke, an army is physically and spiritually rendered unarmed and harmless, rendering it no

Samnites, the greater Roman enmotional community is horrified and humiliated, and they refuse to submit to the arrangement.[152]

Livy's careful treatment of the emotional reaction of all parties in the episode makes it a particularly fruitful examination of ridicule in the emotional community of the Roman army. Livy emphasizes the ridicule and the ensuing shame state so that it becomes part of their military defeat, and so much so that even the Romans at home experience the shame state. Attention is also paid to the Samnites' emotional state: Livy consistently casts the Samnites' success at the Caudine Forks as a result of their use of trickery, in contrast to the Roman virtue that eventually leads to their victory in the war. Livy uses *superbia* five times to describe the Samnites' tactics, each time emphasizing their unlikely or inappropriate position of power over Rome.[153]

Ridicule, Surrender, and the Shame State

The Samnites, Livy explains, have an elaborate plan to trick the Romans. The Samnites disguise some soldiers as shepherds who would tell the Romans that their allied city, Luceria, was under attack by Samnites. Since the Romans are such faithful allies, Livy explains (*haud erat dubium quin Lucerinis opem Romanus ferret, bonis ac fidelibus*

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longer a threat. This conversion is a spiritual necessity when a triumphant army returns home and disbands, but it is a humiliating disgrace for a conquered army to be forced by its conquerors to pass under the yoke. See Fowler 1920: 70- 75, Halliday 1924: 94, and Nock 1926.

152 Haimson Lushkov 2015: 71.

153 9.2.14 *praeterquam quod hostes superbe increpabant* (meanwhile their enemies arrogantly scoffed at them), 9.5.9 *iugum hostile et ludibria victoris et voltus superbos et per armatos inermium iter* (the hostile yoke and the taunts of the victor and their haughty faces and the unarmed walk through the armed enemy), 9.9.5 *an, si eadem superbia qua sponsionem istam expresserunt nobis Samnites…* (if the Samnites with that same arrogance with which they compelled us to agree to that *sponsio*), 9.12.1 *Samnitibus pro superba pace infestissimum cernentibus renatum bellum, Omnia quae deinde evenerunt non in animis solum sed prope in oculis esse* (The Samnites understood that a most bitter war was returned instead of a haughty peace, and they not only imagined but really almost saw with their eyes everything that resulted from it.), 9.14.10 *ubi errorem fraus superbe vicisset* (where [Samnite] fraud had arrogantly won over [Roman] error).

sociis, 9.2.5), the Roman army hurried to their allies' aid. They became trapped in a valley near Caudium, as the Samnites prevented them from exiting either end of the valley. When the Samnites' fraud is revealed (*cum fraus hostilis apparuisset,* 9.2.9), the Romans were overwhelmed with a stupor as they entered a shame state.

> Sistunt inde gradum sine ullius imperio, stuporque omnium animos ac velut torpor quidam insolitus membra tenet, intuentesque alii alios, cum alterum quisque compotem magis mentis ac consilii ducerent, diu immobiles silent; deinde, ubi praetoria consulum erigi videre et expedire quosdam utilia operi, quamquam ludibrio fore munientes perditis rebus ac spe omni adempta cernebant, tamen, ne culpam malis adderent, pro se quisque nec hortante ullo nec imperante ad muniendum versi castra propter aquam vallo circumdant, sua ipsi opera laboremque inritum, praeterquam quod hostes superbe increpabant, cum miserabili confessione eludentes. Ad consules maestos, ne advocantes quidem in consilium, quando nec consilio nec auxilio locus esset, sua sponte legati ac tribuni conveniunt, militesque ad praetorium versi opem, quam vix di immortales ferre poterant, ab ducibus exposcunt. 9.2.10- 15
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> They then stopped cold without any command, and a stupor came over all of their minds, and their limbs were almost paralyzed. They all looked at each other, as each one thought another was more capable in his mind and his plans, and they stood silent for a long time. Then, when they saw the tents of the consuls being set up, some of the men got out tools, although they understood that it would be ridiculous to fortify the encampment when everything was lost and all hope was gone. Nevertheless, so that they didn't add blame to their misfortunes, each one, on his own, with no one encouraging or ordering him, began to fortify the camp close to the water. Meanwhile, the enemy began to chide them haughtily, and they mocked themselves with pathetic candor about their works and their laughable effort. The demoralized consuls did not even call a meeting, since it was no time for a meeting or help, but the legates and the tribunes came together of their own accord, and the soldiers, turning to the headquarters tent, appealed to their leaders for help, which even the immortal gods could scarcely have given.

The Roman army's emotional community has entered a shame state; the leaders of the community are *maestos* (9.2.15). Livy takes care to point out the torturous physical

symptoms of the emotional state: *sistunt gradum, stupor, torpor, immobiles*. The men have frozen in their tracks, unable to do anything but look at each other in horror and disbelief as they realize that the Samnites have tricked and trapped them. This arrest is the first sign of the shame state. Livy's description of the men's helplessness conveys not only their sense of being trapped, but also their unfamiliarity with the situation. The Roman army, Livy seems to say, does not know what to do with this lowly position.

When the men are able to shake themselves into even futile action, their embarrassment is only compounded by the laughter of their enemies. Livy labels their attempts to fortify their position a *ludibrium* (9.2.12) and calls their work *inrisum* (9.2.13) – their efforts are so pointless that they have become laughable. The use of these laughter terms suggests that the very situation is a kind of ridicule for the Romans, who should not have fallen for a trick or found themselves trapped. The Roman soldiers understand the dire situation, and try to laugh at themselves to pull their emotional community out of its sorry position (*eludentes,* 9.2.14). Livy's word choice here is telling: the soldiers' attempts at finding some sense of optimism is representative of their delusion in the seriousness of their situation. Their attempt at light-heartedness is hampered by the real mockery of their enemy (*superbe increpabant,* 9.2.14). Livy uses the word *increpabant* to suggest the kind of derisive rebuke expected in a superior's derision of an inferior. Likewise, *superbe* emphasizes the haughty or condescending nature of the Samnites' laughter, and to emphasize the power reversal of the situation. To a Roman solder, being mocked by any non-Roman indicates that that mocker does not understand their power relationship; in their defeat at the Caudine Forks, though, the Roman soldiers are

certainly in the weaker position. Livy's use of *superbe* here also hints at the Roman victory to come: the Samnites may be haughty now, but they will return to their true position imminently. Livy's treatment of the emotional reaction of the soldiers, combined with the emphasis on derisive laughter, establishes this moment as a low for the *militiae* emotional community.

In contrast to the Romans, the Samnite army is delighted (*laeti*) by the developments, but they are just as clueless about what to do next. When they turn to an elder, Herennius Pontius, he advises drastic action – either complete pardon or total condemnation – because a middle ground would trigger a dangerous emotional response.

> "Ista quidem sententia" inquit "ea est, quae neque amicos parat nec inimicos tollit. Servate modo quos ignominia inritaveritis: ea est Romana gens quae victa quiescere nesciat. Vivet semper in pectoribus illorum quidquid istuc praesens necessitas inusserit, nec eos ante multiplices poenas expetitas a vobis quiescere sinet." 9.3.12- 13

> "That," he said, "is indeed a policy which neither wins friends nor destroys enemies. Just spare those whom you have provoked to anger with humiliation; the Roman race is one that does not know how to be quiet once defeated. Whatever present necessity will be burned on them will live forever in their hearts, and it will not allow them to be still until they have exacted a punishment many times worse from you."

Herennius warns the Samnites about making the Romans' shame state worse through further humiliation. Livy's description of the emotional reaction to the Romans' entrapment at the Caudine Forks resonates ominously in this passage. The evocative expression *ignominia inritaveritis,* for example, occurs only here in the historians.[154] Herennius' suggestion that the emotions of the Romans would cause a future problem for

154 Oakley 2005: 73.

the Samnites is not considered seriously by his fellow Samnites, but for Livy's readers it foreshadows the eventual defeat of the Samnites, or Rome's erasure of its *ignominia* and their humiliation at the Caudine Forks.

The Samnites, of course, do not heed Herennius' warnings and decide to send the Romans under the yoke. With this scene change, Livy redirects his readers' attention to the emotional status of the Roman army community. Their situation is hopeless; any attempts to change their position are in vain (*frustra,* 9.4.1); the war is done and over with, the Samnite Pontius reminds them (*debellatum esse,* 9.4.3),[155] even if the Romans do not seem to know how to be defeated and made prisoners (*ne victi quidem ac capti fortunam fateri scirent,* 9.4.3). The Samnites have determined to force the Romans to submit to the yoke and to the terms of an agreement of peace.

Word that they would be sent under the yoke sends the Roman emotional community spiraling deeper into a shame state. The Romans groan so loudly (*tantus gremitus omnium subito exortus est,* 9.3.6) and are overwhelmed with such sorrow (*tanta maestitia incessit*, 9.3.6) that it seemed like they had been given a death sentence (*ut non gravius accepturi viderentur si nuntiaretur omnibus eo loco mortem oppetendam esse,* 9.3.6).

After a turn of silence, the Romans try to make sense of their position. Lucius Lentulus, a lieutenant – since the consuls were too deep in their shame state to speak – suggests that the shame and humiliation of surrender is better for the soldiers to bear than

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155 The verb *debellare* features prominently in the context of one's enemies and power relationships in Vergil's *Aeneid*; see below at page 108.

a total loss of the city, and as such it is a kind of public service for the soldiers to bear for Rome (*"At foeda atque ignominiosa deditio est." Sed ea caritas patriae est ut tam ignominia eam quam morte nostra, si opus sit, servemus,* 9.4.15- 16). In this discussion, Lentulus recasts the shame state as another form of military service, in an effort to make it more palatable for the emotional community by making it more honorable. After all, as Lentulus says, this submission is necessary, and even the gods are not superior to necessity (*indignitas et pareatur necessitati, quam ne di quidem superant,* 9.4.16).

The time for the punishment is set, and the Romans renewed their lamentations. Livy focuses again on the physical symptoms of the shame state, and the emotional reactions of the community.

> Redintegrauit luctum in castris consulum aduentus, ut uix ab iis abstinerent manus, quorum temeritate in eum locum deducti essent, quorum ignauia foedius inde quam uenissent abituri: illis non ducem locorum, non exploratorem fuisse; beluarum modo caecos in foueam missos. Alii alios intueri; contemplari arma mox tradenda et inermes futuras dextras obnoxiaque corpora hosti; proponere sibimet ipsi ante oculos iugum hostile et ludibria uictoris et uoltus superbos et per armatos inermium iter, inde foedi agminis miserabilem uiam per sociorum urbes, reditum in patriam ad parentes, quo saepe ipsi maioresque eorum triumphantes uenissent: se solos sine uolnere, sine ferro, sine acie uictos; sibi non stringere licuisse gladios, non manum cum hoste conferre; sibi nequiquam arma, nequiquam uires, nequiquam animos datos. 9.5.6- 10
>
> Then a time was set for handing over the hostages and for sending the unarmed army under the yoke. The consuls' return renewed the grief in the camp to the point that the soldiers could hardly keep hands from them, through whose temerity, the soldiers said, they had been led into this place, through whose faintheartedness they were about to leave it more shamefully than that had come to it. They had no guide for the regions, and there had been no scouting; they had blindly been sent into a trap like wild animals. They all looked at each other. They gazed upon their weapons, soon to be handed over, and their right hands, about to be unarmed, and their bodies at the mercy of the enemy. They pictured

> themselves at the enemy's yoke and the taunts of the victors and their haughty faces and their unarmed march through their armed enemies; and from there the miserable trip of their shameful army through their allies' cities, their return to their parents and their homelands, where their ancestors had often returned triumphant. They alone had been conquered without wound, without sword, without a fight. They had not been allowed to draw swords, nor to engage in hand to hand battle with the enemy. For nothing they had been given arms, for nothing they had been given strength, for nothing they had been given courage.

Livy mixes depictions of the physical symptoms with descriptions of the mental anguish of the shame state. The soldiers' grief sounds in the camp (*redintegravit luctum in castris,* 9.5.6), and they resort to the clueless gazes of their earlier shame state (*alii alios intueri…* 9.5.8). The men are barely able to restrain themselves (*ut vix ab iis abstinerent manus…* 9.5.6).

Meanwhile, they imagine (*ante oculos,* 9.9.5.8) the worst: the utter humiliation of walking under the yoke. Livy equates the yoke itself with the *ludibria* of the Samnites (9.5.8), their *voltus superbus* (9.5.9) or haughty countenances, and being stripped of their military paraphernalia before the armed enemy (*per armatos inermium iter*, 9.5.9). After that, the miserable trip home (*miserabilem viam*, 9.5.9) looms large, through allied cities, and back to their formerly victorious families. When the soldiers imagine the shame of explaining their defeat without engaging the enemy, their shame state is deepened.

The actual event of passing under the yoke was worse than their imaginations, (*haec frementibus hora fatalis ignominiae aduenit, omnia tristiora experiundo factura quam quae praeceperant animis,* 9.5.11). The shame of seeing their leaders stripped was so great that the men forgot their own problems and felt the need to avert their eyes from such an unspeakable sight (*ut suae quisque condicionis oblitus ab illa deformatione*

tantae maiestatis velut ab nefando spectaculo averteret oculos, 9.5.14).[156] As the leaders of the army and of the emotional community, they were supposed to be the embodiment of the best of the emotional apparatus. To see that stripped away was devastating to the rank and file of the emotional community, and only served to further than own shame and humiliation.

The Samnites deepen the Romans' shame state by ridiculing them as they endure the humiliation of submitting to the yoke.

> Primi consules prope seminudi sub iugum missi; tum ut quisque gradu proximus erat, ita ignominiae obiectus; tum deinceps singulae legiones. Circumstabant armati hostes, exprobrantes eludentesque; gladii etiam plerisque intentati, et uolnerati quidam necatique, si uoltus eorum indignitate rerum acrior uictorem offendisset. Ita traducti sub iugum et quod paene grauius erat per hostium oculos, cum e saltu euasissent, etsi uelut ab inferis extracti tum primum lucem aspicere uisi sunt, tamen ipsa lux ita deforme intuentibus agmen omni morte tristior fuit. 9.6.1- 3
>
> The consuls were first to be sent under the yoke, half-naked. Each man, in order of rank was next; then finally the legionaries, one by one. The enemy stood around, fully armed, rebuking them and mocking them. Swords were pointed at most of them, and some were wounded and even killed, if their face offended the victor by showing their indignity too deeply. And so they were led under the yoke. And what was even harder was that after they emerged from the pass, under the eyes of their enemies, just as if they had been led out of hell, they seemed to look at the light for the first time. But that light was sadder than any death because the soldiers could see their shameful progression.

Livy has made it clear that the very thought of submitting to the yoke was painful to the emotional community; the humiliation is amplified because the Samnites have witnessed it and ridiculed it. Livy uses both *exprobantes* and *eludentes* to express the ridicule that the Romans endured; these words convey both the reproachful derision and

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156 See Barton 2002 for more about the power of the gaze in this scene.

the more spirited mockery of the Samnites. The force behind their ridicule is clear: the Samnites are armed, with their swords pointed at the unarmed Romans, and they go so far as to actually kill some of the Romans, who did not show sufficient deference to the Samnites. The experience of the shame state is physically forced upon the Romans, on pain of death.

When their humiliation ended, the men began their trip home. Their sad shame (*pudor,* 9.6.4; *miseratio,* 9.6.5; *adeo super maerorem pudor,* 9.6.9) made them anxious about facing their normally haughty allies (*superbiam ingenitam Campanis,* 9.6.5). Indeed, their shame state intensified at Capua, since they admitted in a meeting with the Campanians there that the Samnites had accomplished more than an impressive military victory, which is all the Gauls had done in years past; the Samnites had also conquered Roman virtue and ferocity (*habere Samnites victoriam non praeclaram solum sed etiam perpetuam, cepisse enim eos non Romam, sicut ante Gallos, sed, quod multo bellicosius fuerit, Romanam virtutem ferociamque,* 9.6.13). This line epitomizes the entire episode. The sentiment will prove to be very wrong, of course, since the Romans will regain their *virtutem ferociamque* by defeating the Samnites decidedly. But that Roman victory seems all the more impressive because of how low the Roman army felt after their defeat, and how much of their emotional apparatus – represented by their *virtutem ferociamque* – they needed to recover.

Recovery from the Shame State

Livy crafted the defeat at the Caudine Forks as a nadir for the Roman army, but he also planted seeds of hope for their recovery. First, a Capuan ally, Aulus Calavius,

explains to the morose Romans that their emotional reaction (or, in our terms, shame state) was actually a sign of their strength:

> dicitur A. Calavius, Ovi filius, clarus genere factisque, tum etiam aetate verendus, longe aliter se habere rem dixisse: silentium illud obstinatum fixosque in terram oculos et surdas ad omnia solacia aures et pudorem intuendae lucis ingentem molem irarum ex alto animi cientis indicia esse. aut Romana se ignorare ingenia, aut silentium illud Samnitibus flebiles brevi clamores gemitusque excitaturum, Caudinaeque pacis aliquanto Samnitibus quam Romanis tristiorem memoriam fore; quippe suos quemque eorum animos habiturum, ubicumque confessuri sint; saltus Caudinos non ubique Samnitibus fore. 9.6.3- 5
>
> Aulus Calavius, son of Ovius, a man famous in birth and deeds, and at that time also respectable because of his age, is said to have declared that it was another situation entirely. He said that their obstinate silence, their eyes fixed on the ground, and their ears deaf to any consolation, their shame in looking on the light – these were signs of a spirit bursting with anger. "Either I am ignorant of the Roman spirit," he said, "or that silence in short time will be Samnite cries and groans of anguish, and that the Caudine peace will someday become a memory sadder to the Samnites than the Romans, since each people would have their own spirit wherever they might meet, but the Samnites would not always have a Caudine Forks."

Calavius encourages the Romans to recognize that their emotional reaction to their humiliation is an indication of their previous beliefs about themselves. He suggests to the Romans that their shame state – the symptoms of which he identifies as their silence, disengagement, and inability to be consoled – is not their final emotional state. His analysis is consistent with the pattern of ridicule and the shame state outlined by psychologists.[157] Although the community's emotional apparatus is currently unsettled and in a shame state, it can be recovered. To do so, the Roman army needs to correct the

[157] See Introduction.

perceptions of the power relationship between the Romans and Samnites. If the Roman army successfully reasserts its position of power over the Samnites through a more decisive military victory, then the Caudine Forks will indeed become a painful memory to the Samnites.

After Calavius' encouraging speech, Livy jumps to Rome to feature the Romans' reaction to the news of the Caudine Forks. The emotional community of the townspeople has an emotional reaction (*concitationem animorum,* 9.7.10) similar to the army's emotional community: they feel sadness (*tristior,* 9.7.6; *maestior*, 9.7.9), anger (*irasci,* 9.7.9; *iratis,* 9.7.10; even hatred, *odisse,* 9.7.10), shame (*ignominiosae,* 9.7.6), and grief (*luctus,* 9.7.8; *miserabilis,* 9.7.10).[158] The consuls shut themselves in their homes and refuse to do any business, except nominating a dictator to oversee government business – including an election – in this time of emergency (9.7.12). The entire city enters a shame state as a result of the humiliation of the Caudine Forks.

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158 9.7.6- 10: Iam Romae etiam sua infamis clades erat. Obsessos primum audierunt; tristior deinde ignominiosae pacis magis quam periculi nuntius fuit. Ad famam obsidionis dilectus haberi coeptus erat; dimissus deinde auxiliorum apparatus, postquam deditionem tam foede factam acceperunt, extemploque sine ulla publica auctoritate consensum in omnem formam luctus est. Tabernae circa forum clausae, iustitiumque in foro sua sponte coeptum prius quam indictum; lati clavi, anuli aurei positi; paene maestior exercitu ipso civitas esse; nec ducibus solum atque auctoribus sponsoribusque pacis irasci sed innoxios etiam milites odisse et negare urbe tectisve accipiendos. Quam concitationem animorum fregit adventus exercitus etiam iratis miserabilis.

For the infamous disaster was already known at Rome. They first heard that the men were trapped; then came more news, sadder because of the disgraceful peace than the danger. They had begun to hold a levy on account of rumor of a blockade, but then they dismissed the aid when they heard that such a shameful surrender was made. And immediately, without any official declaration, there was grief of every sort. The stalls around the Forum closed and all business suspended before an announcement was made. Tunics with broad stripes and golden rings were put away. The citizens were almost more devastated than the army itself, and they were not only enraged at the leaders and those who had created and sponsored the peace, but they also hated the innocent soldiers and refused to accept them into the city or their homes. But the arrival of the army, which was pitiful even to angry men, tamed this spirited passion.

First on the agenda for the newly elected government was the peace of the Caudine Forks. The Romans did not want to accept the *ignominia* of the forced surrender and the ensuing humiliation of the yoke: this is a sign that the Roman public and the newly elected officials were in the process of recovering from their shame state. When Spurius Postumius, the consul who had negotiated the peace settlement, was called to explain his actions, Livy makes it clear that Postumius was still suffering in a shame state because of the shame of the Caudine Forks peace: "When he stood up, with that very same expression on his face as when he had gone under the yoke, he said, "I am not unaware, consuls, that I am called to speak about my shame (*ignominia*), not to be granted honor" (*qui ubi surrexit, eodem illo vultu quo sub iugum missus erat, "Haud sum ignarus," inquit, "consules, ignominiae non honoris causa me primum excitatum iussumque dicere,*" 9.8.2- 3).

Spurius Postumius' speech was so moving that the senate took pity on him, and their pity transformed into resentment and anger at the reduction of such a great man into such a miserable figure (*modo miserarentur quod vir talis etiam praecipuum apud hostes supplicium passurus esset ob iram diremptae pacis,* 9.8.12). This emotional shift is the next sign of the Romans' recovery from the ridicule and humiliation at the Caudine Forks.

To recover their hurt pride and save face, the Romans needed to address two problems: the shameful nature of the peace agreement, and the humiliation of the army's surrender. To correct the first problem, the Romans retroactively, and perhaps

unlawfully, reframed the peace agreement with the Samnites;[159] to rectify the second problem, the Roman army's emotional community needed to recover from its shame state and adjust the Samnite army's (mis-)understanding of their power relationship.

Postumius suggests that he, along with the other men who had sponsored the peace, should be given over to the Samnites in a rejection of the peace agreement. He describes the Samnites as haughty ("with that same arrogance," *eadem superbia,* 9.9.5) for forcing the Romans into a surrender and for presuming that they had conquered the Romans. When he finished speaking, he had led the Romans out of a shame state. Livy vividly describes the sense of a new dawn at Rome: "When the senate passed this motion, it was as if light had dawned on the state" (*hoc senatus consulto facto lux quaedam adfulsisse civitati visa est,* 9.10.2). The Romans praised Postumius for his leadership (*eum laudibus ad caelum ferebant,* 9.10.3), and everyone felt as if Rome had been saved from slavery because of him (*emersisse civitatem ex obnoxia pace illius consilio et opera,* 9.10.4). The city was so ablaze with passion that volunteers repopulated the Roman army (*in civitate ira odioque ardente dilectus prope omnium voluntariorum fuit,* 9.10.6).

Postumius and this new contingent of the Roman army arrived at the Samnites, with the explanation that Postumius and others had unjustly agreed to the peace and therefore the Roman people wished to "be absolved of the heinous crime" of surrender (*quo populus Romanus scelere impio sit solutus hosce homines vobis dedo,* 9.10.7). The

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159 Livy is confusing and conflicting and probably purposefully vague about the exact nature of the peace. The key problem is whether the agreement was a *foedus* or a *sponsio,* which would limit the responsibility of the agreement to the *sponsores* of the agreement. If the peace could be recast as a more informal agreement rather than a sanctified pact, the Romans could more completely erase the shame of the Caudine peace. For more, see Oakley 2005: 31ff. The legal arguments of the Romans' handling of the agreement are not necessary to our understanding of their emotional reactions in the situation, so I leave them aside.

Samnite leader, Pontius, rejects the new terms of the surrender and refuses to acknowledge Postumius' reconfiguration of the battle (*nec ego istam deditionem accipiam inquit nec Samnites ratam habebunt,* 9.11.1). But, importantly, he does challenge the Roman people, suggesting that if they would like to redo the peace agreement, then they should also redo the battle at the Caudine Forks: "I appeal to the Roman people: if they regret the *sponsio* made at the Caudine Forks, then let them replace their legions in the valley where they were surrounded. Let no one deceive anyone, let everything be as though it hadn't happened." (*populum Romanum appello; quem si sponsionis ad furculas Caudinas factae fuerunt. nemo quemquam deceperit; omnia pro infecto sint…* 9.11.3- 4). Pontius' charge is meant as a challenge: if the Romans want a do-over, then they should suffer through the same circumstances in which they were so miserably defeated the first time.

But Pontius gives the Roman emotional community what they were seeking: an opportunity to literally erase the humiliation of the defeat at the Caudine Forks. With their new pride in leadership and in their emotional community, the Romans are able to find victory in the renewal of war, and the Samnites realize that the Romans would not end a war without victory (*geri posse bellum Romani pro victoria certa haberent, Samnites simul rebellasse et vicisse crederent Romanum,* 9.12.3- 4). The Samnites understand "too late and in vain" (*sero ac nequiquam,* 9.12.2) that, by humiliating the Romans with ridicule and a "haughty peace" (*superba pace,* 9.12.1), the Romans would recover their emotional state and return a "most bitter war" (*infestissimum renatum bellum,* 9.12.1) in exchange for their brief humiliation.

The Caudine Forks episode is a complicated fabric, with snags in the Romans' religious and legal correctness, but Livy uses the emotional state of his Roman army's emotional community to create a compelling narrative. The evocative descriptions of the army's shame state, and their eventual recovery, gives a casual reader an opportunity to follow along with the story, but it also gives Livy the opportunity to give his Romans a more impressive victory, both moral and military, because of their triumph over a more dismal setback.

VERGIL'S *AENEID*

In the following passages, I provide examples of ridicule in the context of the army in the *Aeneid.*[160] As I will show later, Vergil's representation of ridicule in the army provides a template for Tacitus to use in his own histories. Vergil contrasts pious Aeneas, a model leader of the *militiae* emotional community, with the derisive and *superbus* Rutulian king Turnus.[161] Although Turnus' men attempt to ridicule Aeneas' men, the Trojans' emotional community is too strong and healthy to be wounded by ridicule. Vergil carefully avoids assigning ridicule, sarcasm, or the like to the Trojans in general, and Aeneas in particular;[162] this characterization both solidifies the Trojans' chivalrous piety and draws all the more attention to the ridicule when it does originate from Aeneas, at the final scene of the *Aeneid*.

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160 Obviously the army in the *Aeneid* is not yet Roman but Trojan; but here, as always in the *Aeneid*, Aeneas and his men stand for future Romans.

161 Indeed most of the ridicule is in the second, or war-like *Iliad*-like, half of the *Aeneid*. The combative nature of the war between the Trojans and the Italians certainly lends itself to aggressive verbal expression, like ridicule. See Highet 1972 on types of speech in the *Aeneid.*

162 In sharp contrast to the Homeric heroes: see Keith 1924 and Highet 1972: 116.

In this section, I show that Vergil portrays Turnus and the Rutulians as ridiculers as part of his characterization of them as the enemy. I show how Vergil has his hero Aeneas navigate the complications of pride (*superbia*) without stepping outside the mores of his emotional community. By responding to ridicule without entering a shame state and without succumbing to anger,[163] Vergil's Aeneas sets a model for Roman heroes yet to come.

Parcere Subiectis et Debellare Superbos

Vergil makes the credo for his proto-Roman army clear during Aeneas' *katabasis*. In a parade of heroes in the underworld, Aeneas' father Anchises gives him a tour of future Roman successes and shares a glimpse of the *imperium* that the Romans will one day wield. His words speak both to Aeneas, in the context of the story, but also to Vergil's audience of Romans.[164] Anchises' apostrophe *Romane* (6.851) is an example of this double audience. After describing the glories of future Rome, Anchises provides some guidance to Aeneas in how to achieve these accomplishments (which, of course, Vergil's audience knows well have already been achieved). Anchises' final charge to these audiences is to be mindful of their own authority, by sparing the conquered and conquering the *superbi*:

> tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento
> (hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem,
> <u>parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.</u> 6.851- 853[165]

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163 I address the *ira* of Aeneas in the final scene, in which he kills Turnus after seeing Pallas' belt, below at page 122.

164 Austin 1977: 263, Toll 1997: 42ff, Reed 2007: 40, cf. Horsfall 1995: 144- 6.

165 On Anchises' command, see Lloyd 1972: 126ff, Austin 1977: 263f, Galinsky 1988: 323, Putnam 1995: 18f, Horsfall 2014: 583ff.

> Remember, Roman, to rule the nations with your power
> (these will be your skills), to establish peace with law,
> to spare the conquered, and to subdue the proud.

The verb *debellare* recalls Livy:[166] his tendency to use the word puts in mind the Roman victory narrative, as discussed above. Anchises' words suggest that *superbia* is something to be corrected in one's enemies. If we interpret these lines as a mission statement for Romans both in and beyond the *Aeneid,* then adjusting the exaggerated self-assessment of one's enemy becomes a patriotic duty. For the characters of the *Aeneid,* and as a message for those reading along, conquering one's ridiculers is a step toward fulfilling one's destiny.

Vergil certainly provides us with some handy examples of conquering the proud *(debellare superbos*). In the second half of the *Aeneid,* the Rutulian king, Turnus, and his allies are regularly described as *superbus:* Turnus five times, Turnus' brother-in-law once, the Etruscan king Mezentius twice, the Laurentines once, and in general several more times.[167] Turnus is characterized as a violent braggart of a *hostis* whose *superbia* is out of control; he and his men are constantly shown as ridiculers. Aeneas, on the other hand, is pious and dutiful, and his men deflect ridicule without any losses. Vergil uses *superbia* to highlight another contrast between his antagonist and his hero, and the scenes of ridicule illustrate the idealized reaction of the Roman army's emotional community.

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166 Horsfall 2014: 586 considers *debellare superbos* to be "an outstanding lexical allusion… altogether ignored... the verb is distinctively Livian, 3x in the first pentad, 7x in the second, 49x in the remaining books."

167 Turnus 7.544, 10.445, 10.514, 12.236, 12.236; Remulus 9.634; Mezentius 11.15; Laurentines 8.613. Vergil uses forms of *superbia* 40 times in the *Aeneid,* and only Turnus is described as such more than once. Turnus' name may play on the Greek τύραννος (tyrant), which would in turn evoke thoughts of *regnum* and *superbia.* See Cairns 1989: 67ff for more on Turnus as a "bad king."

Turnus

Turnus is introduced in book seven of the *Aeneid* when the Fury Allecto appears to him at night, having been sent by Juno to stir up Turnus and his men against Aeneas.[168] Allecto appears in the guise of Calybe, an aged priestess of Juno, and rebukes Turnus for his inaction. Allecto calls Turnus *inrise* (425), perhaps "fool" or "mocked one:" Turnus will be the butt of every joke if he loses his betrothed, Lavinia, to the newcomer Aeneas.[169] Allecto immediately draws attention to the connection between Turnus and *inridere.*

Turnus is not impressed with her rousing speech, and Vergil describes his reaction as "mocking" (*inridens,* 435), thus immediately establishing the tone of Turnus' speech.[170] In reacting this way, he embodies the condescension and derision that Allecto-as-Calybe had warned him, by calling him *inrise* (425) would be assigned to him by the Latins.[171] He begins by asserting his superiority over Allecto-in-disguise: he claims to have superior knowledge of events (*non, ut rere, ...effugit,* 437) and a close relationship with Juno (*nec regia Iuno/ immemor est nostri,* 438- 439). Allecto, of course, as an immortal sent by Juno personally, is more aware of current events and of Juno's state of mind than Turnus is. This misunderstanding of the power dynamic serves the dual

168 On the appearance of Allecto to the sleeping Turnus as a reference to the appearance of Hector's ghost to Aeneas in book 2, see Horsfall 2000: 297. Given my analysis of Turnus' characterization in this scene, I agree with Feeney 1991: 170, and disagree with Horsfall 2000: 296f, that Turnus is asleep in this passage.
169 cf. Horsfall 2000: 290 on *inrise.*
170 cf. Cairns 1989: 69, Schenk 1984: 43f; *pace* Horsfall 2000: 298, who does not see "open disrespect" until *ne…finge* at 438.
171 *ibid.* 295.

purpose of establishing Turnus as *superbus* but also providing Allecto with an opportunity to give Turnus his comeuppance.

He then belittles her appearance (*victa situ verique effeta,* 440; technically describing *senectus* but in essence describing Allecto). He continues his ridicule of Allecto by suggesting that her own old age is mocking her (*senectus…ludit,* 440- 441). He then sends her away, landing a final blow by claiming that such affairs are men's work.

> Hic iuvenis vatem inridens sic orsa vicissim
> ore refert: 'classis invectas Thybridis undam
> non, ut rere, meas effugit nuntius auris;
> ne tantos mihi finge metus. nec regia Iuno
> immemor est nostri.
> sed te victa situ verique effeta senectus,
> o mater, curis nequiquam exercet, et arma
> regum inter falsa vatem formidine ludit.
> cura tibi divum effigies et templa tueri;
> bella viri pacemque gerent quis bella gerenda.' 7.435- 444
>
> The young man, mocking the seer, in turn
> spoke these words: "That a fleet has entered the waters of the Tiber
> has not, as you think, escaped my notice.
> Don't assume it's a big fear of mine. And Queen Juno
> is not forgetful of me.
> But you, O mother, old age, conquered by weakness
> and barren of truth, vexes with idle cares and mocks you with false fear,
> you prophetess amidst the wars of kings.
> Your duty is to attend to the gods' statues and their temples;
> men will make war and peace, by whom wars are supposed to be waged.

Turnus' mockery of Allecto is particularly based on her guise as an old woman. He laughs at her supposed weakness and barrenness, and suggests that she has been fooled. His tone is entirely dismissive (*non, ut rere…* 7.437), and he is cruel to her, though he acknowledges she is in a position of some authority (as a priestess). His pompousness is

borne out as he contrasts himself with her, emphasizing how privileged he is to be a favorite of Juno's, and how it is his duty to carry on the important matters of war and peace. This is our first real impression of Turnus as a character.[172] His nature, or personal emotional apparatus, is made clear before he is overwhelmed by the Fury.

Allecto, understandably, does not react well to Turnus' ridicule. She flies into a rage (*exarsit in iras,* 445) and hurls Turnus' own words back into his face:

> Talibus Allecto dictis exarsit in iras. 445
> at iuveni oranti subitus tremor occupat artus,
> deriguere oculi: tot Erinys sibilat hydris
> tantaque se facies aperit; tum flammea torquens
> lumina cunctantem et quaerentem dicere plura
> reppulit, et geminos erexit crinibus anguis, 450
> verberaque insonuit rabidoque haec addidit ore:
> 'en ego victa situ, quam veri effeta senectus
> arma inter regum falsa formidine ludit.
> respice ad haec: adsum dirarum ab sede sororum,
> bella manu letumque gero.' 455
> sic effata facem iuveni coniecit et atro
> lumine fumantis fixit sub pectore taedas. 7.435- 457
>
> With these worse Allecto burned in anger.
> And a sudden trembling seized the young man's body as he spoke,
> and his eyes froze: the Fury hissed with so many snakes
> and she presented herself with such a form. Then, turning her
> fiery eyes on him as he hesitated and tried to say more,
> she pushed him back and raised up a pair of serpents from her hair,
> and she bellowed forth, cracking her whip, and added these words:
> "Oh, look at me, conquered by weakness, whom old age, barren of truth
> mocks with false fear amidst the wars of kings.
> Look at this: I am here from the home of the dread sisters,
> and I bring war and death in my hand."

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[172] I take this characterization as representative of "the nature of the character," not quite yet influenced by the furious nature of the Fury, cf. Horsfall 1995: 158 and Thomas 1998: 285, and *pace* Stahl 1990: 182. Cairns 1989: 68ff describes this negative characterization as a binary for Aeneas' characterization, but also concedes that Turnus' *furor* here is "divinely inspired." I do note, as does Horsfall 1995: 159- 60 (citing "poetical indirection [that] imposes critical caution"), that the perhaps-sleeping Turnus and the perhaps allegorical Allecto confuse our understanding of Turnus.

> Thus speaking she threw a torch at the young man and
> planted the torch, smoking with dark light, in his chest.

Her lines *victa situ, quam veri effeta senectus / arma inter regum falsa formidine ludit* (7.452- 453) mimic Turnus' lines *sed te victa situ verique effeta senectus, / o mater, curis nequiquam exercet, et arma/ regum inter falsa vatem formidine ludit* (7.440- 442). As she aggressively demonstrates her power over Turnus, she twists his words to sound as foolish as they were cruel. In other words, she mocks him for his mockery. She emphasizes her vigor by physically forcing him down (*reppulit,* 450) and snapping her whip (*verberaque insonuit*, 451). Her verbal and physical assaults leave him astonished. She not only addresses his withering dismissal but belittles him, terrifies him into a stupor, and rather efficiently recorrects Turnus' understanding of their interpersonal power dynamic.

Turnus jumps up and immediately sets off to do as Allecto orders. His physical symptoms of being frozen in terror and trembling with fear (7.456- 457), and sweating and arousal from sleep (7.458- 459) are understandable physical reactions to fear and nightmares. They could also be evidence that Turnus is under Allecto's spell. Either way, his characterization as a ridiculer is our first impression of him: *inridens* is the first modifier used to describe Turnus in the poem, and his comments mocking Allecto's disguise occur before she attacks him with her snakes and torch. So, in our dichotomy of hero and foe, victim and ridiculer, good pride and bad: Turnus is *inridens,* or a ridiculer, and a proud enemy. As a leader of his army's emotional community, he promotes a spirit of derisive hostility.

Turnus' characterization in this opening scene is maintained throughout the rest of the *Aeneid* as a foil to Aeneas.[173] Where Turnus first displays his general impiety through his disrespect to Allecto/Cabyle in this scene, Aeneas is known as *pius Aeneas* throughout the poem.[174] Turnus, as we will see in the following sections, is driven by violent anger (*furor, ira, violentia*)[175] and *superbia.* Cairns describes the contrasts between Turnus and Aeneas "particularly in respect of kingly qualities to do with war and peace."[176] In other words, the two men, as leaders of their army's emotional community, embody opposite emotional apparatuses.

Numanus Remulus

Turnus, as the leader of his own army's emotional community, is a representative of the emotional apparatus of that community. Another example of that community's characterization as prideful and aggressively derisive is echoed in the character of Numanus Remulus, Turnus' intended brother-in-law, who appears just once, in Book Nine. In his short appearance, Numanus confirms the derisive characterization of the Rutulains, and gives an opportunity for the Trojans to display their *virtus* by effortlessly silencing him, correcting his assessment of them. This scene occurs during the confrontation between Trojans and the Rutulians after the Trojans Nisus and Euryalus are killed in a raid on the Rutulians' camp. Since Numanus' ridicule is part of the aftermath of this raid, it is important to note two aspects of the Trojan response to the deaths of

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173 Schenk 1984, Cairns 1989.
174 Cairns 1989: 58ff.
175 Turnus alone is ascribed *violentia* in the *Aeneid,* at 11.354, 11.376, 12.9, and 12.45. See Putnam 1995: 247.
176 Cairns 1989: 70.

Nisus and Euryalus. First, Vergil does not dwell on the shame state experienced by the rest of the army's emotional community; second, the Trojans enjoy the reparation of pride and self even without enduring an episode of the shame state.

Vergil sets the scene for Numanus' taunts with heightened tensions and emotions after the raid. However, as Numanus Remulus points out at 9.598, the Trojans were not in a shame state after the defeat of Nisus and Euryalus. Vergil simply says that they "stood around, sad" (*stant maesti,* 471) upon seeing the impaled heads of their comrades. Vergil deflects the grief of the Trojan army to Euryalus' mother, who mourns her son in an extended description at 9.473- 592. Her reaction to her son's death serves as an outlet for Trojan emotions. As she laments, filling the sky with her cries (*caelum dehinc questibus implet,* 480), she offers her own body to the Rutulians and begs the gods to take her away from her grief (494). She addresses her dead son in a series of anguished rhetorical questions (e.g. "Is this what you bring home to me, son? Is this why I have followed you across land and sea?" *hoc mihi de te, / nate, refers? hoc sum terraque marique secuta?* 490- 1), emphasizing her relationship to the dead Euryalus with an enjambed *nate* at the beginning of the line. Vergil emphasizes the physical descriptions of her grief (e.g. "But suddenly the warmth left the bones of that poor woman;" *at subitus miserae calor ossa reliquit,* 475). Her grief touched the men around her: *hoc fletu concussi animi, maestusque per omnis it gemitus* ("Their hearts shook with this wailing, and a groan of sorrow went through them all," 498). Just as the Trojans were touched by Euryalus' mother's grief, a war trumpet sounds (*at tuba…increpuit,* 503- 4) and shakes the community back to its battle stations. The community does not enter a shame state; they

do not even enter an extended stage of grief. They pause long enough to be moved by a woman's motherly grief, they empathize, and they continue their task.

The Rutulian army, on the other hand, has a reaction more befitting a shame state in mourning for their own dead after the Nisus and Euryalus episode.[177] They are described as "weeping" (*flentes,* 451), and there is much grieving in their camps (*nec minor in castris luctus,* 452), and they rush together to their dead and wounded (*ingens concursus ad ipsa corpora… tepidaque recentem/ caede locum,* 455- 6). They follow Turnus into anger and agression (*Turnus in arma viros…suscitat,* 462- 3; *variisque acuunt rumoribus iras,* 464), mounting the heads of Nisus and Euryalus on spears, seeking to avenge their losses. Vergil implies that the Trojans are able to overcome this setback without experiencing the lows of a shame state. They mourn appropriately, but they are not so overwhelmed as to require an impressive recovery from a major setback. Unlike the Romans at the Caudine Forks, their victory is presented without the fluff of an exaggerated loss. The Rutulians, however, follow their leader Turnus in his tendency for *violentia* and aggression.

When the Rutulians approach the Trojan camp, the two armies clash in a fierce battle. With Turnus wounded after an *aristeia* on the battlefield, the focus shifts to Ascanius as he kills Numanus Remulus, who is engaged to marry Turnus' sister. This is our first (and only) glimpse of Numanus Remulus, but he memorably follows the

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177 I would not quite label this a shame state, either, since the term implies a constellation of emotions and values that are not all present. Only one emotion (*maestas*) and its symptoms (*flentes, luctus*) are described. In contrast to the Trojans, who were moved by Euryalus' mother's emotions, the entire community experiences a strong reaction to their setback.

example of Turnus' immediate mockery.[178] He mocks the Trojans mercilessly with a long rant about the manliness of the Italians and the feminine weakness of the Trojans. Numanus is puffed up and swollen with pride (*tumidus novo praecordia regno*, 596)[179] and shouts out with a huge voice that conveys this pride in himself (*ingentem sese clamore ferebat,* 597). Numanus displays the symptoms of having excessive, and therefore negative, pride. His mocks the Trojan army with a series of boasts and taunts, seeking to undermine their courage and their position with derisive jokes and mockery (595- 620).

Numanus begins by implying that the Trojans should be in a shame state after the embarrassing beheadings of their compatriots, as the rest of the army stands in the fortifications rather helplessly: "Aren't you ashamed, you twice-captured Phrygians, that you're being besieged and held behind ramparts again, and holding off death with walls?" (*non pudet, obsidione iterum valloque teneri / bis capti Phryges, et morti praetendere muros?* 598-9). He belittles their experience as an army (and therefore an emotional community) by pointing out their defeats (*bis capti Phryges,* 599), mocking their position behind their walls, and minimizing their previous opponents (*non hic Atridae nec fandi fictor Ulixes,* 602). Since Vergil has *not* presented the Trojans as experiencing the shame

178 Discussed in detail at Baraz 2013: 266f.

179 At 11.715- 718, the Rutulian ally Camilla also describes her foe, known only as the "son of Aunus," as "puffed up with pride" (*vane Ligus frustraque animis elate superbis,* 715). His taunt, which infuriated Camilla with a bitter smart (*dixit, at illa furens acrique accensa dolore,* 709) is one example of ridicule originating in the Trojans' side. Vergil deflects any blame by putting the taunt in the mouth of a Ligurian ally, since Ligurians were said to be liars and tricksters (*dum fallere fata sinebant,* 701). Even still, Vergil tempers this suggestion by noting that the son of Aunus only turns to a tactic of craftiness (*consilio versare dolos ingressus et astu/ incipit haec,* 704- 5) once Camilla has physically cornered him.

state, Vergil suggests instead that the community is strong, though in mourning and under the pressure of an attack.

Numanus attacks the Trojans with several points of mockery. He laughs at the idea that the Trojan army should even pose a threat to the Rutulian army, at least as far as marriage goes (*en qui nostra sibi bello conubia poscunt!* 600). He suggests that their aggression must be madness or divinely inspired (*quis deus Italiam, quae vos dementia adegit?* 601). These taunts are designed to undermine the emotional community's determination, or *animus,* and cause the army to disintegrate. A splintered emotional community would be easier to defeat, and certainly the ridiculing army could derive pleasure from seeing their enemy in such a state.

Numanus suggests that the Trojans are too feminine (*vere Phrygiae, neque enim Phryges,* 617) to be soldiers, whereas the Rutulians are hardened soldiers from birth (eg: *durum a stirpe genus natos ad flumina primum/ deferimus…,* 604- 5). Vergil adds weight to Numanus' taunts in his word choice: the taunts are *dira,* or dreadful curses, and Numanus boasts (*iactantem*) and sings out (*cantantem*) his jeers (621). This haughty presentation and body language increase the impact of Numanus' ridicule.

Despite Numanus' attempts to weaken the Trojans' resolve by ridiculing them, the Trojans do not enter a shame state. Ascanius could not bear Numanus' taunts (*talia iactantem dictis,* 621) and waited only long enough to ask Jupiter's approval in his killing

Numanus (625- 9). When the arrow neatly kills Remulus, slicing his skull in half, Ascanius vaunts his rebuttal to the Rutulian ridicule:[180]

> effugit horrendum stridens adducta sagitta
> perque caput Remuli venit et cava tempora ferro
> traicit. 'i, verbis virtutem inlude superbis!
> bis capti Phryges haec Rutulis responsa remittunt':
> hoc tantum Ascanius. Teucri clamore sequuntur
> laetitiaque fremunt animosque ad sidera tollunt. 9.632- 637
>
> The taut arrow raced forth with a terrible whistle.
> It went through Remulus' head and cleaved his hollow temples
> with its steel. "Go on, mock virtue with haughty words!
> We twice-captured Phrygians send the Rutulians this response!"
> and then Ascanius spoke no more. The Teucrians followed with cheers
> and they shouted for joy and raised their spirits to the stars.

He dares the Rutulians to continue Numanus' ridicule and his *superbi* words, and notes the "twice-captured" Trojans are nonetheless capable of responding to ridicule with fatal results (634- 5). Much as Allecto twists Turnus' mocking words into a taunt of her own, Ascanius is able to reflect the taunt against the Trojans, using Numanus' words against him. The Trojans cheer, their spirits lifted because they have conquered the haughty foe (636- 7).

The Trojans' reaction, led by Ascanius, demonstrates their judgment of the Rutulians and Numanus' ridicule. Ascanius calls Numanus' taunts *superba verba,* the words of someone with excess pride, or someone who has misjudged his relationship with the victim(s) of his ridicule. By quite literally silencing Numanus, Ascanius corrects the power relationship. Not only was Numanus incorrect in reducing the Trojans to

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180 Hardie 1995: 187 points out that Numanus Remulus is not the only Italian with a Rem- name to be killed immediately after mocking newly built walls (cf. Remus).

simply "twice-captured Trojans," he was also wrong about his own strength and valor. Moreover, Jupiter's omen of thunder from a clear sky (630- 1) indicates that Ascanius and the Trojans have the king of gods on their side. Just after Ascanius kills Numanus, Apollo congratules Ascanius on his valor (*macte nova virtute, puer,* 641). These divine endorsements reinforce the Trojans' position over the Rutulians.

This scene is important to the themes of *superbia* and ridicule in the *Aeneid* because it reinforces the characterization of the Rutulians as quick to ridicule, just like the leader of their emotional community, Turnus. At the same time, Vergil depicts the Trojans as a strong emotional community that does not break down into a shame state when faced with ridicule or trauma. Instead, they have the gods' blessing to correct the misunderstanding that allowed for the ridicule in the first place. When Ascanius kills Numanus, he also silences the criticism of their ridicule.

Aeneas and Turnus

The themes of *superbia* and ridicule have informed the characterizations of Aeneas and Turnus, as leaders of their emotional communities, through the second half of the *Aeneid.* Aeneas is shown as a strong and sympathetic character, while Turnus' subversive, derisive *superbia* is emphasized. In the final scene, however, Aeneas kills Turnus as he supplicates Aeneas for his life. This unexpected action leaves the audience feeling unsettled, and the sudden ending of the poem leaves no time to understand his behavior. I argue that the end of the *Aeneid,* and Aeneas' actions, are best understood through the framework of emotional community, as I have outlined it.

Vergil re-establishes the characterizations of both leaders early in Book 12. Turnus opens the book by burning implacably and gathering his courage for battle (*ultro implacabilis ardet/ attollitque animos,* 3- 4). His *violentia* (9) grows restlessly like a wounded lion's (6) as he speaks impatiently (*turbidus,* 10; *'nulla mora in Turno,'* 11) to Latinus, who acknowledges Turnus' *ferox virtus* (20).[181] Turnus responds to Latinus' pleas with *violentia* (45), even growing more angry as a result of Latinus' pandering (*exsuperat magis aegrescitque medendo,* 46). He threateningly describes his bloodlust, even haughtily calling out Venus, as Aeneas' mother (52- 3). Turnus, as ever, is hot-headed and violent.

Vergil reminds us of Aeneas' piety: Aeneas makes a sacrifice and vows to be a pious son-in-law to Latinus, showing deference to his "father-in-law Latinus" (*socer…Latinus,* 192) and husband, naming his future city after his wife Lavinia (*mihi moenia Teucri/ constituent urbique dabit Lavinia nomen,* 193- 4). In this same oath, Vergil has Aeneas promise to be merciful to the Italians, to build a new city instead of conquering them and depriving them of a home (*non ego nec Teucris Italos parere iubebo/ nec mihi regna peto: paribus se legibus ambae/ invictae gentes aeterna in foedera mittant,* 189- 92). With this oath, Aeneas emphasizes his own *pietas* and *clementia,* both important aspects of the *militiae* emotional community.[182]

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181 Latinus' speech to Turnus is calm (*olli sedate respondit corde Latinus,* 18) and placating; an attempt to flatter and appease Turnus and dissuade him from battle against Aeneas. I would argue that *ferox virtus* can be read as both a compliment – intending to flatter Turnus' *virtus,* as a soldier – and a veiled insult – drawing attention to his unstable hostility, with *ferox.*

182 As Tarrant 2004: 112f notes, *pietas* and *clementia* are also important features of Augustus' own emotional apparatus and propaganda campaign.

Because these characterizations have been developed in the previous books, and redeployed in the beginning of Book 12, we are primed to expect certain behavior from each man, as leader and representative of his emotional community. For example, when Turnus' allies break the peace treaty for the second time,[183] Aeneas attempts to control the situation and maintain the emotional apparatus of his community, shouting that the final match is intended to be between himself and Turnus. He is again called *pius Aeneas,* and he is unarmed (*dextram tendebat inermem nudato capite,* 12.311- 312). Aeneas exhorts his army to contain their *ira* and the negative emotions that have disrupted the order of the emotional community:

> At pius Aeneas dextram tendebat inermem
> nudato capite atque suos clamore vocabat:
> "quo ruitis? quaeve ista repens discordia surgit?
> o cohibete iras! ictum iam foedus et omnes
> compositae leges. mihi ius concurrere soli; 315
> me sinite atque auferte metus…" 12.311- 316
>
> But pious Aeneas was holding out his unarmed hand,
> with his head bared, and shouting loudly to his men,
> "Where are you running? What is this sudden outburst of confusion?
> Hold back your anger! The treaty has already been agreed upon,
> and all the rules are set. It is my right alone to do battle;
> Allow me to do it, and put away your fears."

Aeneas is dismayed that his emotional community is disintegrating under the pressure. He calls out the negative emotion (*ira*) and quality (*discordia*) that are overwhelming his army in an attempt to correct his community's emotional apparatus. But suddenly Aeneas is wounded, and he falls back. At the sight of Aeneas stepping away, Turnus burns with

183 The Rutulians were spurred in part by the sight of Turnus submitting to the treaty and to single combat with Aeneas, and in part by the encouragement of Juturna, his sister, and her dismay that the Rutulians did not feel *pudor* at the sight of their leader sacrificing himself for all of them.

sudden hope (*subita spe fervidus ardet,* 325) and leaps proudly onto his chariot (*saltuque superbus/ emicat in currum*, 327- 8). Turnus' proud nature is too strong to submit to the Trojans. The narrator, with the knowledge of his future defeat, labels Turnus as *superbus* to indicate that he has misestimated his position relative to Aeneas. So far, each man has maintained his characterization and emotional apparatus: Aeneas is *pius,* and Turnus is *superbus.*

A turning point comes when Venus puts an idea into Aeneas' head: he should attack the Latins' city while Turnus and the Rutulians are preoccupied (555ff). When the Rutulians realize what is happening, Turnus seeks out Aeneas, and the two leaders finally have their confrontation. Venus' inspiration has shifted Aeneas from his usual emotional situation, and he begins to take on characteristics that are typically at odds with his emotional apparatus. For example, Aeneas is exultant with joy (*laetitia exsultans,* 12.700) when he goes to meet Turnus for their final duel. This fierce glee recalls Aeneas' reaction at the death of Mezentius (*viso Tyrrheni sanguine laetus,* 10.787), contributing to the slow buildup of Aeneas' ferocity in these final scenes.[184] With a savage spirit (*saevo…pectore,* 12.888), the pinnacle of his savagery is his mockery of Turnus:

> Aeneas instat contra telumque coruscat
> ingens arboreum, et saevo sic pectore fatur:
> 'quae nunc deinde mora est? aut quid iam, Turne, retractas?
> non cursu, saevis certandum est comminus armis.
> verte omnis tete in facies et contrahe quidquid
> sive animis sive arte vales; opta ardua pennis
> astra sequi clausumque cava te condere terra.'
> ille caput quassans: 'non me tua fervida terrent
> dicta, ferox; di me terrent et Iuppiter hostis.' *Aen.* 12.887- 895

184 Tarrant 2012: 269.

> Aeneas pushes on and brandishes
> his huge tree-like spear, and with a bitter heart he says,
> "Why more delay now? Or are you, Turnus, still turning back?
> We must fight not in a race but with savage weapons hand-to-hand.
> Change yourself into all shapes and draw out whatever
> strength either of mind or body. Choose to follow
> on wings the lofty stars, or to hide in the hollow ground."
> Turnus, shaking his head, said "Your hot-blooded words do not terrify me,
> fierce one. The gods do, and Jupiter as an enemy."

This time, it is *pius* Aeneas who does the mocking, Aeneas who is burning with rage. His opening line (*quae nunc deinde mora est? aut quid iam, Turne, retractas?* 889) recalls Turnus' words at the beginning of Book 12, where he proclaims *nulla mora est in Turno; nihil est quod dicta retractent/ ignavii Aeneadae*; 12.11- 12).[185] Aeneas turns Turnus' words against him, just as Allecto had done to Turnus. While this mockery, and the haughtiness (*exultans* 12.700*, saevo pectore* 12.888, *ferox* 12.895) that accompanies it, is not unusual for the battlefield, as we have seen, it is highly unusual for Aeneas to be the one doing the ridiculing.[186] The bombast of his speech and body language cannot be ignored or misinterpreted; our attention is drawn to this uncharacteristic ridicule.

Even more surprisingly, Turnus is quiet and calm in his response. He begs Aeneas for his life (*humilis supplex,* 12.930), his eyes cast down and aside (*oculos dextramque… protendens,* 12.930-1) in supplication. Unlike the mortally wounded Hector begging Achilles for proper burial (*Il.* 22.338- 43), Turnus begs Aeneas to spare his life. But as Hector asked Achilles to consider the grief of his father, Turnus calls Aeneas' attention to

185 Tarrant 2012: 319.
186 cf. note 162 above.

both of their aged fathers.[187] Turnus seeks to flatter and persuade Aeneas by emphasizing the values of Aeneas' emotional appartus, arguing essentially that sparing Turnus would be the action most consistent with the *clementia* of the *militiae* emotional apparatus.[188]

Aeneas has a brief moment to consider whether or not to kill Turnus. His decision, based on Anchises' command (6.851- 3), is to make a judgment about whether or not Turnus is *superbus*.[189] If he is, then by killing him, Aeneas would be following Anchises' charge of *debellare superbos.*[190] If he is sufficiently penitent for any past *superbia,* and if he is more of a suppliant than a braggart, then he is instead merely a *subiectus* and therefore deserves pardon.[191] In this moment, Aeneas must judge whether to get the last word and final vengeance over his ridiculer, or whether to let his enemy live.

As Aeneas is processing all this, he notices that Turnus was wearing the belt of Pallas, who had been under Aeneas' protection when Turnus killed him. Turnus, in choosing to wear the belt as a trophy into battle with Aeneas, was displaying one last bit of *superbia.*

> ille, oculis postquam saevi monimenta doloris
> exuviasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira

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187 Tarrant (2012: 331- 2) points out the danger in reminding Aeneas of grieving parents, since it might call to mind Evander, Pallas' father, rather than Turnus' father.

188 cf. Aeneas' own vow at 12.189ff, as discussed above.

189 Other interpretations include Aeneas killing Turnus either as a sacrifice for Pallas, or as punishment for having killed Pallas. The *miasma* of killing Pallas in a way that would require a death penalty would render him inappropriate for use as a sacrificial victim. See Tarrant 2012.

190 Although, as Tarrant 2012: 18 explains, a Roman audience would not necessary have considered Turnus, as an enemy of war, even eligible to be considered as *subiecti.*

191 The determination of Turnus as *superbus* or *subiectus* is essentially a distinction between the pessimistic or the optimistic view of the poem, where Aeneas' actions are a representation of Vergil's view of Augustan Rome.

terribilis: 'tune hinc spoliis indute meorum
eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas
immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit.'
hoc dicens ferrum adverso sub pectore condit
fervidus; 12.945- 951

Aeneas, after he drank in with his eyes the trophy,
the reminders of cruel grief, burned with fury and terrifying
in his anger, said, "You, clad in the spoils of my men,
taken away from me here? It is Pallas– Pallas!– who sacrifices you
with this wound and exacts punishment from this wretched blood."

That Turnus wears Pallas' belt is the evidence some readers need to understand that Aeneas killed Turnus as a just punishment or even "righteous revenge" for his actions.[192] Because Aeneas was spurred on by *furiae* (*furiis accensus,* 946)[193] and consumed with terrifying anger (*ira terribilis*, 946- 7), we can understand that he is not acting independently, and certainly not as a leader of his emotional community.[194]

The sudden reversal of the characters of the hero and his *superbus* antagonist has long flummoxed readers of the *Aeneid.*[195] The careful characterization of Aeneas and

192 Keith 1924: 560.

193 Cairns 1989: 83f argues for a distinction between *furor* (described as a negative quality in the emotional apparatus) and *furibundus* on one hand and *furiae* and *furo/furens* on the other. *Furor/furibundus* are always negative, but *furiae/furo/furens* are not necessarily condemnatory. Citing *Aen.* 8.494 *ergo omnis furiis surrexit Etruria iustis,* he argues that *furiis* are sometimes perceived as *iustis* and therefore good; this would be the sort of *furiae* compelling Aeneas to take action against Turnus. Cairns' suggestion essentially places him in the "righteous anger of Aeneas" camp.

194 *contra* Harris (2001: 246): Aeneas has indeed "fall[en] into emotional excess." Tarrant (2012: 19) suggests that Vergil's narration (*furiis accensus, ira terribilis*) and Aeneas' speech (of sacrificing Turnus for Pallas) both contribute to the "intense emotional state." The other rationales for killing Turnus are "ultimately beside the point" when we consider Aeneas' emotional apparatus when he kills Turnus.

195 See, for example, Gill 2004: 118ff for an examination of the scene in consideration of several different ancient philiosphical approaches. The scene is not an exact match for any one of these viewpoints, though Gill eventually determines that the most supported view is the Stoic, in which Aeneas in the final scene does not live up to the Stoic models established for him throughout the rest of the poem, which makes his killing of Turnus all the more disturbing. In this way, Gill's analysis echoes my understanding, here, of Aeneas as a leader of his emotional community, departing from the norms of the emotional apparatus.

Turnus leading up to this moment makes us expect that Turnus would continue his haughtiness, and that Aeneas, in finally defeating Turnus, would be the embodiment of the ideal leader of the Roman army.[196] Instead, Aeneas is presented as *furiis accensus et ira terribilis:* inflamed by the furies and terrifying in his anger (12.946- 7).[197] The *Aeneid*'s ending is disconcerting and sudden because there is no resolution for the expectations established for the emotional community. The leader of that community, who is supposed to embody the ideals of the apparatus, is suddenly not behaving in a way that is consistent with the emotional community.

Livy's version of the defeat at the Caudine Forks used ridicule and the experience of the shame state to emphasize how low the Romans had fallen before their eventual triumph. We might expect the *Aeneid,* with Vergil's careful characterization of Aeneas, Turnus, and their respective armies, to follow this same pattern of victory narrative. Instead, Aeneas and Turnus almost seem to switch personalities. The end of the *Aeneid* is unsettling because these characters are acting contrary to our expectations and outside the bounds of their emotional apparatuses. Vergil heightens this confusion by ending the *Aeneid* suddenly, in the middle of our reanalysis of Aeneas' behavior.

We are left to attempt an understanding of Aeneas and Turnus. The Rutulian king is usually defiantly haughty and derisive, but by the time Turnus reaches Aeneas in hand-

196 cf. Tarrant 2004: 109: "For a moment, at least, the original roles of Aeneas and Turnus seem to be reversed, with Turnus as the figure who represents pious respect and Aeneas and his men portrayed as violent offenders."

197 Galinsky has argued for the distinction between the violent, unbridled passion of Turnus' *furor,* which stands opposed to the justice-meting anger of Aeneas' *ira,* most memorably featured in the final scene of the poem. He suggests that Turnus, Latinus, and Aeneas fulfill three levels of emotion as described in Aristotle's *NE* 1108a4 (Galinsky 1988: 334). Turnus' *furor* is anger in excess, Latinus' lack of anger is deficiency, and Aeneas' *ira* is observance in the mean. See also Galinsky 1994.

to-hand combat, he has already learned from his sister Juturna that the gods have abandoned their cause (12.869- 86). Aeneas is typically pious and merciful, but when he is reminded of Turnus' nature as a *superbus,* Aeneas kills him. In the end, he has in fact conquered the haughty (*debellare superbos*), but the context is surprising and confusing. This conclusion to the characterizations of Aeneas and Turnus is unsettling because it inverts everything that the audience has come to expect of each man, as representative leaders of their emotional communities.

TACITUS' *ANNALES*

Tacitus echoes Vergil's themes of *superbia,* ridicule, and the destiny of Rome, but his use of ridicule and the shame state forms a more complicated victory narrative than Livy's version of the Caudine Forks. The German chieftain Arminius serves as the main antagonist in the German wars of Tacitus' first and second books of the *Annales.*[198] Tacitus draws on the *Aeneid* for inspiration for Germanicus as a good-natured leader, like Aeneas, and for Arminius as a haughty foe, like Turnus. In so doing, he elevates his own work by comparison to Vergil's, but he obfuscates this binary through his admiration for Arminius and by the Roman failures in Germany. Ultimately, Tacitus' depiction of ridicule, the shame state, and the *militiae* emotional community is the most complicated of our three case studies. Tacitus' conflicted presentation of the typical victory narrative reflects the general pessimism of his histories.

198 As Baxter 1972 argues, this section of the *Annales* serves as an important contrast between Germanicus and Arminius, as other episodes in the *Annales* serve as contrasts between Augustus and Tiberius, Germanicus and Drusus, and Germanicus and Tiberius.

Germanicus

Germanicus is portrayed as a good and thoughtful leader, in a way that recalls Vergil's Aeneas. Bews goes so far as to call Book Two of the *Annals* "Germanicus' book" because of the attention paid to his character in this section of the *Annals,* and the literary aspects that recall Vergilian themes.[199] Leaving aside the well-demonstrated parallels in style and language,[200] I focus instead on Germanicus' emotional qualities that recall Aeneas. Tacitus is careful to draw attention to Germanicus as a pious leader, and a military leader who embodies the ideals of the emotional community. A series of snapshots of Germanicus interacting with his men give us this impression. For example, in one episode, Germanicus slips out into the night, in disguise and unbeknownst to his men, in order to learn what the soldiers are saying as they relax around their campfires. The soldiers praise Germanicus in the standard ways a military leader and member of the royal family is praised: his good looks, his parentage, his leadership skills, and so on.[201] Their conversations at once stress the features of Germanicus as a successful military leader and the qualities that make the Romans good soldiers, while distinguishing the Romans from their enemy. In other words, this passage illustrates this Roman army as an emotional community: the soldiers are identifying certain virtues and features that are valued in the Roman army of Tacitus' *Annales*.

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199 Bews 1973: 38: "Book Two of the *Annals* is in a real sense Germanicus' book. Virgilian language appears in the description of his campaigns in Germany, his travels in the East and in Egypt, in the account of his death and in the description of subsequent mourning for him."

200 See in particular Edelmaier 1964: 134ff, Baxter 1972, Bews 1973. Rutland 1987, and Foucher 2000: 99ff for more on the influence of Vergil on Tacitus in the *Annales*.

201 For more on lineage as part of the emotional apparatus of a community, see the next chapter on the *domi* emotional community of senatorial Romans. This *domi* emotional community has social restrictions on membership, and since leaders of the *militiae* emotional community were also often members of the *domi* emotional community, there is some overlap in their characteristics.

> Nocte coepta egressus augurali per occulta et vigilibus ignara, comite uno, contectus umeros ferina pelle, adit castrorum vias, adsistit tabernaculis fruiturque fama sui, cum hic nobilitatem ducis, decorem alius, plurimi patientiam, comitatem, per seria per iocos eundem animum laudibus ferrent reddendamque gratiam in acie faterentur, simul perfidos et ruptores pacis ultioni et gloriae mactandos. 2.13.1
>
> At nightfall, he left the general's tent in secret and unbeknownst to his sentries, with a single attendant, covering his shoulders with a wild beast's pelt, and he turned to the streets of the camp. He stood near the tents and enjoyed his reputation, as some of the men, in seriousness and in jest but with the same spirit, praised their commander's lineage, others his appearance, most his patience and his kindness. They admitted that they must show their appreciation on the battlefield and slaughter their perfidious and traitorous enemy as a sacrifice for vengeance and for glory.

This description of Germanicus' character and leadership recalls descriptions of other famous Roman leaders, like Sulla (*Iug.* 96.2)[202] and, importantly, Aeneas. That a Roman general would bother poking around his army's camp at night seems too precious for some scholars,[203] but the scene provides Tacitus with an opportunity to show Germanicus as a caring leader, and a member of his army's emotional community. The men casually praise him, and single out several characteristics (including his *nobilitas, decus, patientia,*

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202 The phrase *ioca atque seria* (cf. *per seria per iocos,* 2.13.1 above) in particular recalls Sallust's description of Sulla, though in a slightly different context: Ad hoc milites benigne appellare, multis rogantibus, aliis per se ipse dare beneficia, invitus accipere, sed ea properantius quam aes mutuum reddere, ipse ab nullo repetere, magis id laborare, ut illi quam plurimi deberent, ioca atque seria cum humillimis agere, in operibus, in agmine atque ad vigilias multus adesse, neque interim, quod prava ambitio solet, consulis aut cuiusquam boni famam laedere, tantummodo neque consilio neque manu priorem alium pati, plerosque antevenire. (*Iug.* 96.2)

Moreover, he spoke in a friendly manner to the soldiers, granting many things at their request and others on his own accord; he was unwilling to accept them himself and repaying them more promptly than money. He himself never asked for repayment, but rather worked to have as many men as possible in debt to him. He spoke in jest or earnest with the humblest men, and was often with them in their work, in formation, and on watch. Meanwhile, he did not, like those who are depraved with ambition, undermine the good name of the consul or any other good man. He only tried not to allow anyone to outdo him in counsel or in action, and in fact he surpassed many.

203 See e.g. Goodyear 1981 *ad loc.*

and *comitas*) for attention. While not all of these virtues are part of the emotional apparatus as outlined above, they do describe an elite leader in Augustan Rome, as Germanicus was.

Tacitus similarly characterizes Germanicus elsewhere in the *Annals*. Germanicus is kind and generous in the face of Gnaeus Piso's aggression and insults made behind Germanicus' back (2.55). Although Germanicus knew about the slander of his name (*insectationibus*) and the attempts to undermine him, he nevertheless rendered aid when Piso needed assistance after some storms. While Tacitus does not present this as direct ridicule in the style of Situation D above, Germanicus responds in a similar way. He disagrees with Piso's assessment of him, and he corrects that assessment by acting in a way that demonstrates how he embodies the emotional community.

After Germanicus' death, he is mourned for his good nature (*mansuetudo,* 2.72), shown to friends and enemies alike. Tacitus compares Germanicus to Alexander the Great, saying the former had more *clementia, temperantia,* and other virtues (*ceteris bonis artibus,* 2.73), and that Germanicus could have also surpassed Alexander in *gloria militiae* if only he had had more control over affairs, even if he failed to conquer Germany.

One final important element in Germanicus' characterization is his piety. While *pius* is the most common descriptor of Aeneas in the *Aeneid,* the word is never used to

describe Germanicus.[204] Instead, Tacitus characterizes Germanicus as pious, as when he sees the bones of the Varian army for the first time and is moved to provide burial for the lost soldiers: *igitur cupido Caesarem invadit solvendi suprema militibus ducique, permoto ad miserationem omni qui aderat exercitu ob propinquos, amicos* (And so a desire came over Caesar to provide final rites to the soldiers and their leader, as the entire army present with him was moved to pity concerning their neighbors, their friends;. 1.61.1).

Germanicus' piety for his soldiers is heightened by comparison to Tiberius' indifference and coldness, which Tacitus has him present as decorum befitting an emperor and religious leader:

> Igitur Romanus qui aderat exercitus sextum post cladis annum trium legionum ossa, nullo noscente alienas reliquias an suorum humo tegeret, omnis ut coniunctos, ut consanguineos, aucta in hostem ira, maesti simul et infensi condebant. primum extruendo tumulo caespitem Caesar posuit, gratissimo munere in defunctos et praesentibus doloris socius. quod Tiberio haud probatum, seu cuncta Germanici in deterius trahenti, sive exercitum imagine caesorum insepultorumque tardatum ad proelia et formidolosiorem hostium credebat; neque imperatorem auguratu et vetustissimis caerimoniis praeditum adtrectare feralia debuisse. 1.62.1-2
>
> And so six years after the disaster, the Roman army, who was present, buried the bones of those three legions. No one knew whether he buried the remains of a stranger or a family member, but they all considered all of them to be kinsmen. As their anger towards the enemy grew, they felt at once mournful and hostile. Once the funeral mound was built up, Caesar placed the first grass, as a fellow in suffering with those present and with the greatest gratitude to the departed. But Tiberius disapproved, either because all of Germanicus' actions were met with disapproval, or because he believed that the army would consider the enemy more formidable and

[204] Baxter 1972: 248ff outlines some parallels between Aeneas and Germanicus, pointing out that while Tacitus does not use the word *pius,* the most common descriptor of Aeneas, to describe Germanicus, he nonetheless characterizes Germanicus as *pius* thoroughly enough to evoke thoughts of Aeneas.

> would be more reluctant for battle due to the image of the unburied, and a commander (who was gifted with the augury and ancient sacred rites) ought not to associate with funerals.[205]

The description of Germanicus and his army here works in two ways: it first builds anger towards the enemy (*aucta in hostem ira*), which is necessary for the Roman army to stage a comeback and defeat Arminius. It suggests a shame state (*maesti simul et infensi*) in the emotional community, although the army does not endure the nadir of the shame state experienced by Livy's version of the army at the Caudine Forks. The scene emphasizes the piety of the men, in burying their long-lost comrades, and it lays groundwork for a victory narrative.

Tacitus depicts Germanicus as the pious, respected leader of his *militiae* emotional community and the embodiment of his community's emotional apparatus. Although his campaign in Germany was ultimately unsuccessful, Tacitus' depiction of Germanicus suggests that we should understand him as a good leader. His characterization of Germanicus follows Vergil's Aeneas, and, as we will see in the next section, Tacitus' Arminius recalls Vergil's Turnus.

Arminius

Like Turnus to Aeneas, Arminius provides a foil for the Roman hero Germanicus. Arminius was a son of the Cheruscan chieftain, and lived in Rome for a time as a hostage. He had trained in the Roman army auxiliary forces, where he gained Roman citizenship. Like Jugurtha before him, and Tacfarinas and Julius Civilis after him, he

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205 On Tacitus' disapproval of Tiberius and whether his depiction of Germanicus is similarly negative, see Bews 1973 and Rutland 1987.

trained under Romans, he received citizenship and other rewards, and then he turned on Rome. In 9 CE, he brought a fictitious report of a German rebellion to the attention of P. Quinctilius Varus. When Varus and his three legions were trapped in the Teutoburg Forest, Arminius and his men ambushed the Roman army and completely destroyed them. Seeing that defeat was imminent, Varus fell on his sword. After the defeat, the Romans were driven from Germany. According to Suetonius, the devastated Augustus, upon hearing the news of Varian disaster, cried out, "Quintilius Varus, give me back my legions!" (*Quintili Vare, legiones redde*, *Aug.* 23).

Tacitus implies that Arminius is especially dangerous because of his education in Rome. Arminius understands Romans – almost *is* Roman – and is therefore a serious, inside threat. To convey the gravity of this threat, Tacitus uses allusions to Vergil's Turnus to characterize Arminius as an enemy of Rome (and therefore also uses allusions to Aeneas to describe his own protagonist, Germanicus).[206] He nevertheless relies on his readers' prior knowledge of the infamous Arminius, referring to "Arminius and Segestes, both famous names: the first for perfidy towards us, the other for his fidelity to us" (*Arminium ac Segestem, insignem utrumque perfidia in nos aut fide* (1.55). Tacitus uses scenes of ridicule and the shame state to sharpen these charactizations.

The audience's introduction to the character of Arminius is through his own father-in-law, Segestes, whose daughter he had married against her father's wishes. Segestes had warned Varus and the Romans that Arminius was planning an attack against

206 Edelmaier 1964: 134- 5 noted that the descriptions of Arminius' *violentia, perfidia,* and *audacia* recalled Vergil's Turnus.

them; he was ignored, and Varus' army was destroyed at the Teutoburg Forest. Segestes serves as a German foil for Arminius; the safe barbarian who is an ally of Rome. Segestes notes that his daughter is with him unwillingly (*filiam necessitate huc adductam fateor*, 1.58); Tacitus suggests that she is more like her husband than her father.[207] Tacitus has Segestes beg for acknowledgement of his loyalty, highlighting his own faithfulness to Roman interests and, importantly, Arminius' disastrous deception of Varus: *non hic mihi primus erga populum Romanum fidei et constantiae dies* ("This is not the first day of my fidelity and constancy to the people of Rome;" 1.58). Segestes mentions his own fidelity and constancy to the Roman people (*fidei et constantiae*, 1.58) and his conduct of foreign affairs in consideration of Roman interests (*amicos inimicosque ex vestris utilitatibus delegi,* 1.58) in an unstated contrast to Arminius' behavior. Segestes argues that he has even brought Arminius' perfidy to the attention of Romans, to no avail (*ergo raptorem filiae meae, violatorem foederis vestri, Arminium apud Varum, qui tum exercitui praesidebat, reum feci,* 1.58).

After such an introduction to Arminius, Tacitus turns to Arminius' reaction to Segestes' proposal. Our first glimpse of Arminius highlights his disposition to inordinate anger. Of course a soldier, especially a leader of soldiers, needs to have some of the kind of furious passion that compels him to glory and success on the battlefield (*ira, impetus,* etc.); we have seen a summary of these qualities as we defined the emotional community

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[207] Arminius' wife is pregnant at the time of Segestes' speech; their son is raised at Ravenna by Romans. Tacitus delays the discussion of the son's life and the *ludibrium,* or ridicule or outrage, he endured, and this story is now lost. (*Arminii uxor virilis sexus stirpem edidit: educatus Ravennae puer quo mox ludibrio conflictatus sit in tempore memorabo*, 1.58). That their son lives life in exile (perhaps the sole source of *ludibrium*?) is an opportunity for pathos for Arminius; without the rest of the story, Tacitus' word choice here is tantalizing.

of the army. But, like Vergil's Turnus, Tacitus explains that Arminius has an abundance of anger.

Arminius has been driven beyond his normally violent nature by the capture of his pregnant wife and the continued fight with his father-in-law, Segestes (*Arminium super insitam violentiam rapta uxor, subiectus servitio uxoris uterus vaecordem agebant,* 1.59). Arminius had kidnapped his wife away from her first fiancé, and Segestes has kidnapped her again and dragged her to Rome, where the Romans would hold her and their son captive. Tacitus' characterization of Arminius is as someone who is dangerous (*insitam violentiam*) and angry at the Romans (*agebant vaecordam*) – a volatile combination for an enemy leader. Arminius' separation from his wife and the intervention of her father parallels Turnus' separation from Lavinia and Latinus' decision to betrothe her to Aeneas instead of Turnus. This separation has similarly disastrous results in both the *Aeneid* and in the *Annales.*

Arminius' outburst of mockery adds to his inititial characterization:

> neque probris temperabat: egregium patrem, magnum imperatorem, fortem exercitum, quorum tot manus unam mulierculam avexerint. sibi tres legiones, totidem legatos procubuisse; non enim se proditione neque adversus feminas gravidas, sed palam adversus armatos bellum tractare. cerni adhuc Germanorum in lucis signa Romana, quae dis patriis suspenderit.
>
> And he did not restrain the insults, saying, "What an outstanding father! A great commander! A brave army! Together they carried off one poor woman. Because of me alone, three legions and three generals have fallen – for I do not wage war with betrayal nor against pregnant women, but out in the open against armed men. In the groves of Germany you can still see the Roman standards, which I hung for our ancestral gods." 1.59

Tacitus has Arminius shout insults about Segestes, mocking his greatness as a father and a leader, and about Segestes' army, laughing that they have not really accomplished anything by kidnapping his pregnant wife. Since Segestes is a Roman ally, Tacitus' Roman army is vicariously offended. Tacitus does not explicitly label Arminius' outburst as mockery; instead he says that Arminius did not hold back his insults (*neque probris temperabat*, 1.59). But his next comments are intended to belittle, and his tone is sneering. This opening series of accusatives of exclamation, with asyndeton, gives an impression that his remarks are impulsive, by which Tacitus only intensifies his characterization of Arminius as a rash and angry leader. Arminius' tendency to derision, and his propensity for anger, recall Vergil's depiction of hot-headed Turnus.

Arminius builds on this reputation for ridicule with boasts that, through his efforts alone (*sibi*, 1.59) in manipulating Varus, three entire legions and general have fallen. He disparages both Segestes and the Romans by pointing out this success. He claims not to fight dirty (*non enim… proditione*, 1.59), a claim that Varus would probably have disagreed with, and against men who could stand up to his challenge (*neque adversus feminas gravidas, sed palam adversus armatos*, 1.59). His remarks are intended to intimidate and belittle the Romans.

He denigrates Segestes, claiming that he is subservient to the Romans (as indeed he is, as we have just seen) and lives in their territory, with his son placed into the *sacerdotium hominum.* This text is difficult here, and so the phrase has generated much

discussion.[208] Some scholars have advised that Arminius is mocking the imperial cult, so that a *sacerdos hominum* diminishes the divinity of the emperor. This suggestion is in keeping with Tacitus' development of Arminius' mocking attitude throughout the speech, and his character more generally throughout the *Annales.* The phrase at once derides Segestes and the Romans.

This first glimpse of Tacitus' Arminius – that he is both angry and mocking – is a thorough enough introduction to his character throughout the *Annales.* Arminius mocks everyone, including his brother, and this aggressive humor is symbolic of his threatening nature. When Tacitus has Arminius meet his brother, known to us only by a Latin nickname, Flavus ("Blondie"), the brothers stand on opposite sides of a riverbank, underscoring the division between them. Arminius inquires after his brother's new scars, and his brother's reply details how he was rewarded for his service in the Roman army. Arminius scoffs in return, belittling his brother for his connection with Rome, and therefore the Romans in general.

> et postquam digressi, unde ea deformitas oris interrogat fratrem. illo locum et proelium referente, quodnam praemium recepisset exquirit. Flavus aucta stipendia, torquem et coronam aliaque militaria dona memorat, inridente Arminio vilia servitii pretia. 2.9.2-3
>
> And after they left, Arminius asked his brother where the mark on his face came from. When he had been told the place and the battle, Arminius inquired what reward he had received. Flavus named his increased pay, his collar, his crown, and other military decorations, and Arminius laughed at the cheap price of servitude.

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208 See Goodyear 1981: 87- 88 for a summary of the issue. The word *hominum* is in question, with suggestions of *hoc unum, ignominiam, Roman, Vbiorum,* and more. Goodyear concludes, as do I, that with no satisfactory suggestion we must therefore proceed with caution.

Arminius continues to provoke his brother and the Romans with comments in Latin, as if he wants to be certain that his sneers are understood: on the other side [of the river], you could see Arminius shouting threats and declaring battle, for he kept interjecting many comments in Latin, as he had served as a leader of the tribes in Roman camps (*cernebatur contra minitabundus Arminius proeliumque denuntians; nam pleraque Latino sermone interiaciebat, ut qui Romanis in castris ductor popularium meruisset,* 2.10.3).

Arminius' anatagonism extends to other Germans, including his rival Maroboduus, whom he mocks, calling him a "fugitive, inexperienced in battle, protected by his lair in Hercynia, a betrayer of the fatherland, and a satellite of Caesar" (*fugacem Maroboduum appellans, proeliorum expertem, Hercyniae latebris defensum, ... proditorem patriae, satellite Caesaris,* 2.45.3). This biting criticism insults Maroboduus, but it also recalls Vergil's *Georgics*: *frustra defensa latebris/ vipera* ("the viper protected in vain by its lair," 3.544- 5). This Vergilian allusion raises questions at multiple levels. Like his characterizations of Germanicus and Arminius after Aeneas and Turnus, a Vergilian allusion elevates his work.[209] Tacitus also strengthens the connections between his version of the Roman army and Vergil's. But he puts this allusion in the mouth of Arminius, whose Roman-ness is a tool used against the Romans; the implications of a

209 Tacitus talks about the "trivial affairs" of his histories, perhaps imitating Vergil (*nobis inarto et ingloriosus labor, Georg.* 4.6) at the same time he reaches for loftier subject matter or genre. See Joseph 2012: 375.

Vergilian allusion from a Latin-speaking German enemy are confusing.[210] Whether or not we are to understand that Germanicus or his men understood the Vergilian reference, if Tacitus' readers recognize a literary allusion in the mouth of Arminius, it seems to be a compliment paid to Arminius by Tacitus. In the battle immediately following this speech, we observe Arminius fighting bravely, as described above; although the Germans lost the battle, Arminius comes out relatively unscathed.

The final touch to Arminius' characterization is Tacitus' flattering obituary for him, at the end of the second book of the *Annales,* after much of Rome's interactions with Arminius had ended. Tacitus calls him the *liberator haud dubie Germaniae,* and notes admiringly that he provided a challenge to Rome even at her strongest. In doing so, Tacitus acknowledges Germanicus' failed campaign in Germany, crediting Arminius with the Germans' success, essentially reversing the characterizations of Aeneas and Turnus.[211]

> ceterum Arminius abscedentibus Romanis et pulso Maroboduo regnum adfectans libertatem popularium adversam habuit, petitusque armis cum varia fortuna certaret, dolo propinquorum cecidit: liberator haud dubie Germaniae et qui non primordia populi Romani, sicut alii reges ducesque, sed florentissimum imperium lacessierit, proeliis ambiguus, bello non victus. septem et triginta annos vitae, duodecim potentiae explevit, caniturque adhuc barbaras apud gentis, Graecorum annalibus ignotus, qui sua tantum mirantur, Romanis haud perinde celebris, dum vetera extollimus recentium incuriosi. 2.88.2-3
>
> But Arminius, excited by the retiring Romans and the rout of Maroboduus, aimed at kingship and held himself in opposition with the free spirit of his

210 This is assuming, of course, that Tacitus' readers recognize the reference to the *Georgics* at all. Woodman notes that Velleius Paterculus calls Maroboduus a snake (*serpentem,* 129.3), so perhaps there is more to this name-calling than we understand (2010: 2).

211 Timpe 1970: 11ff provides a biography of Arminius and argues *passim* for the veracity of Tacitus' assessment of Arminius as *liberator haud dubie Germaniae*.

> people. He was attacked by weapons, and while he was fighting with mixed results, he died through the treachery of his neighbors. He was, without a doubt, the liberator of Germany who challenged the Roman power at its strongest, not in the beginning stages of the Roman people, like the other kings and leaders did. He was not clearly defeated in battle, and he was not defeated in war. He lived thirty seven years, and held power for twelve years. He is sung even now among the barbarians, although he is unknown to the Greek annalists, who are only impressed by their own, and similarly is hardly well-known to the Romans, while we extoll the old days and are not interested in our own.

Although Tacitus has patterned his Arminius after Vergil's Turnus, his presentation of Arminius is complicated by admiration for him. He unequivocably grants Arminius victory over Germanicus and the Romans; he not only praises Arminius, but also voices frustration that other Greek or Roman historians do not acknowledge his triumphs, as he has just done.

Ridicule in the *Annales*

In the final scenes of his description of Arminius' and Germanicus' conflict, Tacitus follows Vergil's characterizations of Aeneas and Turnus, and relies on his audience's understanding of the social rules of ridicule and the shame state. The stylized depictions of Germanicus and Arminius inform the expectations of Tacitus' audience so that when Tacitus presents the two armies in conflict – in full military battle, in a war of words, or somewhere in between – readers understand how each leader and his men will react. Like Vergil's Aeneas and his men, Germanicus and his army will eventually be victorious.[212] Like Turnus and his men, Arminius flaunts his power through mockery. Tacitus' goal in presenting the Germans' ridicule of the Roman army is to provide an

212 The Romans never regain the territory beyond the Rhine, however, so their victory is not without its limits.

opportunity for the Romans to recover their pride and vanquish their derisive enemy. He then is able to present a satisfying narrative arc for his Roman audience: a good leader, a challenge from a worthy opponent, and a moral and military victory for the Romans.

A series of interactions between Arminius' Germans and Germanicus' Romans from Book II of the *Annales* illustrates the role of ridicule in Tacitus' history. Tacitus presents snapshots of the Germans' ridicule and the Roman responses to it. His choice of taunts recalls both the *Aeneid* and the real humiliation of the Varian disaster, which surely would have been felt keenly by Germanicus and his Roman army.

The first of these exchanges occurs just as Tacitus depicts the disguised Germanicus visiting his troops and overhearing his own praises as the troops declare their recommitment to Rome and to Germanicus. A derisive German interrupts this scene, just as the Romans were discussing their commitment to their cause and their leader:

> inter quae unus hostium, Latinae linguae sciens, acto ad vallum equo voce magna coniuges et agros et stipendii in dies, donec bellaretur, sestertios centenos, si quis transfugisset, Arminii nomine pollicetur. intendit ea contumelia legionum iras: veniret dies, daretur pugna; sumpturum militem Germanorum agros, tracturum coniuges; accipere omen et matrimonia ac pecunias hostium praedae destinare. 2.13
>
> Meanwhile, one of the enemy, who knew some Latin, drew his horse up near the wall and promised, in the name of Arminius, to each deserter wives and land and a daily stipend of 100 sesterces for the duration of the war. This insult fired up the anger of the legions. "When day comes, there will be a fight!" they said. "Roman soldiers will take fields from the Germans and drag back German wives! What a welcome omen – the wives and money of the enemy are marked out as booty!"

As the Romans gather around their fires vowing vengeance for Rome and praising their leader – in other words, embodying an idyllic scene of a thriving *militiae* emotional

community at rest – a German soldier provokes the Romans, in Latin, with promises of riches and women if they would join the German cause. Tacitus notes that the German soldier can speak Latin, so his taunts are fully understood, and not just some intimidating but unintelligible war cries. The German declares his insults with the authority of "the name of Arminius" (*Arminii nomine,* 2.13), so that the Romans can feel the full shame of mockery of the German chieftain and his men. The Romans recoil in response because they reject the premise of this mockery, since the Germans were foreigners and therefore well removed from the *militiae* emotional community. Their emotions turn to anger (*iras*), and the soldiers are offended at his suggestion that they desert the Roman cause.

This exchange of *contumelia* is the first example of an episode of ridicule and response between the two sides. Each instance of ridicule causes an emotional reaction: in this case, the Romans become angry because they are annoyed that someone they perceive to be beneath them (an enemy soldier, but not an important or impressive one) has mocked them. (This is an example of Situation B.) In order to correct the German's misunderstanding of the power dynamic, the Romans simply respond with derision of their own, adding as much authority as possible in order to appear more powerful in their reply. By labeling his offer an "omen" they add a dimension of religious authority. The Romans use the German's words against him, reasserting their position in the power relationship, correcting his challenge to their status. So, the German soldier's attempt to weaken the Romans through ridicule fails. Even after a minor skirmish later that night (*adsultatum est castris,* 2.13), the Germans are unable to rattle the Romans. The emotional community is strong.

The following day, Tacitus gives the Romans another signal of their superior position in the power relationship: an omen in the form of a dream encouraged Germanicus that the Romans could successfully fight in the forest or swamps like the Germans (*nox eadem laetam Germanico quietem tulit,* 2.14). He gives a rousing speech, in which he demeans the Germans' weaponry and reminds his men that shame did not prohibit the Germans from retreat: "without any shame at the disgrace, without any care for their leaders, they leave and flee. They are frightened in the face of adversity, and even in success they are mindful of neither divine nor human law" (*sine pudore flagitii, sine cura ducum abire, fugere, pavidos adversis, inter secunda non divini, non humani iuris memores,* 2.14). Germanicus uses the vocabulary of his own community's emotional apparatus (*pudor, cura, pavidos*) and the negative actions and consequences of his own community (*flagitium, abire, fugere*; *divini* and *humani iuris*) to make the Germans' actions more severely transgressive to the Romans. Tacitus is able to intensify both the Germans' status as barbaric enemy and the Romans' moral and military might. Germanicus' men respond enthusiastically to his speech (*orationem ducis secutus militum ardor*, 2.15.1): both the Roman leader and the Roman soldiers are confident. Their emotional community is strong, and they are assured of their superiority over the Germans.

But Tacitus shows a similar situation in the German camp. Arminius, like his Roman counterpart, gives a stirring speech to rouse his own army's emotional community. Arminius reminds his soldiers that the Romans they are about to face are the

leftovers of the army that they already defeated so devastatingly at the Teutoburg Forest:[213]

> nec Arminius aut ceteri Germanorum proceres omittebant suos quisque testari, hos esse Romanos Variani exercitus fugacissimos qui ne bellum tolerarent, seditionem induerint… meminissent modo avaritiae, crudelitatis, superbiae: aliud sibi reliquum quam tenere libertatem aut mori ante servitium? 2.15
>
> Nor did Arminius or the other German chieftains fail to note that these were the Romans of Varus' army who had fled most quickly, who could not tolerate war and preferred mutiny… Just remember the greed, the cruelty, the pride of the Romans: what is left for them to do but to cling to their liberty or to die before slavery?

Arminius reduces the very men, whom Germanicus has just been shown instructing and encouraging, to the cowardly and mutinous soldiers whom the Germans had already overpowered. Arminius emphasizes the lows of the Roman army's emotional community in an effort to encourage his own army that the Romans will be easy to conquer.

His criticisms of Rome's avarice and corruption are resonant with Tacitus' own political beliefs,[214] so while his criticism is intended as an insult to the Romans, Tacitus, through Arminius, also implies a critique of Rome. Arminius points out the Romans' *avaritia, crudelitas,* and *superbia*, qualities that are not consistent with the emotional apparatus. Because of his prior service in the Roman army, Arminius has enough knowledge of the Roman army's emotional community to understand the effect of such claims on the community. In particular, his accusation of *superbia* is a loaded one, since

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213 The accuracy of Arminius' description of the misbehavior of these soldiers is confused: he confuses, perhaps intentionally or perhaps not, the actions of the legions of L. Caedicius, L. Aspernas, Varus, Caecina, and Vitellius. See Goodyear 1981: 226.

214 Shumante 2012: 496f.

superbia is a quality of a person (or army, in this case) who thinks too highly of himself, and this sort of comparison is dangerous in a military situation. By giving Arminius this speech, Tacitus makes him an impressively dangerous enemy, since Arminius understands the Roman army's emotional community and therefore better knows how to defeat it. At the same time, Tacitus also provides his audience with another connection between Arminius and Turnus.

The battle that follows is narrated quickly and without much detail. Tacitus adds details that improve his readers' impression of the Roman success: for instance, Germanicus witnesses a divine omen of eagles (*octo aquilae petere silvas et inrare visae imperatorem advertere*, 2.17). Such an extraordinary coincidence of "Roman birds" (*Romanas avis*, 2.17) and especially eight eagles for the eight legions – is doubtful in its authenticity but favorably embellishes the Roman victory.[215] He also pauses to note that Arminius fought admirably in hand-to-hand combat (2.17), but tempers this praise with embarrassing details of the German defeat, allowing his readers to join in on the army's ridicule. Some German soldiers had climbed trees to hide out the battle, in a shameful refuge (*turpi fuga,* 2.17), and the Romans laughed at them (*per ludibrium,* 2.17) as they launched arrows at the hiding men and felled the trees they were hiding in. The Romans' victory is so easy and their superior position so assured that the soldiers – and Tacitus' audience – can laugh at the vanquished enemy.

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215 In Goodyear's words, the omen is "far too good to be true;" though bird omens are not uncommon in battle narratives (1981: 232). Furneaux (1896: 307) notes that, as of the late nineteenth century, eagles are rarely even seen in the area.

The battle was "great and, for us, not bloody" (*magna ea victoria neque cruenta nobis fuit*, 2.18), and Germanicus and his army celebrated by making a trophy of the pile of captured German weapons, inscribing it with the names of the defeated tribes (*miles in loco proelii Tiberium imperatorem salutavit struxitque aggerem et in modum tropaeorum arma subscriptis victarum gentium nominibus imposuit*, 2.18). Such a celebration was keenly felt by the Germans, at whose expense the trophy was erected. Tacitus describes the emotional reaction of the Germans, which we can identify as a shame state:

> Haut perinde Germanos vulnera, luctus, excidia quam ea species dolore et ira adfecit. qui modo abire sedibus, trans Albim concedere parabant, pugnam volunt, arma rapiunt; plebes primores, iuventus senes agmen Romanum repente incursant, turbant. 2.19
>
> This spectacle caused more pain and anger in the Germans than their wounds, their losses, their devastation. Those who had just been preparing to leave their homes and retreat across the Elba now wanted to fight, to take up arms. Commoners and nobles, young and old suddenly attacked the Roman line and threw it into confusion.

Tacitus specifies that the trophy caused the Germans more suffering (*dolore et ira*) than the military defeat itself did. The trophy was an embarrassing spectacle for the Germans, and their reaction is one we would expect from a military emotional community encountering ridicule. They first feel the depressing emotions of the shame state, and then experience the surge of vengeful emotions as they seek to correct their position in the power relationship. As an army emotional community, they are particularly prone to the violent emotions like *ira,* so the military response that Tacitus describes is the predictable consequence in this situation.

Tacitus, however, claims that the resurgence of the Germans was surprising for Germanicus and the Romans, who did not expect to find such strength in their enemy's emotional community. The ensuing battle was life or death for both sides (*spes in virtute, salus ex victoria,* 2.20), and the fighting continued all day. Tacitus concludes that the cavalry battle was inconclusive (*equites ambigue certavere,* 2.21), which seems suspiciously pessimistic after such praise earlier in his narrative.[216]

Tacitus cannot conclude his narrative with an indecisive victory (or an optimistic description that attempts to conceal an actual defeat); that would leave the Germans victorious. Instead, Tacitus explains that the Romans built another trophy: "after praising the victors in a speech, Caesar built up a pile of weapons, with a boastful sign that said 'the army of Tiberius Caesar, after subduing the nations between the Rhine and the Elbe, dedicated this memorial to Mars, to Jupiter, and to Augustus'" (*laudatis pro contione victoribus Caesar congeriem armorum struxit, superbo cum titulo: debellatis inter Rhenum Albimque nationibus exercitum Tiberii Caesaris ea monimenta Marti et Iovi et Augusto sacravisse*, 2.22).

Goodyear points out that the claim to have defeated the tribes in this region is a "proud but untenable claim," since Germanicus had not even reached the Elbe, much less conquered the territory. The "haughty sign" is a reflection of the complicated history that Tacitus was writing. On one hand, the heaping up of weapons in a monument is the act of victors, triumphant in their defeat of an enemy. Tacitus' use of *debellatis* recalls Anchises' command to future Romans to defeat the proud (*memento… debellare*

216 Furneaux calls it a "virtual admission" of defeat (1896: 311).

superbos, Aen. 6.853), especially in light of his characterization of his antagonist and protagonist after those of the *Aeneid.*[217] But on the other hand, Tacitus calls the sign *superbus.*[218] Following our earlier discussions of *superbus* used to describe sympathetic characters or objects, we would understand Tacitus to imply that this monument, or perhaps the Roman army it was set up to honor, was once-great, or about-to-be-dishonored. The victory in Germany was not the triumph of Aeneas' foundation of the land that would be Rome, and neither was it the conquering of neighboring tribes, as in Livy. It was a victory, but barely. In framing it this way, with his references to earlier narratives of ridicule and recovery in Livy and Vergil, Tacitus offers his readers a pessimistic, ironic understanding of the war in Germany.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have identified the Roman army as an emotional community, and described its emotional apparatus. I have focused on this *militiae* emotional community's reaction to ridicule, as depicted in three different authors. Livy's version of the surrender at the Caudine Forks includes a straightforward depiction of ridicule and the shame state as part of a victory narrative. Vergil's characterizations of his heroic Trojans, who adhere to the community's emotional apparatus, and of the ridiculing Tarquins, who are too

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217 Baxter (1972) notes that the use of *debellare* here recalls both *Aen.* 6.853 and a similar passage at 5.730f, where Aeneas dreams that Anchises tells him that he must defeat the hard and rough people with Latin civilization (*gens dura atque aspera cultu / debellanda tibi Latio est*). The only other occurrence of *debellare* in the *Aeneid* is a description of Lausus, Mezentius' son, the tamer of horses and defeater of wild beasts (*equum domitor debellatorque ferarum,* 7.651). Tacitus uses the word *debellare* only seven times in extant works, including just twice in the *Annales;* the other passage is at 12.38, in a description of the war in Britain against Caratacus (as if the war was won, *quasi debellatum foret,* 12.38).

218 Baxter 1972: 263 simply "notes" the interesting adjective *superbo* without further comment. Tacitus' word choice seems to be a tacit admission of the implications of one side calling its enemy *superbi.*

proud and mocking, shatters in the last scene, when his protagonist and antagonist do not act in accordance with their chracterizations. Tacitus combines both Vergil's characterizations and Livy's shame state and victory narrative in order to complicate the war between Germanicus, the hero who was a little disappointing, and Arminius, the enemy who was a bit impressive. When we consider these issues through the lens of emotions and communities, we reach a new understanding of the texts.

Chapter 2: Ridicule and the *Domi* Emotional Community

In this chapter, I define another emotional community and its emotional apparatus: that of the senatorial elite of the late Roman republic. We can understand the details of membership and the features of the emotional apparatus from the works of Cicero, the *novus homo* who worked to become a member of that emotional community. As in the previous chapter, I examine the ways in which ridicule highlights the membership and the rules of the emotional community by using a case study, Cicero's *In Verrem*. I conclude that the distinguishing feature of this emotional community is the demonstration of membership in that community through the embodiment of the emotional apparatus. Unlike the Roman army's emotional community, where we saw that Roman historians focused on the emotional recovery to the apparatus' status quo, the members of the emotional community of the senatorial elite carefully and constantly negotiate their relative status in the community. By focusing our attention on the use of ridicule as a tool to navigate status in the emotional community, we observe the promotion and regulation of both community members and community values. As a case study, the trial against Verres provides Cicero with an opportunity to use his understanding of the emotional community to manipulate his audience into granting him victory and a better position in the community. By mapping the notions of praise and blame in the Roman law courts onto the concepts of emotional communities and ridicule, we can better undertsand how pieces like the *In Verrem* worked in the emotional community, and for (or against) its members.

INVECTIVE AND RIDICULE

It will be useful to make some basic distinctions between ridicule in oratory and invective before we turn to invective for evidence of the *domi* emotional apparatus. The term "invective" was not one Cicero himself would have used, and its precise definition is still debated.[219] Since "invective" is now generally used to evoke the angry attacks made in public speeches, I will continue, in the discussion that follows, to define invective is the kind of highly personal attack one makes publicly against one's enemy.[220] Ridicule, on the other hand, is a broader category. Ridicule is an attack, although perhaps not a tirade against a single person, and probably less angry. It can be public or private, though a public ridicule is more humiliating and therefore likely to be closer to invective.[221] Ridicule can be done to one's friends as much as one's enemies, although, again, an overly harsh use of ridicule against one's friends is likely to have a deleterious effect on that friendship. One key difference appears to be tone: invective is angry and aggressive, whereas ridicule can be inspired from anger, derision, or fun (perhaps cruel fun). Ridicule is not necessarily laugh-out-loud funny, but it is usually clever, witty, or amusing in a mocking way – a joke with a definitive "loser" as the butt of the joke. Invective shares this quality of having a specific victim or target. In its capacity as a personal attack, invective is well-suited for the contentious context of oratory, but

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219 The word *invectiva,* describing a speech, first appeared in the fourth cenutry CE, though Cicero used the cognate verb *invehi* to describe an attack in a military style. Powell (2007: 1- 2) suggests there may not even be enough evidence to determine a genre, and recommends a more nuanced definition that focuses on the personal attack, including the *In Pisonem* and the Philippics, but not the Catilinarians.

220 By "invective" here, in the context of Cicero's speeches and the *domi* emotional community, I refer chiefly to rhetorical invective.

221 Elsewhere Cicero mentions the difference that an audience can make for a joke. At *Phil.* 2.7, he complains that Anthony has read aloud a private letter, since a private joke between two friends can lose its humor when shared more broadly.

ridicule is more widespread. In addition to differences in audience, the tone of invective is an important distinction. Invective is an angry attack. Ridicule can be angry, and in this variation is similar to invective; but when ridicule takes the form of mockery or derision, the ridiculer seems to take too much delight in the negative re-evaluation of his victim to be truly angry. Similarly, when ridicule functions as scorn or disdain, the ridiculer is more dismissive of the newly low position of his victim to work up too much anger about the situation.



Figure 4: Invective and ridicule

Invective attacks the corrupt social *mores* of the community or one or more of its members, and thus marks out deviants from the emotional community and identifies their misbehaviors. In this capacity of assessment, invective does the same work as ridicule. Each technique highlights a social transgression, so invective and ridicule are only effective if all parties involved share the same social norms – that is, if they are all members of the same emotional community. Further, the topics of ridicule are selected because they are important enough in the emotional apparatus to engage in a dispute.[222] Corbeill has argued that invective was able to establish a set of moral rules.[223] In thinking about ridicule in the context of an emotional community, I am working in the opposite direction from Corbeill. I first assert that a community has shared values and emotions, then that the community members feel strongly that these values are right and that their community membership is important, and finally the community members react strongly when either the community's values or its membership are tested (through things like deviance and ridicule). That is, an emotional community's existing emotional apparatus

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222 In other words, if we were to ask if the Romans believed in their ridicule, we might answer: maybe, if the speaker were convincing enough. The social pressure to conform to the standards of the emotional community would encourage the audience to believe whoever was the most powerfully persuasive, either because he was more powerful (closer to the center of the emotional community, or perhaps more connected) or because he was more persuasive (using stronger invective or more convincing arguments). In the zero-sum game of the oratorical reassessment of community positions, the successful ridiculer gains the social standing lost by the victim of the ridicule. See Riggsby 1997 and Craig 2007 on credibility in Roman law courts.

223 Corbeill 1996: 5. The audience of invective, Corbeill argues, shared core values and preoccupations that were "essential to the way a Roman of the late republic defined himself in relation to his community."

can be reinforced through ridicule, not that ridicule (or, more narrowly, invective) shapes the emotional apparatus of that community.[224]

The opportunity to disgrace another member of the community through invective is really an opportunity for a community member to demonstrate his own success as a member of that emotional community. By ridiculing another in front of an audience of their peers, the ridiculer is both reaffirming "what was right and proper for the true, elite Roman" (i.e. a member of the *domi* emotional community) and at the same time taking advantage of a moment of disgrace to discredit another member. In terms of emotional community, the ridiculed member loses prominence in the community, and the ridiculer gains significance in the community.

Because ridicule and invective do some of the same work, we can turn to invective as a source for the inverse of the emotional apparatus of the *domi* community. The most common topics of criticism in invective are representative of what the members of Cicero's emotional community found the most offensive or disturbing. Their reappearance in invective is a key to understanding what was unpalatable for the community. Since invective shares with ridicule a common goal of pointing out a social transgression, these *loci* of invective can be thought of as inverses of an acceptable social position.

Craig has located a list of seventeen of the most common points of criticism in invectives:[225]

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224 Arena 2007: 157 is correct, then, that "invective imposed the authority of a system of collective values" by making public the otherwise private rumors or whispers of some social transgression. I would add that invective does not *create* this system, as Corbeill suggests, but rather *reinforces* the system by threatening exclusion from the group.

1. embarrassing family origins
2. being unworthy of one's family
3. physical appearance
4. eccentricity of dress
5. gluttony or drunkenness that leads to cruelty or *libido*
6. hypocrisy for appearing virtuous
7. avarice
8. taking bribes
9. pretentiousness
10. sexual misconduct
11. hostility to one's family
12. cowardice in war
13. squandering one's patrimony, leading to financial embarrassment
14. aspiring to *regnum*
15. cruelty to citizens and allies
16. plunder of private or public property
17. oratorical ineptitude

If each of these *loci* represent an opportunity for invective, and therefore ridicule, then we can assume that the opposite of each *locus* is not an opportunity for such criticism. In

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225 Craig (2004 and 2007) has assembled a list of "specific content *loci* that an audience will expect a formal invective to contain" (2004: 189), based on the studies of Nisbet 1961, Süss 1920, and Merrill 1975. These are simply the features that Cicero tends to dwell on in his invective; issues of truth and merit are more complicated, as Riggsby 1997 and Craig 2007 have demonstrated, just like the punchline of a joke may be based on exaggeration or falsehood.

other words, the ideal member of the emotional community would embody the direct opposite of this list (as well as being located near the center of the emotional community, with many useful bonds of *amicitia*).

Another method of assembling the emotional apparatus of the emotional community is to look for the features that are valued by members of the emotional community. In particular, the bits of praise found in speeches like *de Lege Manilia* and the *Pro Marcello* reinforce some of these features. When Cicero praises Pompey or Caesar in these speeches, he hits on certain categories that correspond to the opposites of the invective *loci.* We can therefore develop a sense of the emotional apparatus for this community through the negative examples of invective and the positive examples in praise speeches.

While there are no real republican examples of epideictic praise speeches, like Pliny's *Panegyricus* for Trajan, many Roman speeches had some elements of praise in them.[226] In the speech *Pro rege Deiotauro,* for example, Cicero describes the king Deiotaurus as someone to be admired: "in that king are all the virtues" (*omnes in illo sunt rege virtutes,* 26), claiming that he is *fortem, iustum, severum, gravem, magnanimum, largum, beneficum, liberalem,* and *frugalem* (*ibid*.). Cicero has explicitly listed several praiseworthy aspects of a leader, underscoring his magnanimity and fortitude and sense of justice. These are some of the aspects of the emotional apparatus.

226 Manuwald 2011: 92. And, as Manuwald delightfully points out (95), Cicero loved to praise himself, of course.

Contextualizing Cicero's list of virtues, though, provides us with an even deeper understanding of the emotional apparatus. Since Deiotaurus is foreign and a king, he is not exactly a member of the *domi* emotional community. But Cicero tries to convince Julius Caesar that, because Deiotaurus' emotional apparatus is similar to that of the *domi* emotional community, Deiotaurus should be granted Caesar's *clementia*. In describing and praising Deiotaurus, Cicero is describing and praising his and Caesar's emotional community; in highlighting the generous *clementia* that Caesar might grant Deiotaurus, Cicero also praises and flatters Caesar.

He avoids conflating the two, however, and distinguishes Caesar from the foreign king, saying *et quem nos liberi, in summa libertate nati, non modo non tyrannum, sed clementissimum in victoria ducem vidimus* (And we free men, born in the greatest liberty, not only do not see you as a tyrant, but in fact see you as the most merciful leader in his victory, *Deiot.* 34). Cicero is careful to praise Caesar's character, especially his *clementia,* while steering clear of any hint of *regnum*. Tyranny in any form, such as *regnum,* was distinctly unsavory for a Roman, and therefore one of the qualities least valued in the *domi* emotional community.[227]

So, now that we have reviewed two methods for gathering information about the *domi* emotional community's emotional apparatus, I will continue by providing a sketch of the emotional apparatus through an outline of the ideal member of the emotional community. I have divided the emotional apparatus into four categories of qualities and emotions that make up the ideal member of the emotional community: family

[227] As seen in the Introduction in our discussion of *superbia.*

background, personal qualities, civil conduct, and military conduct. These categories are loosely based on the *loci* of invective.

CICERO'S EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY

In order to discuss the relationship between Cicero, his speeches, and his emotional community, we must first describe the members of that community and their emotional apparatus. I have labeled it the *domi* emotional community for convenience and to distinguish it from the *militiae* emotional community in Chapter 1. We can think of the *domi* emotional community as the group that controls Roman affairs from the city's center – the senatorial elite of Rome. Some of this emotional apparatus is based on the *loci* of invective, I also distinguish ridicule from invective.

Membership in the senatorial elite's emotional community is something of a birthright: men born into a senatorial family are eligible to participate at the highest level of Roman politics and therefore be members of this emotional community. After the Sullan reforms in the first century, membership in the senate was extended to anyone who held the office of quaestor.[228] Therefore, Cicero, despite his equestrian and non-patrician background, was able to mingle with senators and participate in the highest courts of law. Men who were born into equestrian families and eventually became senators, like Cicero, were technically members of the emotional community, but their status as *novi homines* forever marked them out as marginal members of the community.

These are the men who are the leaders of the city: the senators and some equestrians who dominate the public sphere of government and of law courts.

228 For more on the Sullan reforms in the senate, see Hawthorn 1962.

Significantly, these are also the men who were able to articulate their positions and beliefs and commit them to writing. In examining the public speeches and the published private letters of these men, we can comprehend their community's emotional apparatus and the ways that the community used and responded to ridicule.

We can also appreciate how membership in this community was articulated through these works. The simple ability to give a speech or occupy a particular political office indicates an elite status, and a positive reception by the elite audience indicates their acceptance of the speaker in their emotional community. For instance, when Cicero spoke as prosecutor against Verres, he was a relatively unknown equestrian and praetor, but his success against Verres secured his position in at least the outskirts of this emotional community.[229] Cicero's later election to consul confirmed his position as a *novus homo* and a member of the emotional community, although perhaps he was never as confirmed a member as he would have been had he been born a senator.

Speech-making, then, is a kind of public performance of one's membership in this emotional community. The mere permission to speak in front of the assembly is a demonstration of a man's membership in the community. A community member can advance his position in the community through speech-making as well: by making influential speeches, or perhaps by successfully prosecuting a higher-ranking member of

[229] For more on Cicero's rise through the ranks of the senate, see Mitchell 1979.

the community. Such a victory would entitle the prosecutor to the defeated man's position in the speaking order of the assembly.[230]

To sum up: the members of this *domi* emotional community are the leading men of Rome, who were mostly born into the senatorial social class, or who were elected to it as *novi homines.* The members of the community provide the evidence for their own membership, both to each other, through their public speeches, and to us, through their extant writings. Men in Cicero's position, the *novi homines,* were never quite as accepted in the community as those who had been born into it. While the majority of the community's social functions operated on an in-or-out basis – either you could speak in the courts, or you could not – those who were most accepted as senators were those who had many illustrious ancestors and who had served in many offices themselves. Men like Cicero were always regarded with skepticism, despite any, even considerable, talent and demonstrated deeds.[231]

The schematic chart below is an example of how such a community might function. Each individual, represented by dots, is located within the general bounds of the community, represented by the circle. Some members are closer to the center, while others remain around the periphery, as a result of their birth or bootstraps entry into the community. Individuals in the community are united to one or more others through bonds of *amicitia,* or friendship, represented by solid lines.[232] *Amicitia* was more like a political

230 Taylor 1971: 112. See below for more discussion on invective and rhetoric as methods for navigating in and out of the emotional community.

231 On Cicero's career as a *novus homo,* see, e.g., Scullard 1965 and Blom 2010.

232 For more on *amicitia,* see Brunt 1965 and Konstan 1997.

alliance than a union of mutual affection; its diplomatic functions were useful for political machinations. Conversely, bonds of *inimicitia*, represented by the dotted lines, represented the animosity between feuding members of the community. Again, *inimicitia* was a political trait: men could enter into a relationship of *inimicitia* and later recover their productive relationship.



Figure 5: Social relationships in the senatioral elite in the Roman republic

While technically all individuals are members of this community, those that are closest to the center of the group and those that have strong bonds of *amicitia* are the most comfortable and powerful in the community. A man born to a long, proud senatorial family, who himself has served as consul multiple times, and has many *amici* will be firmly near the center of this conceptual map.

Cicero's position, as a *novus homo,* was liminal, along the edges of the community, particularly at the time of Verres' trial. Cicero was only a quaestor, a low ranking official and the first position in the Republican *cursus honorum*. He had yet to make a splash on the Roman oratorical scene, and he did not yet have many bonds of *amicitia* (or, for that matter, *inimicitia*). The speeches against Verres, however, provided him an opportunity to change all this, since he was able to use the speeches to improve his position in the ranks of the membership of the *domi* emotional community.

Domi Emotional Apparatus

Now that we have determined the members of the emotional community, we can turn to defining the emotional apparatus under which the community functioned. The emotional apparatus is a constellation of emotions and values that are esteemed by the community members. It is again important to note that some of the qualities in this emotional apparatus are not necessarily emotions. Virtues and personal qualities inform the emotional apparatus of an emotional community, as we saw in the previous chapter in our discussion of the Roman army's emotional community. The fulfillment of these preferred values earns a person a position in the social group, and their commitment to

these values and the social group generates emotions – such as anger, in the case of invective – that reinforce the social group through the workings of the emotional community.

In order to identify the emotions and values that comprise the emotional apparatus, I propose two methods. First, I turn to the negative example from invective: if the targets of invective are members of the *domi* emotional community and are criticized for doing something, then we can assume that the speaker believes that that action is not in accordance with the emotional apparatus of the community. These criticisms therefore inform our understanding of what was acceptable, by providing examples of the opposite. Second, I synthesize some emotions and values from sections of speeches by members of the emotional community that praise other members of the emotional community.

Family Background

The first category of qualities in the emotional community corresponds to the first two traits outlined by Craig: (1) embarrassing family origin and (2) being unworthy of one's family.[233] Nisbet gave examples like one's father being a slave, or having barbarian ancestors, or having ancestors who were in menial professions.[234] The vulnerability of one's family background is based on the membership rules of the community, since many members are born into the senatorial class, and very few, like Cicero, are able to ascend to its ranks through their own means.

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233 2004: 190.

234 1961: 192- 7.

This *locus* of invective, then, speaks directly to membership in the community. While an ideal member of the emotional community is born into the community because he is born into a senatorial family, others are able to rise up through the *cursus honorum* and become a member of the senate, and therefore the *domi* emotional community. The ideal member is the former, who is a member of the community by birthright. Along with this inheritance, the ideal member of the *domi* emotional community is also a good representative of this privilege, and lives up to his family's respectable name. In contrast, for example, Antonius earns Cicero's invective because he has squandered his patrimony and his opportunity to live up to his grandfather's example in oratorical skill (another locus for criticism): *Vide autem, quid intersit inter te et avum tuum. Ille sensim dicebat, quod causae prodesset; tu cursim dicis aliena.* (But look at what a difference there is between you and your grandfather! He used to be very careful when he was speaking, and said what was useful for his argument. You blurt out somebody else's words, *Phil.* 2.42)

Personal Qualities

Prescriptions on a community member's personal character shaped public and private perceptions of his behavior. To combine several of the *loci* listed by Craig: a community member must not be gluttonous, prone to drunkenness, greedy, sexually inappropriate, disrespectful of his family, or irresponsible with his finances.[235] These are

235 He should also not be ugly or deformed, or inclined to wear foreign dress; he should also be highly skilled at oratory. These qualities are not so much emotions or personal qualities or virtues, so I leave them aside in this discussion. They do, however, contribute to the notion of the ideal member of the *domi* community, since physical characteristics were considered linked to qualities of one's personality, especially if the phsyical qualities are perceived to be connected to a social status. For instance, Cicero equates Piso's appearance with the complexion, hairy cheeks, and discolored teeth of a slave, and suggests that his disposition is as untrustworthy as his appearance (*Pis.* 1). Similarly, he jeers that Antony has the

all common topics in invective: Antony is such a drunk that he vomits in public proceedings (*Phil.* 2.62), Catiline squandered his patrimony (*Cat.* 1.14), Piso is a "whirlpool and glutton" who was born to serve his stomach, not praise and glory (*Pis.* 41).

Put simply, he should be in control of himself. He should also be aware of how he is perceived, and not claim more or less virtue than he truly possesses. Overestimating one's position is a crime of *superbia,* as we saw in the previous chapter, or *audacia,* as is sometimes used to label political figures.[236] Conversely, if a member of the emotional community realizes that he has been assessed to have less virtue or standing than he believes that he has, he feels a sense of shame, or *pudor,* at the underestimation.[237] These terms reflect the constant reassessment and comparison of one's standing in the community. As I will demonstrate below, ridicule, and the labeling of one's opponent as *audax,* is one tactic to trigger such reassessment and allow for a rearrangement of the social hierarchy.

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body of a gladiator (*Phil.* 2.63). These comments are as much about the social status of slaves and gladiators as they are about the supposed unseemliness of Piso's and Antony's bodies. Since the criticism of family background – and any possible connection to slaves or gladiators – is already tied to one's membership in the emotional community, I lay aside these *loci* of invective.

236 See below for more on *audax* as a label for Verres, and see Wirszubski 1961 on the political connotations of *audaces.* He argues that *audaces* is a label for men who are disruptive in both their personal and public lives; Wirszubski takes *audaces* as a synonym of *improbi* or *mali,* or an antonym of *boni.* In this way, someone who is *audax* steps beyond his role, and someone who is *bonus* fulfills his role admirably. Wriszubski suggests that the epithet was tied to particular figures in the late republic, like Curio or Antonius, because of notoreity in their public roles that resonated with rumors of their private lives, too.

237 Kaster 2005: 28- 65 discusses the contexts for feeling *pudor.*

Civic Conduct

As political leaders, members of the *domi* emotional community were expected to behave in a manner befitting their offices, with proper respect to the republic and to their fellow citizens. Therefore, he should not take bribes or aspire to *regnum.* He should practice sufficient amounts of *sapientia, iustitia,* and *clementia* so that he is not cruel to his fellow citizens or to allies, and so that he does not abuse their property. He should be qualified – an educated man, a skilled orator – for his office. And he should not claim to be more than he is, for fear of becoming pretentious or *superbus* or *audax.*

For instance, in the speech supposedly in support of Marcus Marcellus, Cicero goes out of his way to praise and flatter Caesar. Cicero dwells especially on Caesar's *clementia,* which was so extraordinary that Cicero called it "unfamiliar and unheard-of" (*tam inusitatam inauditamque clementiam, Marc.* 1). Caesar's *clementia* is probably his most famous virtue, and is certainly relevant here, since Caesar had forgiven Marcellus and allowed him to return to Rome. Caesar's *mansuetudino, potestas, sapientia* deserve mention (*Marc.* 1, 18) before Cicero notes that it is Caesar's deference to the authority of the senate and the republic that is truly noteworthy – in other words, Caesar's *pudor* (*Marc.* 3). Caesar's kindness (*beneficii, liberalitas*) is paired with his *sapientia* and his *clementia* – the wise, gentle leader doles out forgivenesses to the other members of his community. Especially in uncertain times of civil war, "all hope for safety depends on the clemency and wisdom of the conqueror" (*omnem spem salutis ad clementiam victoris et sapientiam contulisse, Marc.* 18), when parties on both sides fo the conflict are members of the emotional community.

Just as a political leaders should have *clementia* to protect persons under their protection, they should also protect and respect property. Cicero attacks leaders, like Catiline and Verres, who have plundered property (e.g.: *direptio sociorum impunita, Cat.* 1.18). The prosecution against Verres, which I review in detail below, is because of Verres' gross mismanagement of Sicily: "It is not doubtful to any of you, judges, that Verres most openly plundered everything in Sicily, both sacred and profane, both public and private, and that without the slightest of scruples or even a disguise he carried out every kind of thievery and plunder" (Cicero's opening line at *Ver.* 2.5.1). These actions are betrayals of the public trust and the qualities of *iustitia, aequitas,* and *misericordia* (justice, fairness, and compassion) that are expected of these leading citizens of Rome.

Military Conduct

The members of the *domi* emotional community do, of course, venture outside the city on military missions, where there are similarly high expectations for their leadership. In this category we see some overlap between the virtues of the *domi* emotional apparatus outlined above and the qualities of the army's emotional community, as detailed in the previous chapter. The strength and smarts that are expected of a military leader must be combined with the virtue and mercy that are praiseworthy in a civic leader; when a single man inhabits both roles, as Pompey or Caesar did, he is praised in the proper context of his leadership.

Cicero praises Lucius Lucullus with the sort of praise he suggests is owing to a great general (*magno imperatori*): that he had defeated a well-supplied army of a king with his Roman *virtus, assiduitas,* and *consilium* (*Leg. Man.* 20). Later, in the same

speech, Cicero claims that there are four essential qualities for the ideal general (*in summo imperatore*): knowledge of military matters, *virtus,* authority, and luck (*scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem*, *Leg. Man.* 28). Cicero goes on to praise Pompey's virtues as a general, including his efforts in performing his duty, his bravery in danger, his dedication to managing affairs, his swiftness in action, and his thoughtfulness in strategizing (*labor in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in providendo, Leg. Man.* 29). While some of these qualities are more befitting a military man – namely, of course, *scientia rei militaris, fortitudo in periculis,* and probably *felicitas* – *virtus* is a value that Roman men aspire to more generally, and *auctoritas* is a quality required for all Roman leaders. Qualities that make Pompey a great general, like his attention to detail and powerful leadership style, also make him a good civil leader.

Cicero lumps military leadership with civil leadership in his praise of Caesar, but I separate them here. We have already reviewed in detail the emotional apparatus of the Roman army, with its military leaders also serving as emotional examples, but it is useful to note that Cicero commented on these same emotional skills as valuable in the *domi* emotional community. Men like Pompey and Caesar, then, can serve as links between the two communities.[238]

238 There are as many emotional communities as social communities, so generally people are in more than one at a time. Men like Pompey and Caesar, who are leaders in both the *domi* and the *militiae* emotional communities, would be therefore expected to embody the ideals of each community as he interacted with members of that community. Such a feat could become complicated if the emotional apparatuses of the communities were at odds with one another, but it is possible to emphasize a trait that occurs in both or multiple emotional apparatuses – like Caesar's *clementia,* for instance – in order to maximize its effects.

Some qualities of leadership are easy to transfer between one emotional community to the other, such as Caesar's *clementia* or the respect for fellow citizens, allies, and their property. Bravery in war was another *locus* for invective, so men who dropped their shields in battle faced scorn at home as well as on campaign. But too much honor and glory from military victory was unsavory, since men shed their uniforms at the city *pomerium.* Cicero alludes to this, suggesting that some people say military authority is not as impressive as others claim it to be (*Marc.* 6), but he does use Caesar's military victories in Gaul to praise his *gloria* and *clementia* endlessly in the *Pro Marcello* (6- 9) and cede his own loss in the civil wars.[239] Most importantly, Cicero claims, is that Caesar would have preferred peace to personal *gloria* (*Marc.* 15), since the republic would have been intact, and he implores Caesar not to chase after *gloria* at the expense of the rest of the community (*Marc.* 25).

The emotional apparatus of the *domi* emotional community, then, can be summarized by constellations of values and emotions: the ideal member of the emotional community has a superior family background and comports himself with the highest standards of the emotional community. Members of the community who do not act in accordance with the emotional apparatus of the *domi* emotional community risk being singled out and excluded from the group. Since membership in the emotional community was frequently performed by giving public speeches, one common method of

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239 The civil wars, that is, that he also denied he ever encouraged: *quod quidem meum consilium minime obscurum fuit. nam et in hoc ordine integra re multa de pace dixi et in ipso bello eadem etiam cum capitis mei periculo sensi.* (And indeed my feelings on that matter were not at all a secret, for I said much in favor of peace in this assembly, while things were still intact, and even after things fell apart, I still felt the same, even in my own mortal danger, *Marc.* 15.)

marginalization from the group was public ridicule in oratory. We will now turn to Cicero's speeches against Verres to explore the ways that Cicero used membership in the *domi* emotional community and the embodiment of its emotional apparatus as parts of his argument.

CICERO'S *IN VERREM*

Cicero's campaign against Verres provides us with an opportunity to explore the *domi* emotional community, its apparatus, and the ways ridicule affects them. In 70 BCE, Cicero, then only recently returned from his service in Sicily as quaestor, won the right to prosecute Verres for crimes of corruption and extortion during his time as governor of Sicily. Cicero's scathing attack on Verres made an oratorical star of Cicero and sent Verres to voluntary exile.

The Verrines are a series of seven speeches composed by Cicero for the trial of Gaius Verres on charges of extortion stemming from his service in Sicily as propraetor. The first speech, *In Q. Caecilium Divinatio,* is a contest between Cicero and Caecilius to determine which of the two would serve as prosecutor against Verres. Caecilius was friendly to Verres, and Cicero easily defeated him. The second group of speeches, the *In Verrem,* is further divided into two sections, *Actio Prima* and *Actio Secunda.* The *Actio Prima* is the only one to have been actually delivered in court.[240] In this speech, Cicero takes the unusual tactic of calling witnesses and reading evidence, rather than performing a large speech and waiting for the response of his opponent. Because Verres and his

240 See Alexander 1976 and Frazel 2006 for a review of scholarship and a discussion of the delivery of the *actio prima* and the publication of the *actio secunda,* and Hortensius' possible responses to both.

defender, Hortensius, were attempting to delay the trial in order to wait for more favorable, newly elected magistrates to take office, Cicero boldly rearranged the traditional order of the trial.[241] The results were so devastating that Hortensius declined to finish the case, and Verres left for voluntary exile. Cicero, however, in his conquest, circulated the remaining five speeches, known together as *Actio Secunda,* although they were never delivered in court.

In the following case study, I use the Verrine orations to examine how Cicero used ridicule in order to navigate the emotional community of the senatorial elite for his own personal benefit. I divide my argument into several parts, roughly according to the progression of speeches composed in the case. First, I outline how Cicero demonstrated his own knowledge of the emotional apparatus, and as a result, Caecilius' lack of understanding of the apparatus, in the *Divinatio.* I argue that Cicero uses ridicule to ostracize Caecilius and to position himself as a member of the in-group of the emotional community, thereby winning the right to prosecute Verres. Next, I show that Cicero uses three different techniques of ridicule against Verres in the *In Verrem*: traditional jokes at Verres' expense, invective, and speech acts that label Verres as both *ridiculus* and *audax*. I conclude that this analysis of ridicule and emotional community bolsters the traditional reasons given for Cicero's publication of the *Actio Secunda* – namely to circulate and promote his own accomplishment.

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241 Cicero claims to have done this rearrangement of the argument at the last minute; it is also possible, perhaps even likely, that he intended to use this tactic from the start. See Frazel 2006: 131ff.

I have chosen to focus on the Verrines as a case study for our discussion of ridicule and emotional community for several reasons. First, Cicero's jokes in the Verrine orations are infamous. Quintilian claims that Cicero was a great wit (*mira quaedam in eo videtur fuisse urbanitas,* 6.3.3), but, even so, Quintilian has to defend the "more uninspired" (*frigidius,* 6.3.3) jokes in the Verrine speeches as invented by others and merely reported by Cicero (*ab aliis dicta,* 6.3.55).[242] Plutarch notes that Cicero made many witticisms (πολλὰ χαρίεντα, *Cic.* 7.4) at the trial, specifically mentioning the puns on Verres' name.[243] According to the nineteenth century scholar William Forsyth, the "cutting sarcasm and irony" of the *in Q. Caecilium Divinatio* "has never been surpassed."[244] In a review of Cicero's humor across the genres of his work, Haury proclaims that the Verrines are one of the pinnacles of humor in Cicero's oratory.[245] Cicero's success in removing Verres from the community while also promoting himself in the community makes the Verrines a fascinating study of ridicule and emotions in the *domi* emotional community; I now turn to this analysis.

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242 Cicero's humor was not universally loved during his lifetime. Cato is said to have remarked about Cicero: ὡς γελοῖον ὦ ἄνδρες ἔχομεν ὕπατον ("Gentlemen, what a funny consul we have!" Plut. *Comp. Dem. et Cic.* 1.5) Plutarch's word choice in γελοῖος is as ambiguous as the Latin *ridiculus* and the English *funny*: Cicero is both funny in that he makes people laugh and funny in that he causes people to laugh *at* him. See Rabbie 2010: 207, Beard 2014: 102.

243 Plutarch also mentions a joke at Hortensius' expense, but since this joke is not cited in the orations by Cicero himself, I exclude it from this discussion. It is a pretty good zinger and does contribute to Cicero's reputation as a wit, so I will quote it here: "And the orator Hortensius did not dare to defend Verres directly, but was persuaded to appear for him at the penalty hearing, taking an ivory sphinx as a reward. When Cicero made some oblique comment to him, and he responded that he had no skills in solving puzzles, Cicero said, "But you have a Sphinx at home!" (τοῦ δὲ ῥήτορος Ὀρτησίου τὴν μὲν εὐθεῖαν τῷ Βέρρῃ συνειπεῖν μὴ τολμήσαντος, ἐν δὲ τῷ τιμήματι πεισθέντος παραγενέσθαι καὶ λαβόντος ἐλεφαντίνην Σφίγγα μισθόν, εἶπέ τι πλαγίως ὁ Κικέρων πρὸς αὐτόν τοῦ δὲ φήσαντος αἰνιγμάτων λύσεως ἀπείρως ἔχειν, 'καὶ μὴν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας' ἔφη, 'τὴν Σφίγγα ἔχεις.' *Cic*. 7.6)

244 1880: 133.

245 1955: 117; see also Arena 2007: 150, cf. Powell 2007: 2.

In Q. Caecilium Divinatio and the Emotional Community

When Cicero attacked Verres, he was not yet a powerful or wealthy man. He had not yet become consul; he had not yet earned a reputation as Rome's greatest orator. Verres, on the other hand, was more established than Cicero, although he himself was only the son of a *novus homo,* and he had several powerful connections of *amicitia,* including the Metellus brothers, who were from a great family and who held several offices. Cicero's efforts paid off, as his reputation as an orator quickly spread, and Cicero went on to climb the *cursus honorum* successfully.

In other words, Cicero began the Verrines as a marginal member of the emotional community, and he attacked Verres, who inhabited one of the more secure positions at the center of the emotional community. This difference in status is important for men sparring in this emotional community, since members nearer the center, like Verres, are in a more comfortable position to defend themselves. On the other hand, Cicero, from his liminal position on the fringes of the community, was not yet powerful enough to affect Verres unless his attack were thoroughly and skillfully planned – which, of course, it was.

Cicero acknowledges this difference in status in the introduction to the *Divinatio in Caecilium.* In this speech, the only surviving example of the *divinatio* genre, Cicero must argue that he, not Q. Caecilius, should prosecute Verres for his crimes.[246] To do so, Cicero first argues that Verres is such a criminal, and Cicero has such an obligation, that

246 Craig 1985: 442.

there is no other choice but to have Cicero prosecute Verres.[247] Cicero has been asked by all the cities of Sicily, with the exception of Syracuse and Messina, to represent them in pursuing Verres for his crimes against the province. He frames this task as one of great honor and duty; one he is inspired to take up because of his pity for the Sicilians but also because of the example and customs of his predecessors in the Roman senatorial elite (*officio, fide, misericordia, multorum bonorum exemplo, vetere consuetudine instituo maiorum,* 5). In other words, by prosecuting Verres, Cicero is fulfilling an obligation set out by more senior members of the emotional community. He puts this claim at the top of his argument, in part to help make his participation in the trial seem a natural choice – Cicero is just doing what other members of the emotional community do. Cicero, acknowledging that he is not usually one to prosecute criminals (5- 6) notes that his position in the community (having served as quaestor in Sicily) has given him a moral duty to protect the entire republic from the huge and horrible crimes of Verres (*homo singulari cupiditate, audacia, scelere praeditus, cuius furta atque flagitia non in Sicilia solum, sed in Achaia, Asia, Cilicia, Pamphylia, Romae denique ante oculos omnium maxima turpissimaque nossemus, me agente in iudicium vocaretur,* 6). Cicero argues that a member of the emotional community must prosecute Verres, and that he is in a better position to do so than Caecilius.

He not only argues that he is in a better political or social position than Caecilius to prosecute Verres; he also claims that his emotional apparatus is better suited to do

247 Cicero argues for the moral difficulty of Caecilius, a quaestor, prosecuting Verres, his own praetor. See Thompson 1962 *passim*, Stroh 1975: 178, and Craig 1985: 445.

so.[248] First, he has been chosen by the Sicilians themselves, since he has already proven to them his trustworthiness (*ad meam fidem…spectatam iam et diu cognitam,* 11; *cuius fides est nobis cognita,* 20). Cicero emphasizes that his personal emotional apparatus is already proven to the Sicilians to be worthy to prosecute their corrupt governor; he implies that Caecilius is too tainted by his closer association with Verres.

As further demonstration of his own excellence (particularly compared to Caecilius) and Verres' vice, Cicero argues that he is the candidate whom Verres does *not* want to be selected to prosecute him. Cicero accuses Caecilius of being the weaker, softer prosecutor (22- 23). He goes through the list of ideal traits of the emotional community to point out how he is the superior choice: he suggests that Caecilius does not understand how a prosecution really works, claiming that Caecilius is lacking in the proper oratory skills and training (27, 35- 39). Caecilius does not have the virtues of firmness and honesty needed in a prosecutor (*firmum verumque*, 29), and Cicero suggests that Caecilius might be persuaded by Verres' money not to pursue him to the fullest extent of the law (30- 35). Cicero belittles Caecilius, suggesting that he think carefully about whether he can handle the prosecution, implying that Caecilius does not have the ability or mental wherewithal to pursue the case (*tu ipse quem ad modum existimes vide etiam atque etiam, et tu te collige, et qui sis et quid facere possis considera,* 37).[249]

Cicero continues with details of Caecilius' failings. He provides evidence of Caecilius' unsavory dealings while in office in Sicily, when he deprived a woman of her

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248 cf. May 1988: 34ff.

249 *pace* May 1988: 35. I am not convinced that Cicero is truly displaying *arrogantia* here, since I am not sure that he is misrepresenting his own skill or talent, though his comment is certainly demeaning.

property (55- 58). While Caecilius claims to be the better candidate for prosecution, since he was Verres' quaestor, Cicero counters that, if praetor and quaestor are like father and son, then Caecilius is far too close to the criminal Verres to be trusted himself (61). Cicero's intentions in prosecuting Verres are noble, he says, because they benefit the entire republic, whereas Caecilius' motivation is personal (64).[250]

Cicero imagines Caecilius' response to such accusations: *quid ergo? haec in te sunt omnia?* ("So what? Do you have all those qualities yourself?" 40). With "rather jocular malice"[251] he imagines Caecilius as the pitiable victim of the skilled opposing orator, Hortensius:

> Te vero, Caecili, quem ad modum sit elusurus, quam omni ratione iactaturus, videre iam videor; quotiens ille tibi potestatem optionemque facturus sit ut eligas utrum velis, factum esse necne, verum esse an falsum: utrum dixeris, id contra te futurum. Qui tibi aestus, qui error, quae tenebrae, di immortales, erunt homini minime malo! *Div. Caec.* 45
>
> I can already picture it, Caecilius: how he's going to play you, how he will toss you every which way; how many times he's going to give the power and option to choose what you want – whether something happened or not, whether something is true or false, and whichever you choose, it'll work against you. Ye gods! What a heat you'll be in, what confusion, what darkness, will there be, you poor thing!

Cicero's condescension makes for a humorous and insulting scenario.[252] He makes it clear that even if Caecilius had had the bare minimum of oratorical training, skill in rhetoric, and the personal qualities of honesty and virtue that would make him an

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250 Cicero, of course, would also benefit greatly; see below for more discussion.

251 Davies 1969: 157, cf. May 1988: 36ff.

252 This passage is classified as «*ridiculiser*» by Haury (1955: 117). His derision is emphasized by the oratorical flare of several tricola that follow (*quid cum… quid cum… quid cum; transigere, expedire, absolvere; necessitudinem… morem… religionem;* and so on). Cicero is at once showing off his own rhetorical skill, diminishing Caecilius' oratorical power, and shaming him with hypothetical failure.

effective orator, Cicero still has *more* of each of these. Cicero grants that Caecilius is also a member of the emotional community, but Cicero argues that he himself is the one who better embodies the optimal qualities. Cicero concludes: *dubitare quisquam potest quin honestius sit eorum causa apud quos quaestor fueris, quam eum cuius quaestor fueris accusare?* (Can there be any doubt that it is more reasonable for a prosecutor to be serving those among whom he was quaestor, than pursuing the man under whom he served as quaestor? 65).

Cicero's conclusion is bold: Caecilius, he says, has absolutely nothing to gain or lose if he takes on this case, and it will show. Cicero, however, has put his entire future on the line – *obsides,* hostages, as he says – to his own success. If Rome wants a man with faith, industry, wisdom, and authority, then Cicero is prepared to serve (*quapropter, iudices, vestrum est deligere quem existimetis facillime posse magnitudinem causae ac iudicii sustinere fide, diligentia, consilio, auctoritate* (73). But, if the court chooses Caecilius instead, it will be clear that the court did not want an honorable, strict, and attentive prosecutor like Cicero (*populus Romanus ne tam honestam, tam severam diligentemque accusationem neque vobis placuisse neque ordini vestro placere arbitretur, providete,* 73).

Cicero uses the opportunity to compete against Caecilius as a chance to advance in the emotional community that both men inhabited. By depicting himself as the more closely adhering to the qualities of the ideal emotional community member, Cicero secured the position as Verres' prosecutor. This first step in the trial process, the *divinatio,* is really a comparative evaluation of membership in the emotional community,

and Cicero was eager to prove himself and enhance his position. Next, Cicero must take on Verres himself.

In Verrem

We now turn to the speeches against Verres. In these speeches, as I mentioned above, Cicero demonstrates how Verres is a poor representation of the emotional community, and he takes the opportunity to re-negotiate their respective positions in the community, removing Verres and promoting himself.[253] To do so, Cicero employs three strategies of ridicule. The first two techniques are more typical of speeches of personal attack: he makes jokes and uses invective to ridicule Verres, therefore putting his position in the emotional community in jeopardy. His other strategy, using speech acts to label Verres as risible, is less common but still effective. Cicero frequently calls Verres *ridiculus, audax,* and *amens,* which has the effect of labeling Verres as a non-compliant member of the emotional community, and one who should be mocked and ostracized. I will begin with the basic jokes and wordplay in both *Actio Prima* and *Actio Secunda* that, especially combined, make a mockery of Verres.

Puns

Cicero indulges in some simple wordplay with several puns on Verres' name. First, Cicero puns on the *verr* sound of Verres' name, connecting it to the verb *everrere,* "to clean out" or "sweep away." The joke suggests that *verr-* is a reflection of an essential part of his character, since it alludes to both his name and his greed. Cicero explains that

253 May 1988: 38ff emphasizes the contrast between Cicero's ethos and Verres' ethos; while he defines "ethos" only broadly, as "character," as in rhetoric, his use of the term seems comparable to my "emotional apparatus."

one of Verres' first tasks upon arriving in Sicily was to "sweep out" money from his citizens. What a clever omen (*ex illo omine urbano*) his name is, Cicero says, because as soon as he landed in Sicily, he began to clean out the province's public and private coffers (*ad everrendam provinciam,* 2.2.19, 2.2.21). Equating Verres' name with this undesirable quality of his character demeans his ability to serve as a civic leader and his status in the emotional community.

Cicero continues the pun on Verres' name with the verb *everrere* later in the same speech. He bemoans the fact that Verres refused to grant permission to the Sicilians to celebrate the Marcelli, but dedicated "glorious festivals" (*sacris epulisque,* 2.2.52) to himself. Verres also arranged to profit off the festivals by arranging contracts, for which brazen impudence Cicero cannot contain himself. He marks his indignation with an epic hyperbole and tricolon: "time, voice, and lungs would fail me if I wanted to cry out how miserable and shameful it is" (*nam me dies vox latera deficiant, si hoc nunc vociferari velim, quam miserum indignumque sit…* 2.2.52). Verres' actions are so outside the realm of acceptable practice that even an epic Cicero could not speak against them. He continues, with an address to Verres and an interjection to the festival (*O Verria praeclara!*), to rave about the indignity of the Verrine festival, using anaphora, alliteration, and another tricolon to underscore the shameful disgrace of Verres' actions: *quo accessisti, quaeso, quo non attuleris… etenim quam tu domum, quam urbem adisti, quod fanum denique…?* (Where have you gone, I ask you, where you have not brought… and even what house, what city, what temple even… 2.2.52) He concludes that the festivals are aptly named Verria, since they were founded in honor of Verres' natural

predisposition to greed – the pun *everrere* rather than his name Verres (*non ex nomine sed ex manibus naturaque tua constituta esse,* 2.2.52).

The literary devices that Cicero employs in this section call attention to Verres' inappropriate actions, but the jokes, and in particular, Cicero's casting of the joke, play an important part in renegotiating Verres' position in the emotional community. By crediting the joke to the common talk of the town, Cicero expands the in-group of criticizers of Verres, making it easier for his audience to feel comfortable joining them – knowing, of course, that his "audience" was reading the circulated copy of the speech that was never delivered. With this further level of remove, Cicero knows that readers of his speech will know the outcome of Verres' trial. His audience will already have heard of his success, so *Actio Secunda* is meant to secure those impressions: that Cicero is a representative of the community, that he is an impassioned, skilled, successful orator, and that Verres is not.

Elsewhere, Cicero uses the same tactic with a slightly different pun. This time, he credits the pun on Verres' name with the word for a boar to Romans who were so resentful of their situation in Sicily under Verres that they had to joke about it (*illi homines erant qui etiam ridiculi inveniebantur ex dolore,* 2.1.121).[254] Cicero highlights the emotional state (*ex dolore*) of the Romans who have been victims of Verres' crimes and even calls them *ridiculi.* This word, as I will discuss below, has several shades of meaning, including that they are humorous, but also that they have been so downtrodden

254 Apronius, Verres' associate, has a name that might pun on another word for boar, *aper,* but Cicero does not take that bait.

as to be made fools of. The joke amongst these townspeople is a pun on Verres' name with the word for boar: "it's no wonder *ius verrinum* is so worthless" (*negabant mirandum esse ius tam nequam esse verrinum,* 2.1.121). *Ius verrinum* is a double pun: *ius* is both a sauce and the law, so *ius verrinum* is pork gravy, and *ius Verrinum* is Verres' law. This double pun is clever, but it also connects Verres with the qualities of an unseemly boar. By distancing himself from the joke, Cicero disavows any corny humor[255] and yet also expands the number of Verres' critics, letting his peers in the emotional community know that there is a significant group who would like to see him marginalized from the community.

The pun continues with another joke, again attributed to the talk of the town: *alii etiam frigidiores erant, sed quia stomachabantur ridiculi videbantur esse, cum Sacerdotem exsecrabantur qui verrem tam nequam reliquisset* ("Others were even duller, but since they were boiling with rage, they appeared to be funny, cursing the priest (Sacerdos) for leaving behind such a worthless pig (Verres)," 2.1.121) The formula is the same, as Cicero notes the emotional state of the citizens (*stomachabantur*) and comments on the quality of the boar, or Verres. His goal in repeating these jokes is not to impress the audience with his own wit, but to make them understand that Cicero's opinions of Verres' worthlessness and unfairness (*istius nequitiam et iniquitatem,* 2.1.121) were widespread and common knowledge.

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255 This is, after all, one of the cheesy puns that Quintilian feels the need to defend in 6.3.3 and 6.3.55. Cicero's humor was often piquant and useful in his speeches, but it also seems to have served as a marker of his status as *novus homo*. See Rabbie 2007.

Cicero extends the attack on Verres to Verres' henchmen, including Quintus Apronius, whom Cicero calls the *princeps* of Verres' *ministros ac satellites cupiditatum suarum* (the chief of the aides and ministers of his desires, 2.3.21). The attacks against Apronius are particularly vicious;[256] Cicero goes into detail describing a debauched party hosted by Apronius, where upstanding citizen Quintus Lollius (*equite Romano spectato atque honesto*, 2.3.61) felt demeaned. Since Apronius is a lower-ranking official, Cicero does not consider him to be an equal in the emotional community and therefore pursues him more aggressively. Apronius' link with Verres, however, means that Verres is nonetheless damaged by Cicero's attacks on Apronius; we are to assume that anything Apronius has done was sanctioned by Verres, or perhaps even participated in. In particular, Cicero uses shaming invective to condemn Apronius' *os impurum,* or unclean mouth.[257] The mouth stands in, through synecdoche, for all of Apronius' (and therefore Verres') bodily faults, including the drunkenness, gluttony, or inappropriate appearance mentioned above as *loci* of invective.

Cicero uses puns to mock Verres' deficiencies in the emotional community. The *verr-* pun allows Cicero to connect Verres to unseemly creatures (boars) and habits ("sweeping out" treasuries, *vel sim.*). Given the Roman soft spot for puns, the phenomenon itself is not altogether surprising, despite Cicero's supposed reluctance to mention the puns he claims are in common use. The repetition of the joke helps Cicero convince his audience that Verres really is boar-like or corrupt; as I show below, Cicero

256 Cicero "points" to Apronius in the "courtroom" in 2.3.22; he harangues Apronius for the next dozen paragraphs (through 2.3.33).
257 Corbeill 1996: 107ff, Richlin 1996: 99.

uses a similar technique to label Verres as an outcast of the emotional community. This collection of wordplay jokes represents relatively tame ridicule, but when combined with other types of ridicule, Cicero is able to achieve his goals.

Invective

In addition to the puns and jokes Cicero makes throughout the speeches, he uses the traditional *loci* of invective to disparage Verres. In this section, I provide an overview of the invective against Verres, according to the four categories of emotional community membership based on invective (family background, personal qualities, civil conduct, and military conduct).[258]

Little is known, outside of Cicero's campaign against him, of Verres' family background. Cicero does not attack Verres for being connected to slaves or other persons of low origin, and surely he would have taken advantage of this opportunity if it had existed.[259] Verres' father, the elder Verres, is mentioned in passing. He is portrayed as the sensible inverse of Verres, who begs his son to be more careful in his behavior in Sicily (2.4.41) and who, after his son did not heed his warnings and was in court for his crimes, fruitlessly begged the senators to spare his son (2.2.95). The son Verres is characterized as disrespectful of his father; Cicero claims that the younger Verres never had any measure of piety or courtesy for his father (*neque pietatis neque humanitatis rationem habuisset umquam*, 2.2.97) and that he neglected to listen to the advice or authority of his

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258 As I have mentioned earlier, the *In Verrem* is not a traditional case of invective, in that the primary purpose of the speech is not a personal attack on Verres; it is rather a judicial speech in the prosecution of Verres on crimes of extortion. Although, as part of that prosecution, Cicero certainly derides Verres.

259 Cowles 1917: 3.

father (*neque in eo quod monebatur auctoritatem patris,* 2.2.97). So, while Cicero is quiet on Verres' family hertage, he exploits the relationship Verres had with his father. In this way, Verres' family is symptomatic of his personal qualities, rather than his family background. Similarly, Cicero uses *prosopopoeia* to have Verres' father attack Verres for his failures to meet the standards for personal conduct in the emotional community.

Throughout the campaign, Cicero attacks Verres for his personal comportment, including his dress, his drunkenness and behavior at elaborate parties, his sexual escapades, his crudeness, and his body, and usually more than one of these at once. Verres' dress and conduct at public events and his behavior at private parties directly relate to his ability to serve as governor of Sicily. For example, Cicero pairs Verres' bold and vulgar display of stolen treasure with his choice of inappropriately feminine Greek clothing (a *tunica pulla* and *pallium*), dwelling especially on the *pallium* (2.4.54- 5).[260] Cicero exclaims that Verres' choice of *pallium* is so singular that it has become infamous among all good men in Syracuse. Cicero interjects *o tempora, o mores!* to punctuate his outrage at a leading Roman official, and therefore a member of the emotional community, appearing in feminine foreign attire. For Cicero, Verres' neglect of the proper dress for a Roman governor is a sign that he is also neglecting other duties.[261]

In the next speech, another episode in which Verres sports a *tunica pulla* and *pallium* gives Cicero more opportunity for criticism and ridicule in multiple aspects of Verres' life. This time, Verres not only wears Greek clothes unfitting a Roman governor,

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260 Heskel 2001: 133ff.

261 See Heskel 2001 for a full discussion of Cicero's opinions on intersection of dress and comportment.

but he also spends time with a mistress on the beach, instead of meeting with other government officials (2.5.32). In his revelry, he bared his chest to partygoers, displaying the scars on his chest from bites of women, the traces of lust and wickedness (*vestigia libidinis atque nequitiae*), according to Cicero. This incident is an example of Verres' worst traits, including his thefts, his rapacity, his desire, his cruelty, his haughtiness, his evilness, and his brazenness (*furta, rapinas, cupiditatem, crudelitatem, superbiam, scelus, audaciam,* 2.5.32). Cicero suggests that even Verres' service as a general cannot possibly overcome these negative traits, as Hortensius might have tried to argue.

These constellations of inappropriate behavior allow Cicero to use *prosopopoeia* to imagine Verres' recently deceased father chastising him for setting a bad example for his son, for his plunder of his territory, his betrayal of the people of Sicily and of Rome in general:

> tu in provincia tam splendida, tu apud socios fidelissimos, civis Romanos honestissimos, in metu periculoque provinciae dies continuos compluris in litore conviviisque iacuisti, te per eos dies nemo tuae domi convenire, nemo in foro videre potuit, tu sociorum atque amicorum ad ea convivia matres familias adhibuisti, tu inter eius modi mulieres praetextatum tuum filium, nepotem meum, conlocavisti, ut aetati maxime lubricae atque incertae exempla nequitiae parentis vita praeberet, tu praetor in provincia cum tunica pallioque purpureo visus es, tu propter amorem libidinemque tuam imperium navium legato populi Romani ademisti, Syracusano tradidisti, tui milites in provincia Sicilia frugibus frumentoque caruerunt, tua luxurie atque avaritia classis populi Romani a praedonibus capta et incensa est; post Syracusas conditas quem in portum numquam hostis accesserat, in eo te praetore primum piratae navigaverunt; neque haec tot et tanta dedecora dissimulatione tua neque oblivione hominum ac taciturnitate tegere voluisti, sed etiam navium praefectos sine ullacausa de complexu parentum suorum, hospitum tuorum, ad mortem cruciatumque rapuisti, neque te in parentum luctu atque lacrimis mei nominis commemoratio mitigavit; tibi hominum innocentium sanguis non modo

voluptati sedetiam quaestui fuit!' haec si tibi tuus parens diceret, posses ab eo veniam petere, posses ut tibi ignosceret postulare? 2.5.137- 138

"You, in that splendid province, among our most faithful allies and the most honorable Roman citizens, in a time of fear and danger for the province, you lay for many full days together in banquets on the beach! No one could find you at home; no one could see you in the forum. You hosted the mothers of associates and friends at these parties; among women of that sort, you brought your young son -- my grandson -- so that his father's life would serve as an example of iniquity, when he is at a particularly susceptible age. You, while praetor in your province, were seen in a tunic and a purple cloak. You, on account of your love and lust, you took up the command of the navy from a representative of the Roman people and gave it to a Syracusan. Your soldiers in Sicily needed goods and grain. Because of your luxury and greed, one of the Roman people's fleets was captured and burned by pirates. In your praetorship, for the first time since the city of Syracuse was founded, pirates sailed into the harbor, where no enemy had ever entered. You did not wish to cover these many disgraces with any pretending on your part, or with the blind eye or silence on the part of others, but you took those overseers of ships, without any cause, from the embrace of their families, who are your hosts, and sent them to death and torture. And in the parents' grief and tears, no mention of my name softened you. The blood of innocent men was not only a delight but also an advantage to you!" If your father were to say these things to you, would you ask for his pardon? Would you be able to ask him to overlook these things?

This extended public scolding is uncomfortable to imagine, and was surely designed to humiliate Verres. Later in his career, Cicero delighted in the comedic effect of *prosopopoeiae,* using characteristics from *senex* characters in Roman comedy to ridicule Clodius and his sister Clodia.[262] Cicero's imagined elder Verres addresses his son's personal characteristics: attention to revelry and lust, rather than the government or his office. He provides a bad example for his impressionable son, with a particular contrast in his foreign dress and his son's age-appropriate attire. Every action that Cicero's elder

262 See Geffcken 1973: 17ff on the *prosopopoeiae* in the *Pro Caelio.*

Verres mentions is an aspect of the *domi* emotional community that Verres has violated. Cicero continues, through the character of the elder Verres, to point out where Verres fails to live up to the emotional apparatus: he plundered the people who were supposed to be in his care, and he betrayed the citizens of Rome. His actions were unacceptable for a representative of the *domi* emotional community.

So far, we have already seen that Cicero claimed that Verres' personal qualities caused him to be an inferior civic and military leader. His predisposition for revelry and plunder regularly distracted him from his duties as governor, according to Cicero. Moreover, the main reasons for Verres' trial are his crimes of extortion and corruption, or his failures as a civic and military leader. Cicero goes into some detail as he outlines Verres' progress on campaign through Greece, stopping to plunder temples along the way (such as Delos, 2.1.48) and to party, of course (2.1.49). Cicero accuses Verres, in a combination of both direct address and praeteritio, of stealing the most beautiful statues from Greece and setting them up in poor taste in his own house (2.1.49- 51). Cicero speaks disparagingly, as if he cannot quite believe what he is not quite saying, while at the same time implying that everyone already knows what he is saying.

Cicero is no less sparing in his ridicule of Verres' military career. At one winter camp, Cicero jokes, it was so cold and stormy that it was difficult to see Verres – out of bed (*ut eum non facile non modo extra tectum, sed ne extra lectum quidem quisquam viderit,* 2.5.26). Verres' military camps were swathed in linen and luxury, full of banquets and women (2.5.27- 30), yet Hortensius, to Cicero's purported disbelief, defended Verres as a military man (*hunc tu igitur imperatorem esse defendis, Hortensi?* 2.5.32). With

another clever joke, Cicero concedes that Verres had been quite attentive to his "post," where he had "suffered many losses:" the gambling table (*aleatoris Placentini castra commemorabuntur, in quibus cum frequens fuisset tamen aere dirutus est*, 2.5.33). Once again, Cicero has highlighted with ridicule the ways in which Verres fails to live up to the standards of the emotional community.

I have described how Cicero's presentation of Verres' faults corresponds to the common points of invective, including family background, personal qualities, civil conduct, and military leadership. While these accusations against Verres stray from the main charges against him, for crimes of extortion, they nevertheless serve to characterize Verres on the whole. Cicero has used ridicule to make it easier for the jury to believe that Verres would commit such acts, and that he deserves to be punished for his myriad crimes.[263] Cicero includes these morsels of information in order to characterize Verres as so completely unlike the ideal member of the emotional community.[264]

Ridiculus

This image of the corrupt Verres, put forward by Cicero through his jokes and invective, is compounded again by Cicero's repeated use of the terms *ridiculus, audax,* and *amens*. With each repetition, Cicero tells his audience that Verres is laughably outside the boundaries of the emotional community's apparatus. This tactic uses illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts to simply declare Verres ridiculous. As we have seen, ridicule has the effect of isolating an individual from his emotional

263 See Riggsby 1997 on (purported) truth in Roman law courts.

264 cf. Tempest 2007: 23f on the *digressio,* as she argues for it, in the *Actio Secunda.*

community, so in labeling Verres as *ridiculus,* Cicero is in essence removing him from the emotional community and promoting himself at the same time.

The notion of "speech acts" was first presented in J. L. Austin's *How to Do Things with Words.* According to Austin, and his taxonomy of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts, a speech act is an utterance that has a performative function, such as congratulating, declaring, promising, or warning.[265] A locutionary speech act is the linguistic performance of the utterance: the phonetic aspects of the utterance itself. An illocutionary speech act further incorporates the pragmatic functions of the locutionary act: for example, "I now pronounce you man and wife" is an utterance that also takes an action of marrying two people. A perlocutionary speech act has further consequences in the speaker or listener. For instance, a warning "Stay away from there!" has the illocutionary effect of warning the listener and the perlocutionary effect of keeping the listener safe from danger.

John Searle further developed Austin's ideas by introducing the concept of the indirect speech act, which conveys more of the pragmatic aspects of interlocutors who share knowledge relevant to the conversation.[266] His classic example is the following exchange:

> Speaker X: "We should leave for the show or else we'll be late."
>
> Speaker Y: "I am not ready yet."[267]

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265 Austin 1962: 108ff.

266 Searle's first work on speech acts was his 1969 book *Speech Acts;* he has since written numerous articles and books refining his approach.

267 1969: 178.

While Speaker Y's locutionary act does not directly respond to Speaker X's locutionary act, both speakers understand the perlocutionary force of Speaker Y's comment, that they cannot yet leave for the show, since Speaker Y is not ready to go. This indirect response makes Speaker Y's utterance an indirect speech act. As Searle has explained, indirect speech acts are usually concerned with the perlocutionary force of the speech acts.

In terms of ridicule in Cicero's speeches then, Cicero's disparaging comments about Verres can be considered a series of indirect speech acts with the perlocutionary force of removing Verres from the approved circles of the emotional community. In the speeches against Verres, though, Cicero takes an unusual step of using illocutionary speech acts to label Verres as ridiculous.[268]

In the speeches against Verres, including the *In Q. Caecilium Divinatio* and both *Actiones* of the *In Verrem,* Cicero uses the word *ridiculus* twelve times, plus variants of the verb *ridere* five times. To provide some contrast, Cicero uses *ridiculus* only once in the *Philippics,* and never in the *In Pisonem.* Cicero uses these words far more often in the Verrines than in any other of his speeches. By repeating the word *ridiculus* in reference to Verres, Cicero is performing the illocutionary speech act of labeling Verres as ridiculous. As we have seen, ridicule provides a social function of weakening the cohesion of a

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[268] Catherine Steel has argued for a similar technique in the post-exile speeches (2007: 105- 127). She has shown that Cicero names his target – Verres (named 4.9% of sentences in the *Verrines*), Catilina (11.4%), Antonius (10.2%) – when the target himself is the subject of invective. But when Cicero is speaking against a broader social trend – the corruption of the emotional community at large, essentially – as he was in most of his post-exile speeches, Cicero does not name a specific target, even though Clodius is frequently a focus of invective in these speeches (named in just 0.9% of sentences in the five speeches in which he receives the most invective). By naming his targets over and over again, Cicero is driving home the shame and *ignominia* of his invective. In terms of speech acts, Steel has argued that Cicero uses a perlocutionary speech act to connect his target's name with the shame he feels they deserve.

larger community. This use of the word *ridiculus* gives Cicero a method for labeling Verres as a deviant from the approved behavior of the emotional apparatus of the community.

Cicero does not use this technique of perlocutionary speech acts in other campaigns. Of the 88 uses of the term *ridicul-* in Cicero's works, almost half are in his philosophical works, and only one other speech (*Pro Quinctio*) even uses the *rid-* words more than once. I suggest that this perlocutionary speech act technique is therefore rather a simple or inelegant tool for attacking one's opponent. Cicero, as an ascendant member of the Roman senatorial class, did not have many opportunities to establish himself. By using perlocutionary speech acts in this way, Cicero is demonstrating his knowledge of the emotional community and its emotional apparatus. If that is the case, then, Cicero needs to use this technique less and less frequently as he becomes a more important figure in Roman oratory and in the Roman senatorial elite's emotional community.

A simple use of the indirect speech act occurs when Cicero labels Verres' behavior as deviant: "It's ridiculous that I'm talking about Verres in the same breath as Piso Frugi" (*Ridiculum est me nunc de Verre dicere, cum de Pisone Frugi dixerim…* 2.4.57). Cicero has just established the scrupulousness of Piso Frugi, son of Lucius Piso, the founder of the extortion law.[269] The Piso men are models of their responsibility and behavior as leaders and members of the emotional community; Verres' corruption is so far removed from them that it is offensively absurd to even mention Verres in the same

269 On Piso's *lex de rebus repetundis,* see Richardson 1987. See also Cic. *Brut.* 27; *In Verr.* 2.3.195, 2.4.56-7; *de Off.* 2.75.

sentence as either Piso. Cicero's use of the word *ridiculus* is the illocutionary speech act declaring that comparing the behavior of Verres and Piso is ridiculous, but its perlocutionary force is that Verres' behavior is ridiculous in its irregularity. As Cicero repeats these claims, particularly combined with the other rhetorical strategies in the Verrine orations, he performs the perlocutionary, indirect speech act of labeling Verres as *ridiculus,* or a deviant who should be removed from the emotional community.

A combination of these speech acts demonstrates the effect of Cicero's strategy. The outburst *O rem ridiculam!* (2.4.146) interrupts Cicero's discussion of the reluctance of the Syracusans to perform a *laudatio* in Verres' honor despite his insistence upon it. Cicero's comment indicates that the entire situation is irregular – that is, not within the typical standards of behavior as defined by the emotional community. This speech act labels Verres as an outlier.

But in this case, Cicero goes further to identify the in-group that is excluding Verres because of this deviant behavior. Cicero explains that, as he was told by the Syracusans themselves (*me docent,* 2.4.144), they did not wish to produce a *laudatio* for Verres, as was customly done for leaders. Instead, the Syracusans conspired to produce a sham *laudatio* that instead generated derision and pointed out Verres' corruption (*potius irrisionem esse illam, quae commonefaceret istius turpem calamitosamque praeturam,* 2.4.144).

Not only does Cicero perform the illocutionary act of labeling Verres' actions as *ridiculus,* but he also points out that the group of people who feel that way includes all of the leading Syracusans, who have personal knowledge of the situation and who refused to

speak on Verres' behalf. Cicero is therefore expanding the size of the group of people who condemn and disparage Verres. Demonstrating the expanse of the in-group makes it safer for other members of his emotional community to turn their backs on him and join in the derision: they would be conforming to the standards of their community by excluding the man who has violated those same standards.

Putting the *ridiculus*-label in the mouths of others is therefore a clever tactic in generating support for Cicero's case. This strategy is similar to the puns on Verres' name and the association Cicero makes between the pun and Verres' character. If many people see the connection, Cicero implies, then that makes it even more powerful and true. At 2.2.18, for example, Cicero combines the opportunity to pun on Verres' name (with *everrere*) and give credit to others (*homines*) who can label Verres with the thoroughly funny (*perridicule*) and appropriate (*augurabantur*) pun: *O praeclare coniectum a vulgo in illam provinciam omen communis famae atque sermonis, cum ex nomine istius quid iste in provincia facturus esset perridicule homines augurabantur!* (What an amazing prediction was the common rumor and conversation for that poor province, when from that man's name they hilariously divined the way that he would behave in their province! 2.2.18)

Cicero is careful to label as *ridiculus* the behavior that he claims is extraordinary in its corruption. *Ridiculus* is the term for unusual behavior or actions outside of the norm, and ones that need to be condemned for this deviance. For example, when Verres claims not to have kept copies of his financial records: "But this is a ridiculous novelty: he has told me, when I demanded his records from him, that he maintained them up until

Terentius and Cassius were consuls, but that he stopped after that" (*Hoc vero novum et ridiculum est quod hic nobis respondit cum ab eo tabulas postularemus, usque ad M. Terentium et C. Cassium consules confecisse, postea destitisse*, 2.1.60). Cicero does not believe that Verres is being truthful, and he uses the terms *ridiculus* and *novus* to label Verres' behavior as irregular and suspicious. This is not the traditional way of behaving – the way that is endorsed by the emotional community – and Cicero wants to demonstrate Verres' deviance. The situation is similar at 2.1.117, as Cicero protests indignantly to Verres' claims about an inheritance. *Iam hoc ridiculum est?* ("What is this ridiculousness?") Cicero exclaims, continuing with *Quid ait?* ("Wait, what is he saying?") and a series of rhetorical questions, as if he cannot fully comprehend Verres' accounts and his corruption.

Cicero uses the *ridiculus*-label to indicate that Verres is acting outside the guidelines of the emotional community. In the passage below, Cicero returns to another of Verres' crimes in Sicily, and introduces the episode by calling attention to two negative qualities of Verres. Cicero drives home the point by bringing up, again, the festival in honor of Verres; this time calling it *turpia ac ridicula*:

> Ac videte hominis impudentiam atque arrogantiam, iudices, qui non solum Verria haec turpia ac ridicula ex Heraclii pecunia constituerit, verum etiam Marcellia tolli imperarit, ut ei sacra facerent quotannis cuius opera omnium annorum sacra deosque patrios amiserant, eius autem familiae dies festos tollerent per quam ceteros quoque festos dies recuperarant. 2.4.151[270]

[270] See also 2.2.52, where Cicero again decries the Verrine festival and makes the pun on Verres and *verres*: *Nam me dies, vox, latera deficiant, si hoc nunc vociferari velim, quam miserum indignumque sit istius nomine apud eos diem festum esse, qui se istius opera funditus extinctos esse arbitrantur. O Verria praeclara! quo, quaeso, accessisti, quo non attuleris istum tecum diem? Etenim quam tu domum, quam urbem adisti, quod fanum denique, quod non eversum atque extersum reliqueris? Quare appellentur sane ista Verria, quae non ex nomine, sed ex manibus naturaque tua constituta esse videantur.*

> But consider the impudence and arrogance of this man, judges. He not only established the shameful and ridiculous Verres Festival, using money from Heraclius, but he also actually ordered that the Marcellus Festival be canceled. The Sicilians were supposed to honor with sacred objects, every year, the very man who destroyed their sacred objects of all previous years and deprived them of their ancestral gods, to whom they owe the recovery of that festival and many others.

The festivals are shameful and ridiculous because they are hosted by orders of an impudent and arrogant man, Verres, and they appear to make a mockery of the Sicilian religious traditions because they do not take into account their long-standing religious traditions, like the festival for Marcellus.

With this illocutionary speech act, Cicero connects Verres both to the label *ridiculus* and to other negative qualities, *impudentia, arrogantia,* and *turpia.* These negative qualities are the opposite of what would be expected of a member of the emotional community, so by closely associating Verres with such terms, Cicero again makes Verres an object of ridicule and drives him from the center of the emotional community.

The other uses of the term *ridiculus* in the Verrine orations are on similar tracks: they all perform a speech act of labeling – identifying Verres as someone who should be

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For daylight, my voice, my lungs would fail me, if I wanted to cry out now about how miserable and unbecoming it is that those people have a holiday in that man's name – those people who think that they were completely destroyed by that man's deeds. O spendid Verrine Festival! Where, I beg you, have you gone that you have not brought that day along with you? Or, really, what house, what city, what temple even have you ever approached that you did not leave turned out and wiped out? So let them appropriately call it the Verrine Festival, and let it seem to be named after your grabbing hands and your nature, not after your name.

the object of ridicule – and the perlocutionary speech act of actually beginning to remove Verres from the emotional community.[271]

Audax atque Amens

Verres is also labeled as *audax* and *amens* for his behavior that breached the emotional apparatus of the community. The adjective *audax* and its cognate noun *audacia* suggest brazen, reckless, or presumptuous behavior. These words are used to comment on Verres' boldness in conduct, because his actions imply an overestimation of himself or an underestimation of the importance of the rules of the emotional community. In the same way that we saw *superbia* denote a miscalculation of one's status in the *militiae* emotional community, *audax* is a label for a member of the *domi* emotional community who has overstepped his position in the community.[272] Cicero frequently pairs *audax* with *amens* ("insane" or "out of one's mind"), suggesting that acting out of accordance with the emotional apparatus of the *domi* community is so preposterous that Verres must be crazy.

Cicero describes Verres as *audacissimus atque amentissimus* ("most audacious and most senseless," 1.1.7) in the opening paragraphs of the first speech against him,

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271 Cicero does the same work when he labels Verres as *superbus* at 2.1.122, 2.2.9, 2.2.192, 2.3.5, 2.4.45, 2.4.89, and 2.5.32. As we have seen above, *superbia* is the social mistake of over-estimating one's position relative to others in the community. To a Sicilian audience, or to the Roman senatorial elite, the term *superbus* would connect him with the tradition of the (Greek) tyrant. For *superbia* or *arrogantia* and tyranny, see *Rep.* 2.46, Sal. *Cat*. 6.7, Livy 9.46.8, 28.42.22. See also Dunkle 1967, Erskine 1991, Vasaly 1993 on *superbia,* Greek tyrants, and republican political invective.

272 References to Verres as *audax* or to his *audacia*: *Div. Caec.* 6.6; *In Ver.* 1.1.5, 1.1.7, 1.1.36, 1.1.52, 2.1.11, 2.1.15, 2.1.20, 2.1.36, 2.1.40, 2.1.87, 2.1.105, 2.1.128, 2.1.129, 2.1.154, 2.2.48, 2.2.71, 2.2.74, 2.2.134, 2.2.189, 2.3.5, 2.3.7, 2.3.22, 2.3.24, 2.3.64, 2.3.81, 2.3.83, 2.3.122, 2.3.140, 2.3.141, 2.3.152, 2.3.155, 2.3.166, 2.3.169, 2.3.176, 2.3.177, 2.3.206, 2.3.208, 2.3.213, 2.4.7, 2.4.73, 2.4.78, twice). References to Verres as *audax atque amens*: *In Ver.* 1.1.7, 2.1.1, 2.1.6, 2.1.54, 2.1.105, 2.1.142, 2.2.104, 2.3.40, 2.3.126, 2.4.44, 2.4.99.

establishing this characterization of him early in the campaign. Cicero directly contrasted Verres with the "good men" (*omnibus bonis,* 1.1.8) who are judging him in the trial, and whom Verres assumes he can bribe. This distinction between the *audax atque amens* Verres and the *boni* judges of Verres gives Cicero's audience an easy path to follow in thinking of Verres as an aberration, and someone to shun out of the community.

The audience will get regular reminders of Verres as *audax,* or sometimes both *audax* and *amens*. Cicero begins the *Actio Secunda* with a reminder of how his audience should think about Verres' personal emotional apparatus (*tam audacem, tam amentem, tam impudentem;* "so audacious, so crazy, so impudent," 2.1.1) and punctuates the rest of the speeches with these labels. He does not allow his audience to forget that Verres is *audax atque amens,* and provides examples of this *audacia atque amentia* throughout the speeches.

This framework for considering Verres predisposes the audience to think about his aberrant, presumptuous behavior. Cicero constructs this characterization of Verres so that his audience can more easily determine that his behavior is not in keeping with the community's emotional apparatus, and so that they can therefore exclude him from the emotional community. The terms *audax atque amens,* however, are not precisely ridicule in that they do not invite derisive laughter, but they do indicate that Verres has stepped beyond the proper boundaries of his place in the emotional community. This contributes to the overall picture of Verres, combining with the ridicule described above and the label *ridiculus*. The *audax atque amens* Verres is one whose emotional apparatus is not the

same as that of the *domi* emotional community, so Verres himself no longer belongs in the emotional community.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have defined the membership of the *domi* emotional community and described its emotional apparatus. Using Cicero's prosecution against Verres, I have shown that the case provided Cicero with an opportunity to prove his membership in the community by arguing for Verres' unworthiness. Cicero's methods of ridicule included jokes and wordplay, invective, and speech acts; his attack against Verres was successful, as Verres fled from the emotional community, and Cicero gained instant notoreity and advancement in the community.

This measure of success – that Cicero used ridicule and emotions in his community to win the case against Verres and gain personal advancement – reflects the rather individual focus of the *domi* emotional community. Individual members perform their membership in the community by giving speeches in court, with the hope that their success in court would also entail advancement in their position in the community. This individual game is reflected in the discourse about the emotional community: Cicero describes how he is closer to the ideal member of the community than Caecilius is, and he attack Verres for being such a poor representative of the *domi* emotional apparatus. Cicero's own speeches promote his own interests in this community, unlike the Roman historians, whose depictions of the *militiae* emotional community played into broader arguments about the development of Rome.

Conclusion

This dissertation has focused on the ways that ridicule and emotion reveal the values, rules, and membership of Roman communities. Ridicule and emotion are both, at their core, evaluations or judgments of value. Ridicule in turn triggers a chain reaction of emotions that varies based on the community's rules of membership and the assessments of relative positions of power, and community members had to navigate these negotiations in order to maintain the structure of their community and their own personal positions.

Roman authors used emotion and ridicule in order to present the narrative that fit their own needs. Some, like the historians who described ridicule in the *militiae* emotional community, relied on ridicule's emotional toll on a community: Livy used it for his victory narrative, Vergil for his leading men, and Tacitus for both. These authors present the *militiae* emotional community experiencing ridicule, and recovering from it, together, perhaps following the example of leaders like Aeneas or Germanicus. On the other hand, members of the *domi* emotional community used ridicule for personal advancement in the community. As we saw in the discussion of Cicero's *In Verrem,* his argument in the Verrines can be reduced to his analyses of Caecilius and Verres as poor representatives of the emotional apparatus. As a result of these arguments, Cicero advances in the community, and Verres is removed. In each of these scenarios, we are able to understand the values and motivations of the emotional community by the reactions the members have when one of those valued items is harmed or diminished by ridicule.

There is much more to consider. To my knowledge, "emotional communities" have not been the subject of another work in Greek or Roman literature; there are, however, a growing number of monographs on emotions.[273] The benefit of studying the emotional apparatus of a community is to understand the implications and interactions of emotions within that specific community.

To that end, future study of individual emotional communities should prove beneficial to our understanding of the engagement between ancient Romans, their values and emotions, and their communities. Some literary genres that are most traditionally associated with ridicule have been left out of this study completely. In future projects, I would be interested to pay attention to some genres that are traditionally associated with ridicule, such as the satires of Horace or Juvenal. The studies of ridicule and the power of persuasion in satire[274] could be supplemented by a study of the emotions and values privileged most by Horace or by Juvenal, and an identification of who the members of that particular emotional community might be.[275] Further, work centered on the development of emotions in Catullus could complement, for example, Krostenko's study of community and the language of social performance.[276]

Smaller or more intimate emotional communities, especially featuring women or other marginalized members of society, might be found in Roman comedy or novel.

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273 These include Cairns 1993 on *aidos*; Braund and Gill 1997 on "the passions in Roman thought and literature;" Harris 2001 on rage; Kaster 2005 on *verecundia, pudor, paenitentia, invidia,* and *fastidium*; Konstan 2006 on "the emotions of the ancient Greeks;" Fulkerson 2014 on regret.

274 e.g. Bloom and Bloom 1981.

275 Or, if the emotional community has a population of one, i.e. Juvenal's *persona.*

276 Krostenko 2001.

Attention to multiple communities as represented by a single author could shed insight into the finer distinctions between communities: for example, we might consider Cicero's letter in light of his public speeches. Do the letters navigate a different kind of ridicule process, since they are addressed from Cicero to an individual, or does Cicero's intended publication of the letters mean that his ridicule works the same way in both genres? For that matter, do early Christians use ridicule in their letters and treatises in the same ways as Cicero, despite huge differences in their emotional communities?

This approach to understanding the emotions and communities of ancient Rome is very flexible, since each analysis begins with an understanding of the specific members and their emotional apparatus. In this consideration of ridicule and emotion, I hope to have identified a way of looking at texts that helps us to understand how Romans felt about themselves, each other, and the world around them, and how they have communicated that world to us.

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This dissertation was typed by the author.